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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem and Literature Review 
How to determine optimal policies for inspecting and/or replacing systems or 
components subject to failure is already an old problem. It is also an extensive 
and heterogeneous problem as it relates to many different areas where the nature 
of the component as well as the criteria of importance may vary a lot, e.g., nuclear 
engineering, electrical engineering, aerospace engineering, etc. Several books have 
been writen that try to present a" unified general view of the typical features of 
this problem, e.g., Jorgenson, McCall, and Radner (1967), Barlow and Proschan 
(1981), Anders (1990), etc. A very important case arises when one considers that 
the failure of the component results from the combination of fatigue, degradation 
and failure processes. Even in the more specific case where the level of degradation 
is defined as being the size of a crack which grows within the part of interest, the 
problem is involved and allows many approaches as testified in the very comprehensive 
compendium by Provan (1987). The complexity of the problem is due both to the 
number of parameters involved, and to their random nature. In effect, if the failure is 
a consequence of the development of a flaw (crack), within the structure of interest, 
many parameters will be required to describe 
• the failure state of the crack. 
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• the crack growth law, 
• the initial state of the crack, 
• the probability of detection when inspections are performed. 
As to the crack growth, for example, the best known fatigue crack growth model 
for components under dynamic loads is the Paris-Erdogan (1963) law, for which, 
even under well controlled crack growth experiments, the heterogeneity in material 
properties is the cause of a large statistical variability. Therefore, several approaches 
have been developed in order to include stochasticity in the growth model, mainly 
by considering a stochastic multiplicative factor in the right hand side of the Paris 
law equation, (see Yang and Donath (1983), Yang and Chen (1985), Provan (1987)). 
The failure state of the crack in the most sophisticated approaches considers the 
critical crack length (assuming len'gth is the parameter of prime importance) as a 
random variable with a distribution that is a function of material toughness distribu­
tion and stress distribution. Also, some models consider a random length initiation 
phase (where the crack has not formed yet), with a certain distribution, along with 
a Paris law growth model, Yang and Chen (1984, 1985). Reliability analysis based 
on a variety of assumptions/approaches have been made, e.g., Yang and Chen (1984, 
1985), with lognormal distribution for the time to crack initiation and a complex 
random multiplicative factor in Paris law conclude that the design life of a system 
can be improved while maintaining a low probability of failure if in-service inspec­
tions are used. Harris and Lim (1983) analyze a two dimensional model of the crack 
as it is growing. Under certain assumptions, they relate the hazard functions with 
and without inspections and find them independent of the initial crack size distri­
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bution. Recently, the probabilistic finite element method has been applied to the 
fatigue reliability problem concluding that only the upper part of the initial crack 
length probability distribution has an important effect on the reliability of a system 
submitted to nondestructive evaluations, Harkness, Belytschko, Liu, (1991). 
1.2 Explanation of Dissertation Format 
This dissertation consists of three papers suitable for publication. A general 
summary follows the last paper, and references cited in the general introduction are 
given after the general summary. In the first paper, a fatigue reliability model is 
considered where the crack growth obeys a Paris-Erdogan law with non stochastic 
parameters. Expressions are derived for the service life length probability distribution 
under nondestructive inspections of the component. Some figures of merit are ana­
lyzed with an emphasis on the hazard function. A program in the S-plus language, 
interfaced with Fortran computational routines is developed so that crack growth, 
time to failure distribution and hazard function can be calculated and plotted. 
The second paper generalizes the model in the first paper by considering a general 
degradation problem where several parameters are allowed to be random and where 
inspections are scheduled dynamically, on the basis of both the current observations 
of the component, and some reliability criterion to be satisfied. 
The third paper is devoted to the development of a computer code that gen­
eralizes the one used in the first paper by considering a degradation process with 
a random initial level of degradation distribution and such that the degradation 
growth obeys a specified law (e.g., the Paris-Erdogan growth law). The growth law 
parameters are random, and follow a given bivariate probability distribution. Service 
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life length distribution and hazard function are calculated and plotted so that the 
behavior of these functions and the effect on them of modifying some parameters 
may be assessed both numerically and graphically. Numerical examples are given for 
crack growth degradation cases where the Paris parameters distribution is a bivariate 
normal. 
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PAPER I. 
A RELIABILITY MODEL FOR PLANNING IN-SERVICE 
INSPECTIONS FOR COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO FATIGUE 
FAILURE 
6 
ABSTRACT 
A probabilistic model and a computer code are developed for the fatigue relia­
bility and cost analysis of components subject to periodic nondestructive inspections. 
In this first model, only two variables are considered random, the initial crack size 
and the observed size of the crack at inspection. Several figures of merit are obtained 
including the hazard function, an approximation of the cost per unit of service time, 
and the mean time between failures. A numerical example is given where inspections 
are scheduled so that the hazard function is kept below a prefixed value. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
When components of a machine, or a system, subject to fatigue^ develop a flaw 
whose growth could lead to failure, two main strategies exist in order to handle the 
problem of controlling reliability. 
1. One may decide on theoretical or practical grounds that the component will 
be retired from service at a fixed predetermined time. Of course, this horizon 
time, also called design life, is chosen so that the probability of an in-service 
failure is acceptably low. This policy, standard for components requiring de­
structive inspections, is still often in use. It is inefficient in the sense that many 
components are retired while they could stay safely in-service for a much longer 
time. 
2. Recent developments in Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) give the opportunity 
to inspect parts and determine if they should be retired from service or if they 
could safely remain until the next inspection. This, of course, depends on some 
criteria as to what safe means. 
It is therefore of interest to study the possible properties and advantages of such 
nondestructive inspections, e.g., how NDE can improve the cost per unit of time 
while maintaining an adequate level of reliability. 
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General treatments of this problem, with different approaches, may be found in a 
number of books , e.g., Jorgenson, McCall, and Radner (1967), Barlow and Proschan 
(1981), Anders (1990), etc. 
Harris and Lim (1983), develop a mathematical expression for the ratio of the 
failure rates (hazard functions) with and without inspections, that turns out to be 
independent of the initial crack size distribution under certain assumptions. These 
failure rates are actually equivalent to the continuous part of the service life length 
probability distribution of the component, due to their approximation that the sur­
vival function is 1 in all cases (both with and without inspections). Their argument, is 
based on an iterative use of the probability transformation method that matches the 
crack depth distribution immediately following an inspection to the crack depth dis­
tribution right before the next inspection, with a final match from the last inspection 
to the failure time axis. 
Yang and Chen (1984, 1985) develop a fairly genereil model with somewhat 
different assumptions as to the initial crack size distribution and the crack growth 
law. Their model considers à special probability distribution for the time to crack 
initiation. Then, they perform a cost/risk analysis based on the optimization of 
the RFC life-cycle cost saving for one component, under the restriction that the 
unconditional probability of failure of this component during the design life of the 
engine (system) is smaller than an acceptable value. For that purpose, they obtain in 
p a r t i c u l a r  a n  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  r e j e c t i n g  a  c o m p o n e n t  a t  i n s p e c t i o n  j ,  
G{j) in their notation. As to the gravity of failure for the cost expectation calculation, 
safe failures are considered, i.e, failures are not catastrophic, and the engine keeps on 
working until the failure is detected at the next inspection. 
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Harris and Lim (1983) deal successively with stochasticity on one and two initial 
crack parameters. A random variable is also introduced in the crack growth law in 
order to take in account the variability in the crack growth characteristics. The same 
growth law describes the evolution of the crack during all its service life. Yang and 
Chen handle the variability of the crack growth in a similar way, i.e., using a random 
multiplicative factor in the equation for the speed of growth, but they consider a one 
•dimensional crack model. 
Actually, all of the many parameters in this problem could be considered random, 
at least theoretically. However, in this paper, stochasticity will be present only in 
the size of the crack when the component starts its service life and in the detection 
of the crack when performing an inspection. 
Both the failure time density of Harris and Lim and the probability of rejection 
at inspection of Yang and Chen are derived here with a straight (non iterative) ar­
gument based on a generalization of the basic probabiHty transformation method. 
Failure time density and probabilities of rejection are necessary inputs in the further 
computation of the hazard function and the approximate cost per unit of service 
time. The cumulative distribution function of the service life length with inspections 
is established and expressed in terms of its equivalent without inspections so that 
the exact expression of the hazard functions ratio is obtained. The expected service 
life length and cost are established and expressed as a sum of terms corresponding 
respectively to the effects of horizon, inspections and their interaction. A numerical 
example using data from Lu and Meeker (1993) shows how inspections may be opti­
mized so that the hazard function does not exceed a critical level and the number of 
inspections is minimized. 
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2. TERMINOLOGY AND NOTATIONS 
This section presents the most important initials and terms used in the paper, 
followed by a list of mathematical notations. 
2.1 Terminology 
• NDE stands for "nondestructive evaluation" , inspections performed on a com­
ponent in order to detect, or measure, a flaw within the component, and which 
do not harm the component. 
• POD stands for "probability of detection", the conditional probability to ob­
serve a crack given its actual size. 
• RFC stands for "retirement for cause" , the decision to retire a component from 
service on the basis of what was observed at an inspection. 
• K a component is removed because it reached the horizon, it is "retired". 
• If a component is removed because an inspection decided so, it is "rejected". 
• If a component is removed because it has failed, it is a "failed" component. 
• The term "removed" is used in a general sense. Either retired, rejected, or 
failed, the component in the model is "removed". 
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• ESLL stands for "expected service life length", the average time a component 
will stay in-service until removed. 
• ESLC stands for "expected service life cost", the average cost associated to a 
component. 
•  C u  stands for "cost per unit of time". It is defined as the ratio of ESLL to 
ESLC. 
• MTBF stands for "mean time between failure", the elapsed time between fail­
ures observed on successive components . 
• The points in time where an inspection may be performed are referred to as 
"inspection opportunities", or simply, "opportunities". 
• An inspection scheme is a set. of points in time where inspections will be per­
formed. 
• Conditional on failure, we speak of "failure service life". 
• Conditional on rejection at inspection, we speak of "rejection service life". 
Also, we will follow the standard procedure of having capital letters denote 
random variables, and lower case letters denote the realizations of these random 
variables. 
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2.2 Notations 
.4q: The initial crack size at service time zero, a random variable. 
Cp: Cost of a failure. 
C j :  Cost for an inspection. 
Cost of a replacement at inspection or horizon. 
A: The time interval between inspections opportunities. 
E { i ) :  Expected number of inspections. 
/Ao(^o): The p.d.f. of Aq. 
QT The failure time probability density. 
q T  i { t ) :  A function such that the probability to fail in the interval 
(ti,T2) C is given by 
P r { r i  < T < t 2 ) =  f  g j ' : i t ) d t ,  
n  
where the last inspection is at 
gj" l(t): The continuous p a r t  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e  l i f e  l e n g t h  ( T )  
probability distribution, i.e., a function such that the 
probability of failure in the interval (, rg) C (0,i^) 
is given by 
^2 
fr(failure m(T]^,r2)) = J" 
whatever the scheme of inspections. 
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n  : The number of inspections in the inspection 
scheme with a horizon. 
^max • The number of inspection opportunities. 
The probability of rejecting at inspection k  
a  c o m p o n e n t  t h a t  w o u l d  f a i l  a t  t i m e  t .  
Pj^: Probability that a component will end up rejected. 
P p :  Probability that a component will end up failing. 
Pff: Probability that a component will reach 
horizon. 
P(ij) =  P r { T  =  t j ) :  The discrete part of the service life length 
distribution, i.e., the probabiUty for the part 
t o  b e  r e j e c t e d  a t  i n s p e c t i o n  i .  
P^i^-i-l) : The probability to observe a failure in the 
interval 
The rejection region for the observed crack 
size at inspection time I. 
tfj: The component horizon time, a predetermined 
time such that the component is automatically 
retired from service when reaching tff. 
tj = jjA: The time of inspection i,(An integer 
multiple of A by definition). 
T: A random variable representing service life 
length, i.e., time the part will be in-service. 
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3. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The different features of the model are now presented with details. 
We assume that the fatigue of the component is well described by following only 
one crack. The component starts its service life with a crack of random size. Then, 
the crack grows deterministically until the component is retired from service. This 
may happen because the crack reaches a failure size and failure occurs, or because 
a crack is observed at some inspection and the component replaced, or because the 
component has reached its horizon time and is retired. A detailed account of the 
model assumptions is given now. 
Initial crack size distribution: The component under analysis has a 
known crack size probability distribution as it comes from a preservice inspec­
tion. If there is no preservice inspection, the distribution describes the initial 
crack size probability distribution at service time zero. This distribution de­
scribes unit to unit variability. Typically, the entire distribution falls below a 
threshold where cracks can be detected by standard inspection methods. 
Crack growth model: The evolution of a crack follows a known deterministic curve, 
e.g., Paris law, while the component is in-service. Therefore, the size of the crack 
is perfectly defined by specifying its starting size ag and the elapsed in-service 
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time (g. Thus, the size a  of the crack at any time is given by 
a  =  a(ao,(g). (3.1) 
In particular, at inspection time t j ,  the actual crack size a  is given by <Z(<ZQ, t j ) .  
Horizon time: Time when a component is retired from service, even if a crack 
has not been detected. We consider here that if the component belongs to 
a system having its own design life (horizon), either this horizon is infinitely 
large compared to the one of the component or the component is removed from 
the system and installed into another system when the system breaks/reaches 
its horizon. Note that we also assume implicitly the lack of damage, on the 
component due to a major failure elsewhere in the system. 
Inspection times: At times A, 2A, 3A... where A is constant, inspections may be 
performed in order to measure the present size of the crack. 
An inspection scheme is a set of points in time where inspections will be 
performed. For a model with a finite horizon, there is a maximum number 
nmax of points available for inspections i.e., A, 2A, ...,n,max^- Thus we have 
^"max^ ^ ^T^maxj ^^maxj _ available inspection schemes. 
For a given horizon time and its corresponding nmax, the total number of 
i n s p e c t i o n s  i n  t h e  i n s p e c t i o n  s c h e m e  o f  o u r  c h o i c e  i s  d e n o t e d  n ,  
n 6 {0,1, ...ramax}? ^max < co­
in the no horizon model, rem ax = oo- However, it is assumed that the total 
number n of inspections in the inspection scheme may not be taken as oo. This 
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comes from the fact that it is meaningless to schedule inspections beyond a 
point in time where the probability to see the component is negligible. 
Here n € {0,1, ...,nmax}, «max = «3. 
Inspection scheme: The inspection scheme may be prespecified, i.e., inspections 
are scheduled at fixed points in time (opportunities), and the different figures 
of merit calculated for that scheme, or inspections are scheduled so that their 
number is minimized and the hazard function does not cross a given critical 
level. 
Probability of rejection and POD: Let us consider the probability Pj{aQ) of re­
jecting at inspection time tj a component with initial crack size cq. Generally 
speaking, a component will be rejected and removed if its observed crack size 
falls in a rejection region R, .typically defined by being larger than a critical 
acceptance/rejection level ac- Therefore, if we let f{a* | a) denote the proba­
bility density of the observed crack size a* conditional on its actual value a, we 
have 
oo 
• f j (ao) =  j  /(«* I a(ao, t j ) ) d a * .  
a c  
For convenience, a *  at t j  is denoted a J and its probabihty density conditional 
on CQ is written as f{a*j | cq). Hence, the necessary input for the calculation 
of the probabilities of rejection is /(a* | a). 
However, notice that if we set ac = 0 in the above formula, Pj{aQ) becomes 
the probability to observe a crack of any size, i.e., to detect a crack. Thus, the 
POD is just a special case of POR, where the component is rejected for any 
value of the observed crack size. Of course, the POD could be obtained from 
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the previous integral formula if /(a* | a) were available but the converse is not 
true, i.e., if the POD is provided as a basic input, f{a* | a) is not retrievable, 
and the unique ac value we can handle is 0. 
Failures: Different types of failure may be considered, e.g., safe failures or catas­
trophic failures (Young (1984)). The assumption made here, necessary for the 
calculation of the expectations, is that failures are either catastrophic for the 
system and therefore lead to an immediate end of life, or failures are detected 
when they occur but are not catastrophic and the component is removed at the 
end of the cycle where the failure happened. In the latter case, the length of the 
cycle is considered small with respect to the inspection opportunities spacing, 
so that failure time and service life length are taken as approximately equal. 
Costs; Three types of costs are assumed here: 
• Cost for performing an inspection. 
• Cost for replacing a component that has been rejected at inspection. 
• Cost for replacing a component that has failed. 
It is assumed that each time a component is replaced another new component 
is put into service in identical condition. 
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4. PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION OF THE SERVICE LIFE 
LENGTH T 
The service life may end upon rejection at the discrete points in time corre­
sponding to inspections/horizon or, continuously upon failure at any point between 
two successive inspections. We proceed here to determine the expressions of the 
discrete and continuous part of the service life length (T) probability distribution 
associated with these events. 
4.1 Continuous Part of the T Distribution 
4.1.1 Without Inspection 
By putting a  =  a  j  and = t in  (3.1), CQ may be viewed as a monotonically de­
creasing function of the failure time t. To avoid excess of notation and to keep in mind 
the variables we are dealing with, ag, the function of failure time is denoted aQ(t). 
We present now intuitively what is actually a case of the probability transformation 
method. This intuitive argument will be extended in further developments. 
If there are no inspections, and no horizon, the probability distribution of T is 
simply a probability density for failure time. It is given by the following relationship; 
19 
t  E (0,oo) 
(4.1) 
0 otherwise. 
This may be interpreted as follows: for a small interval Ac q  on the <i q  vertical axis, 
the probability of having an initial crack size in the interval ACQ is roughly 
On the other hand, due to the deterministic crack growth in the model, the probability 
of failure in an interval At is also roughly gj< where At is the map of ACQ 
on the ay hne. However, we may not equate the two previous expressions without 
taking care of the fact that as oq increases, t decreases. See Figure 1. This leads to 
4.1.2 With Inspection 
When n  inspections are performed, the CDF of the random variable T has a 
continuous part in the segments i=0,l,2,...,n and a discrete part at t^, 
i=l,2,...,n and t f f ,  i.e., the set of values of T may be partitioned into values associated 
with failure (the open intervals) and values associated with rejection at inspection or 
retirement at horizon (the ends of intervals). 
/4o('^o)^^0' ao G Aag. 
or 
For infinitesimal amounts is equivalent to 
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Let's define a function g j '  j { t )  such that the probability of failure in the interval 
1. For a horizon model with a total of n  inspections, the notations 
and (g = 0 are used. 
2. Due to the above property, g j<  j { t )  is handled as a "probability density for fail­
ure time." (The subscript I emphasizes the presence of inspection.) Clearly, it 
is not a proper probability density since gj'jit) integrates to the total prob­
ability of failure which is not one. A similar remark applies to gj' jyj when 
there is a finite horizon. 
In order to determine the expression of g^p  j { t ) ,  we define another function g j '  
in the following manner. The probability of failure in any interval C 
with no inspection later than is given by 
^2 
Pr(failure in(r2,T2)) = j 
n  
Then, g j<  ^ (i) is obtained by a slight modification of (4.1). 
The new formula is 
(ri,r2) C (0,ijy) is given by 
^2 
Pr( failure in(Tj^,r2)) = j g j j { t )d t .  
n  
Note: 
0 otherwise 
where 
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• Pi{t) is the probability to reject at inspection I a component that would fail at 
time t. See Figure 2. 
• Pq(^) = 0 by definition. 
And so 
gr j i t )  = \  
0 otherwise. 
Intuitively, g j<^{ t ) \A t \ ,  the approximate probability to fail in |Ai|, has to be 
equated to the probability /^Q(ao)iAaol to start in the right ag zone, that one 
reaching |Ai|, multiplied by the probability to pass ail inspections on the way, i.e, 
[1-pl(0] •••[!-
This yields 
nrr ,  • ( t \  l A M  =  f  |Ail = /^Q(ao) l^®ol 11 
/=0 
The intuitive step from this to (4.2) is the same limit argument as for (4.1). 
4.2 Discrete Part of the T Distribution (Inspections) 
The probability that a component starting its service at f = 0 will be rejected 
at inspection i is given by: 
oo 
Pi ^ i )  = =  t j ) =  J  d t  i = l,2,...n, (4.3) 
h  
and f((g) = 0 by definition. 
In tu i t i ve  approach- .  In order to be rejected at inspection i ,  a component needs to 
reach this inspection. But the probability to have a component reaching w^ithin the 
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AA^- map of ACQ (See Figure 2), is equal to the probability of reaching (and therefore 
faihng in) the At map of ACQ when inspection i is not performed, i.e., 
So the approximate probabihty to reach within Aa^ and be rejected at is the 
product 
i € a i .  
Finally, all cracks able to fail in some At  after t ^  (and only those cracks) may be 
rejected at This implies that the probability to be rejected at t^ is of the form 
all AO 
or, switching to the integral by a limiting (Af 0) Riemann argument: 
t> t^  
which is (4.3). 
Proofs of (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) may be found in the appendix (Sections 10.1 and 
10.2). 
4.3 Discrete Part of the T Distribution (Horizon) 
4.3.1 With Inspections 
Let Pf f . j  denote the probability to reach the horizon in the presence of, say, n  
inspections. From (4.2), ^{ t )  is the continuous (failure) part of the end of service 
oo 
life probability distribution after the last (nth) inspection, therefore / g j<  ^ {u )  du  is 
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the probability to fail later than t  >  tn -  Moreover, all the components that would end 
their service life after tjj are censored at tg, so that Pjj.j is equal to the probability 
of theoretical failure later than tjj. This leads to 
CO 
=  ^ H ) =  J  9 T , n i ^ )  ( 4 . 4 )  
4.3.2 Without Inspections 
Of course, the probability to reach the horizon when no inspections are performed 
is given by 
oo 
= / 9T ,Nl i ^ )  
obtained by putting n = 0 in (4.4), and noticing that gj'q  is equivalent to 9x NI-
Also, Pff.j is obviously equal to minus the probability that components 
heading to fail after the horizon are rejected at some inspections, i.e., 
n  
Ph- I  =  PH;NI~H J  ^ = 0,1,2, ..../Zmax-
/=0 t f f  
See appendix (Section 10.4). Finally, thanks to the notations and definitions at initial 
Vcilues, formula (4.3) in section 4.2 may be extended and include the results of section 
4.3, i.e., consider 
oo 
= y  i = o, i ,...,7i +1. 
k  
If we define Pji+iii) = 1 by thinking of the horizon as a special inspection where the 
probability to reject the component equals 1 then, for i = n + 1, we have 
-P(^7i-{-l) = particular 
PH- ,n i  = Pih)  
oo 
= j 
h  
oo 
= / 9T ,Nl i ^ )  d t -
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5. COST AND LENGTH EXPECTATIONS FOR A SERVICE LIFE 
5.1 Expected Service Life Cost (ESLC)  
The average cost per component during service life is obtained by conditioning 
the cost (C) expectations over .the type of event (rejection, failure, horizon) at the 
end of the service life. 
Thus, the expected service life cost ESLCj j  j  may be obtained from 
ESLCj j  j  =  Pr(rejection)E(C [rejection) + (5.1) 
Pr(failure)E(C [failure) + 
Pr(horizon)(E(C [horizon). 
For each event, costs are straightforward: 
1. Conditional on a service life ending by rejection at inspection i, the cost is 
CR + iCj. Cji is the cost of replacement for a rejected (not failed) component, 
i is the number of inspections that were performed and Cj the cost assumed 
constant for any of these inspections. This total rejection cost is associated to 
the probability P{t^) to be rejected at 
2. Conditional on a service life ending by failure between inspections i  and i  + 1, 
the cost is Cp 4- iCj with similar notation and argument. This total failure 
26 
cost is associated to the probability 
^i+l 
k  
to fail within 
3. Conditional on a service life ending at horizon, the cost is Cj^  -f nCj  where n 
is the total number of inspections in the component design life. This cost is of 
course associated to the probability to reach tjj i.e., Pff.j = 
Therefore, equation (5.1) becomes 
ESLCg,  =  ' t l< .CR +  iC! )P{ t i )+  •  (5.2) 
t=0 
{Cp  +  iC j )Pm, t i ^ i ) ]  +  
{Cj i  +  nCj )P{ tn+i ) .  
This expectation can be partitioned so that the effect of the different types of in-
service intervention (horizon, inspections, horizon and inspections) on the component 
are clearly related to costs. 
First, (5.2) is rearranged as 
n  
ESLCj j  j  =  Cp  ^  (5-3 )  
2 = 0 
C g | z % )  +  f ( W i ) |  +  
C/  I  Ê  i lP{ t i )  +  Pi t i :  f i+1  )]  +  nP( t„+i  )  I  ,  
where the first term of (5.3) is recognized as the probability for a component to end 
up with failure (i^) in presence of horizon and inspections Pf-ffj and the 
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bracket in the second term as the probability for a component to end up with rejection 
{R) in presence of horizon (if): Pji-ff, or at the horizon in presence of inspections; 
Pr-J- The bracket in the third term represents the expected number of inspections 
on a component in presence of horizon: These notations are for the general 
model both with horizon and inspections. In the following, if one of these features is 
absent, say horizon, it will be emphasized by putting an N before the corresponding 
subscript, i.e., NH. With these notations, we have 
ESLCf f i  =  CpPp . f f j  +  Cj i iP j i . f f  + Pf f . j )  + CjEf f i i ) ,  
and from P f;H .I  + PR ;H + P h-,I  = 
ESLChj  =  Cf  +  {Cj i  -  Cp){Pj i . j j  +  Pf f . j )  +  CjEf f i i ) .  (5.4) 
Finally, using 
PR;H =  PR;NH- iPR- ,NH -  PR;H)  
PH;I  =  PH;NI  -  (PR^NI  -
Ef f { i )  =  Ep f f j { i ) - {E j^ j j { i ) -
ESLCj j  J  may be rewritten as 
ESLCj j j  =  Cp  (5.5a) 
- {Cp  -  Cj i )P f f . ^ j  (5.5b) 
- {Cp  -  Cj i )P j i . ^ f f  + CjE^ j j { i )  (5.5c) 
[Cp  -  Cj i )  ( {Pr .nh  -  PR;H)  +  (5-5d)  
- %;/)) - ^ liENHii) " 
Let us consider several special cases of this formula. 
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• For the no horizon/no inspections design, the right hand term reduces, logically, 
to since , Pjj. , E,{i) are all 0. 
ESLCNH-NI  =  Cf  
• For the horizon/no inspections scheme, = E^i) = 0 and Pf f . j  =  
Thus the right hand side reduces to 
ESLCj j .N i  =  ^ F -  i ^F  -
This means that (5.5b) is accounting for the effect of an horizon alone. Term 
(5.5b) stipulates that the fraction Pjj.j\[j of the components that reaches the 
horizon will be removed at the horizon instead of failing and thus will have its 
assoc ia t ed  cos t  r educed  f rom Cjp  t o  Cj^ .  
• For the no horizon/inspections scheme, 
PH; .  =  0, PR;NH =  PR;H^  
Thus the right hand side reduces to 
ESLC^H;!  =  ^ F -  (Cf  -  CR)PR-NH 
This means that (5.5c) is accounting for the effect of inspections alone. Term 
(5.5c) says that the fraction Pji-^jj of the components removed at inspections 
will have its associated cost reduced from Cp to Cj^, but this reduction is done 
a t  the  cos t  o f  in spec t ions  CjE] \^ j j { i ) .  
• Finally, in the general scheme of horizon/inspections, we have (5.5a) -f (5.5b) 
+ (5.5c) + (5.5d) where (5.5d) accounts for the interaction between horizon 
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and inspections. Formula (5.5d) shows that components rejected after the 
new scheduled horizon and components rejected while they would reach the 
horizon are counted twice in (5.5b) and (5.5c). Of course, the general hori­
zon / inspec t ions  expec ted  cos t  i s  be t t e r  wr i t t en  a s  (5 .4 ) .  S ince  we  expec t  Cp 
to be larger than Cjj, the effect of horizon and inspections is readily seen to 
decrease the expected cost unless inspections costs are too large. 
The expected service life length is obtained by partitioning the end of service 
life as was done in the previous chapter for ESLC. Thus, 
• If a service life ends due to rejection at inspection z, its length is and this 
happens with probability P{ti), 
• If the service life ends due to failure somewhere between and say at i, 
it is associated to the continuous part of the service life probability distribution 
As ESLC, ESLL may be partitioned in terms representing the effects of the horizon 
and/or inspections on the component service life, namely 
oo 
5.2 Expected Service Life Length [ESLL)  
• If the service life ends at the horizon ijy, the associated probability is Pj j . j  
So we have 
ESLLj j j  =  J 
0 
(5.7a) 
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oo 
~ J (5.7b) 
UN H y  
~  Y .  f 9T , i - l i ^ )P i {^ ) i ^ -k ) ' ^ ^  (5.tc) 
1=0 t: 
unh oo 
i=n+lf. 
n 
+ S / 9Ti - l ( i )P i { t ) ( t - tg ) i i .  
-'4 
Note: 
1. A derivation of (5.7) is given in appendix (Section 10.5). 
2. n  /yjy is the number of inspections in the no-horizon scheme. When adding t j j  
somewhere to this scheme, the total number of inspections in the new scheme 
i s  r educed  to  n .  
3. The notation = tjj has to be handled with care; in an expression referring 
to a no horizon scheme, represents the time where the (n + l)th inspection 
takes place. 
Terms (5.7a), (5.7b), (5.7c), and (5.7d), are to ESLL what (5.5a), (5.5b), (5.5c), and 
(5.5d) were to ESLC. They account respectively for 
• the expected service life length in the no horizon and no inspections scheme, 
ESLLnh ,NI^  
• the effect of an horizon alone; i.e., all components that would fail after the 
horizon, say at t, have now a service life T = tjj, so that is 
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reduced by the average o i t  -  t j j ,  
• the effect of inspections alone, i.e., all components that are rejected at inspection 
i and would have failed at t have their service life length reduced by f 
• the interaction horizon/inspections which takes care of the fact that components 
removed both at horizon and inspections are counted twice. 
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6. FIGURES OF MERIT 
Depending on the nature of the system/component, different figures of merit can 
be used for measuring the effects of horizon and/or inspections on the component 
reliability. Typically, if a very high reliability is expected, i.e., an extremely low 
probability for failure, the mean time between two successive failures is not as good an 
indicator of reliability as the hazard function. In what follows, we consider a variety 
of figures of merit, probably not all suitable for the same type of system/component. 
Let the cumulative distribution function of a component service life length in a 
horizon/inspections scheme be denoted by Fj j{t). Then, we have 
6.1 CDF of the Service Life Length T 
0 ( < (g 
t  
j = 0 tq 
1 
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t  i—1 ^ j4 - l  
where the short notation f du stands for ^ f  g A u )  d u  
tQ  '  j=0  t j  
t  
+  j  g j ' ^ j ^^u )  du .  may interestingly be partitioned as follows 
0 t< tQ 
k  
I oo 
^t,iv/(^)+ u<i< (6.1) 
1 ^ > ^n+1 
where i  =  0,1,.. .n and /j- is the CDF with no inspections. Formula (6.1) is 
derived in appendix (Section 10.3). This formula makes clear the fact that compo­
nents removed before ( in a scheme with inspections are of two types 
1. components that would reach failure before t  represented by Fy 
2. components that would fail after t ,  but are rejected at some inspection before 
t, represented by the summation. 
It will be convenient to let Pji{t) denote the probability for a component heading to 
fail after t to be rejected at any of the i inspections before t, i.e., 
j=0  t  
where < t  <  i  =  0, 1 , . . . , re, and J^_L2(-) = 1 .  Note also that compo­
nents heading to fail before t  and that are rejected at an inspection (before t )  plus 
componen t s  tha t  do  fa i l  be fo re  t  a re  exac t ly  a s soc ia t ed  to  the  p robab i l i ty  Fj< 
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6.2 Approximate Cost per Unit of Service Time 
By stopping the component life at the horizon or after an inspection, the cost of 
failure is replaced by a replacement/inspections cost. However, the expected service 
life length of the component is also decreased so that a standardized measure of 
improvement is necessary. A common one is to approximate the cost per unit of 
time, denoted Cu,  by making use of the fact that the average long-run cost per unit 
of service time is asymptotically equal to the ratio of expected cost to expected service 
p  c  T n  
time, i.e., Cu =  £$11 ,  •  See for example Gertsbakh (1989). For example, if we want 
to determine the influence of inspections on the model with a horizon, Cu^ j will 
be compared to Cujj and we may call improvement 
6.3 Cumulative Failure Probability 
Let G g j ( t ]  denote the probability that the component fails before f in a general 
horizon/inspections scheme. It is easy to express this probability in terms of the 
equivalent probability in a no inspections scheme which is, of course Fji For 
ti < t < z = 0,1,...,ra, we have 
j=0 
which becomes, using formulae 4.3 and 6.1 
i  oo  ^  oo  
;=o t  
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i  i  
= ^T ,N iW -Ï2 f 
j=Ot j  
The last summation represents the effect of inspections on the cumulative fail­
ure probab i l i ty ,  i . e . ,  componen t s  head ing  to  fa i l  be fo re  t  and  re j ec ted  a t  any  o f  t he  i  
inspections before t are substracted from Fj- The effects on the failure prob­
ability improvement due to modifications in the key ingredients: initial crack size, 
crack growth law, POD, and inspections scheme can be analyzed in this formula. 
6.4 Hazard Function 
We may also be interested in the conditional probability for failure given that the 
component has not been replaced (including failure and rejection through inspection), 
that is, the hazard function. 
Let (ri,T2) C then 
Pr(failure in (rj,72)[component was not replaced at or before r^) 
_ Pr(failure in (tj,T2)) 
Pr(component was not replaced at or before 
Pr(service life ends in(r|^, r2)due to failure) 
Pr(service life ends after rj) 
^2 
1 - fj'jiri) 
T2  gT j { i )d i  
T i l -FTj iT iY  
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So we define 
(6.2) 
as the "hazard function" at ( E (if, i = 0,..., re. 
Note that Formula (6.2) defines a hazard function that has the probabilis­
tic/physical meaning of the usual hazard function, but it is special in the sense that 
its denominator is not the integral of the numerator from t to oo. Another equivalent 
and possibly convenient formula, is 
Xj{ t )  =  oo 
/  g j '  - {u )du  
t  
for t  e (if, if-j-i). Again, this formula looks familiar, however ^ { f )  is not a proba­
bility density. 
Now, by substituting (4.1) into (4.2) 
i  
/=0 
and, substituting (6.1) and (6.3) in (6.2), we have: 
(6.3) 
Xj{ t )  =  
n [1 - •p/(0] 
z=0 
1 - -^r,iv/(^) - ^ (0 ' i f  i  ^  i f _ l _ 2 ,  z  —  0 , 1 , . . . , 7 2  
0 Otherwise. 
Let us denote the failure rate in the no inspection case by Then 
1 
0 < i < i H 
Otherwise 
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c i  1 — F' t j\ rT{ t )  
So, for i  =  0,1,.... n 
—  t i < t <  ti+i 
(6.4) 
0 otherwise 
and we may measure the benefit of the inspection scheme by comparing \j with 
Xni-
Remark: 
1. When dealing with very high reliability components, one expects Fy ,y/ a-nd 
even Fy j to be very small with respect to one, thus, both the numerator and 
the denominator of the ratio of survival functions in (6.4) may be approximated 
by 1 and the ratio itself is approximately 1, Harris and Lim (1983). 
However, even for very small values of Fp jyj, Fy j could be considerably larger 
than 0 if the reliability criterion to be met were very strict and implied a very 
tough rejection criterion, i.e., many components heading to fail later than tjj 
would be rejected at inspections prior to t due to the severity of the rejection 
criterion, therefore increasing This increase is also dependent on the 
failure probability distribution g j<  ^ { t )  so that each case should be considered 
separately. Typically, if comparing gj' iit) with a narrow mode right after tjj 
to gj' ^-(i) with the same narrow mode far ahead of F^(() will obviously 
be larger in the former case than in the latter. Hence, the rejection criterion 
and the set of parameters involved in the shape of g/j^ ^(t) determine the value 
of which can theoretically approach 1. Even if one does not expect such 
extreme values in practice, we have that for these cases where the probabilities 
of rejection become large and decrease the product in (6.4), the ratio of survival 
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functions will increase and work the opposite way. 
2. If we are not dealing with very high reliability components, i.e., possibly large 
values of Fj< for large values of i, and if we need to guarantee more reliability 
by using inspections, then P^{t) will be large and the same comments as in the 
previous remark apply. The shape of grp is not as important as in remark 
1) since a high percentage of components is supposed here to have failure times 
smaller than 
3. When approximating the ratio of survival functions by 1, the improvement 
of the hazard function due to inspections is simply measured by the product 
i  
n [1 — Pl{i)]- Based on this, Harris and Lim (1983) comment that the im-
Z=0 
provement due to inspections is independent of the initial crack size distribution. 
We observe, however, that P;(T) depends on the initial crack size OQ SO that 
for different values of ag the improvement due to inspections is different. This 
observation suggests as a more satisfying description of the improvement the 
i  
use of the expected improvement of the hazard function where H [1 — is 
Z=0 
weighted by the probability density 
4. Finally, it is worth noticing that if the ratio in (6.4) is to be taken in account, 
the improvement due to inspections is not independent any more of the initial 
crack size distribution, for P^{t) does depend on /^Q(ao(0)-
6.5 Mean Time between Failures 
A comparison may also be done for the expected times between failure with and 
without inspections. It is worth recalling that we are dealing with in-service times 
39 
The time until failure is the time until the first service life that will end due to 
failure plus the length of this "failure service life". 
Let M be the number of service lives previous to the first failure service life. 
Let T]\fjr. be the random length of the ith nonfailure service life. 
Let Tf  he  the random length of the failure service life. 
Then the random time between failure is given by 
M 
i l  Tn f -  +  ' ^F  1 
i= l  :  
T bf = 
M = 0  
and, the mean time between failure conditional on the value of M by 
M E(T'^JR') + E (T^) M > 1  
H'^BF i •^) = 
M = 0 
thus 
Finally, 
i m) = £(7^-) + me(t/v^) m = 0, 1 , —  
MTBF =  EMI^T^F I M)]  = E^[E(T^)] + E(%p)Ej^(Af) 
and, so 
MTBF =  E{M)E{TJ^F)  +  E( î» -
M, the random number of service lives before a failure service life is clearly 
geometric. Thus, 
VxiM =  m)  =  {1  — P jp )  Pp  M = 0,1,... PJ? € (0,1) 
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and 
E(M) = ^ - 1, 
F 
where Pp is the probability for a service life to be a failure service life. 
One notices that the formula for the expected value of service lives before the 
failure service life is valid also for Pp = 1, i.e., when no inspections and no horizon 
take place. Consequently, we write 
MTBF = ( ^  -  + Wf )  
which covers all inspection-horizon schemes. 
Expression for E{Tf ) :  E{Tp)  is the expected length of the service life conditional 
on failure . The "probability density" for failure time is given by gj' j{t) and 
so the conditional (on failure) probability density for failure time is 
and 
E(Tr) = J 
0 
Expression for E{Tj \ ^p ) :  E{T j \ j -p )  is the expected length of the service life condi­
tional on rejection or retirement (no failure). Now, the unconditional probabil­
ity for rejection at is f ((^), the unconditional probability for retirement at tff 
is P{tff), and the probability for a nonfailure service life is 1 — Pp. Thus, the 
probability for rejection and for retirement conditional on a nonfailure service 
life are respectively 
p ' ( t i )  = p j t j )  
1  — Pp 
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^ 
so that 
e(^ivf) = kP ' i k )  +  
i=Q 
We have finéilly the general formula: 
MTBFf f  j  = |— - l |  -r J t g j ,  j { t }d t .  
MTBFf f  J  is simply related to the expected service life length so that it can easily 
be evaluated if ESLL is available. In effect, 
MTBFf f j  =  —(1  -  Pf )E iTp fp )  +E{Tp}  
with usual notations. 
Let's consider now the different possible interventions on the process. 
no horizon-no inspections: MTBFj^g  is obtained by doing 
^  V im^  MTBF 
oo 
= J tgrp^j^j{t)dt. 
Of course, ^ lim ~ ® it means no horizon. 
Horizon-no inspections: 
MTBFf f^^ j  =  MTBFf f j \n=Q 
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0 
where, 
9T ,Nl i ^ )  
»T,JV/(') - ^  
F;H,M 
and 
^F;H,NI = PF;H,L\N=0 = J 9T,NI^^)'^^-
0 
No horizon-inspections: 
MTBF]\ tit t = lim MTBF tt t 
>oo 
r 1 1 ""NH , ^ , 
where, 
and 
" 1 -
oo  
PF;NH,I = ^  ^F;H,I = f 
^ 0 
Based on the MTBF, the improvement due to inspection may be observed 
the gain of time between failures i.e., 
MTBFrj  -  MTBFj j j ^ j  
or in the reduction of the average number of failures per unit of in-service time, i. 
1 1 
MTBFH^NI 
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7. EXAMPLE 
We developed S-plus functions (Becker, Chambers, and Wilks 1988) interfaced 
with Fortran routines in order to calculate and construct graphs for the following two 
figures of merit; 
• the "probability density" g j^  j { t )  for the times to failure , referred to as crossing 
times, on the graphs. 
• the hazard function Aj(i). 
7.1 Inputs 
Necessary inputs for the calculations are: 
1. the initial crack size distribution 
2. the crack growth law (Paris law) relating the crack size a  to the number of 
cycles I/, a measure of the elapsed time, and to the initial crack size ag, 
3. the probability of detection for a crack of size a ,  
4. a vector of potential inspection times, 
5. the failure crack size a^. 
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Note that, for generality, the model in this paper is dealing with a probability 
of rejection based on the theoretical possibility to actually measure the crack at 
inspection and compare it with a critical acceptance/rejection value. In this numerical 
example, the input provided was a POD and the component is therefore rejected when 
a crack is detected. 
7.2 Choices for Inputs 
1. The initial crack size probability density was modeled in this example as a 
discretized normal with its .001 quantile at .65 inch and .999 quantile at 1 inch. 
The distribution was discretized into 149 intervals of equal sizes. 
2. The crack growth law was modeled as an uni dimensional Paris law ^ = ca^ 
du  
with parameters b  = 2.5714 and c = 3.7319, where v  represents a number of 
time cycles. These values are estimates obtained by Lu and Meeker (1993) for 
a set of real life data borrowed from Bogdanoff and Kozin (1984). Note that 
the Paris law is used here to describe the crack growth from service life time 
zero up to failure time. 
3. The probability of detection was modeled as a logistic distribution with its .01 
quantile at 1 inch, its .99 quantile at 1.4 inches (the crack failure size). The 
distribution was discretized into 149 intervals of equal sizes. 
4. A time range of .15 millions of cycles was chosen with 20 equally spaced in­
spection time opportunities, the first one being set at time zero. At potential 
inspection time 20, the probability to detect a crack is given a value of 1 so 
that it acts as an horizon . 
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5. For an illustrative purpose, the failure size of the crack was fixed at 1.4 inches. 
7.3 Outputs Presentation 
Given the previous inputs, gjjit) and Aj(i) were calculated and plotted for 
several schemes of inspections. Note that the discretization of implies a 
discretization of gj '  j i t )  and Xji t ) .  However, intervals are small enough to make 
these distributions look smooth. 
7.4 Comments on Graphs 
/4o(®o) is plotted along the vertical axis at  u  = 0.0 x 10® cycles. It is the curve 
at the bottom, indicated in Figure 3 as "initial crack size distribution", gj' jit) is 
the curve above the horizontal line drawn at ay = 1.4 inches. The discretization of 
/^^(ao) shows up as the cracks grow and their different slopes separate them. 
The first ag value generated from the discretized distribution leads to 
a failure time shortly before the tenth inspection opportunity (LO^o)- Thus, both 
3T,I (Figure 3) and Xj (Figure 4) start at this point on the graph. 
• When no inspections are performed (Figure 3), the "probability density" gj' jit) 
matches the initial crack size distribution except for the truncation at 
the horizon (z/ = 0.15 x lO^cycles). The black crack growth curve corresponding 
to the center of the intervals discretizing crosses ay neatly on the right 
of the time to failure distribution mode indicating a right skew of gj< j i t )  due 
to the uneven crack growth slopes from curve to curve. Note (Figure 4) that 
\j starts below 2 x 10~® which is considered here, for illustrative purpose, as 
46 
being the upper acceptable (critical) value for the hazard function. In order to 
maintain the hazard function below its critical value, an inspection is necessary 
at (I.Oii) (or earlier). 
• Based on a criterion like, say, minimizing the number of inspections, we add one 
inspection at (I.Ojj) with the effect of pushing the crossing point after I.O^g 
(Figure 7). If, for instance, we had set = I.O9, the next crossing would have 
occured before I.O^g (Figure 5). By the time the first inspection is performed, 
only the largest values of ag may have led to detectable crack sizes. Therefore, 
this inspection modifies essentially the left tail of gj' j (Figure 6). As we go 
beyond the inspection, its effect dissipates and the time to failure distribution 
resembles more and more the one in the no inspection case (Figure 8). Similarly, 
after dropping below its critical level at the inspection, the hazard function slope 
is larger and the hazard function curves with and without inspection meet at 
about I.Oj^g (Figure 9). 
• Trying to maintain the hazard function below its critical level, an inspection 
is added at I.O^g (Figures 10, 11). Note that there is no choice as where to 
schedule the next inspection now. The behavior of the hazard function with 
these two inspections is compared to the one with none or one inspection in 
Figure 12. After setting (g = I.O14, we notice that we can wait again two 
inspections opportunities until the critical level is attained (Figures 13 and 14). 
Then, inspections need to be scheduled at each opportunity, and we end up 
with the saw shape curve shown in Figure 15. 
It is clear, that for a given parameters setting, Xj  could eventually cross its 
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critical value before the next inspection opportunity. Theoretically, this could be 
avoided by either changing the parameters of the initial crack size distribution, crack 
growth law, probability of detection or, by decreasing the spacing between inspections 
opportunities. The last two items of the list have the advantage that they do not 
imply a modification of the material properties. 
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Using first principles arguments of probability, the continuous and discrete parts 
for the probability distribution of the service life length T are established on the basis 
of the model assumptions. - Then, they are used to express several figures of merit, 
i.e., the expected service life length, the expected service life cost, the approximate 
cost per unit of service time, the cumulative distribution function of the service life 
length, the cumulative failure probability, the hazard function, and the mean time 
between failures. 
The exact expression of the hazard function with inspections shows that the im­
provement of the hazard function due to inspections depends on the initial crack size 
probability distribution. The importance of this dependence varies with the rejection 
criterion and the parameters in the model. Most of the mathematical expressions of 
the figures of merit are partitioned so that the effects that the horizon and/or inspec­
tions have on the component life are easy to interpret. Moreover, these partitions 
allow specific evaluations of the effect on the different figures of merit of each possible 
intervention. In particular, in the case where closed forms of the probability distri­
butions are considered, a mathematical analysis of the interventions effects could be 
performed. An example is worked out of the very high reliability type, that is, failure 
probabilities are very low. Figures of merit considered are the continuous (failure) 
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part of the service life length probability distribution and the hazard function. A 
minimum number of inspections is set up so that the hazard does not cross a given 
critical level. The crossing of the critical hazard function level can be avoided by 
increasing the number of inspections unless the slope of the hazard function becomes 
so large that it grows to the critical value in a time smaller than the inspections 
opportunities spacing. 
Many aspects of the problem presented in this paper are open to further research, 
in particular 
• Some work is necessary in order to determine the importance of the hazard 
function dependence on the initial crack size distribution, for different values 
of the key parameters. 
• Most of the parameters in this paper are assumed deterministic, including those 
involved in the crack growth law. Harris and Lim (1983), and Yang and Chen 
in several papers, consider stochasticity for example, in the Paris law, by in­
troducing a multiplicative random factor. Actually, most of the parameters 
could be taken as stochastic, constant values being averages of measurements. 
Therefore, a model, which in a general setting would allow any parameter to 
be random, would present a convenient flexibilitv. 
• Most papers that deal with the NDE/RFC handle a POD, not a probability of 
rejection based on the observed crack size. If the assumption is made that the 
crack size may be measured at each inspection, then information can accumulate 
and the next inspections can be scheduled on the basis of the current set of 
observations on the component. This suggests a generalization of the model so 
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that it could handle the dynamic setting of inspections. 
• Depending on the exact nature of the system considered, different types of 
optimization can be of interest. Typically, we may want to minimize the cost 
per unit of time subject to some reliability restriction or optimize the hazard 
function for a given number of inspections to be scheduled. 
<q 
t-
Crossing times Critical 
cracl< size 
CM 
o 
00 
d 
0.15 0.10 0.05 0.0 
Service life time (Millions of cycles) 
Figure 1: Crack growth curves matching doo and dt  
Inspections opportunities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8' 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Critical 
crack size 
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.0 
Sen/Ice life time (Millions of cycles) 
Figure 2: Crack growth curves matching dao and dt ,  with inspections 
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Figure 5: Hazard function with inspection at opportunity 9 
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Figure 6: Crack growth and probability distributions with inspection at opportunity 
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Figure 7: Hazard function with inspection at opportunity 11 
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Figure 8: Overlapped time-to-failure probability distributions with inspection at op­
portunity 11 and without inspection 
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Figure 9: Overlapped hazard functions with inspection at opportunity 11 and with 
out inspection 
Inspections opportunities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
_j I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  
Time to 
failure 
distribution 
Critical 
crack size 
0.0 0.05 0.10 0.15 
Service life time (Millions of cycles) 
Figure 10: Crack growth and densities with inspections at opportunities 11 and 13 
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Figure 11: Hazard function with inspections at opportunities 11 and 13 
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Figure 12: Overlapped hazard functions with inspections at opportunities 11, 13 
and with no inspection 
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Figure 13: Hazard function with inspections at opportunities 11, 13, 14 
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Figure 14: Hazard function with inspections at opportunities 11, 1.3, 14, 16 
Inspections opportunities 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Critical 
hazard value 
0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.06 
Service life time (Millions of Cycles) 
Figure 15: Hazard function with inspections at opportunities 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 
19 
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10. APPENDIX 
10.1 Derivation of Equation (4.2) 
We want to show that 
I  =  f t  Innf tW I I fl — — 
dt  = /.4o("o(0) n [1 - Pli i )]  l=Q 
where PQ{t) = 0 by definition. 
Proof: By definition of gj' ^ {t), the probability to fail in an interval 
(ri,T2) C is given by 
^2 
19j ' j { t )d t .  (10.1) 
n 
On the other hand, 
Pr (failure in(r]^,r2)) = Pr ({starts in(ao(r2), ao(n))} 
P|{passes all inspections}) 
= Pr ^{ylo E (ao('^2)'<^o(n))}n I fl {^Z ^ ^#z} j j 
go(ri) 
= J J J 
00(^2)^^1 '4^ 
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where ARj^  and f {aQ,a '^ , . . . ,a*)  stand respectively for the acceptance region at in­
spection i and for the joint probability density of the initial crack size cq and of the 
first i observed crack sizes <iQ,ap By assuming the independence of ... .4* 
conditional on .4Q, we have 
/(ao,ai,...,a^*) = /^(ûq) / ((aî> •••,aj*)iao) 
= /4n("0) n /(a?!«0)' (10-3) 
1=1 
and substituting (10.3) in (10.2), we get 
go(ri) 
Pr(failure in Ti,r2) = f  /4f>(ao) < H [  '  daQ (10.4) 
a0(t2) [z=1.47z, 
where the acceptance regions assumed different at different inspections are considered 
functionally independent so that the multiple integral in (10.2) may be written as a 
product of simple integrals. Each integral in the product is just the probability of 
being accepted at inspection I conditional on an initial crack size CQ, i.e., 1 — Pi(aQ) 
in our notation. Beside, if we express cq in terms of the failure time t ,  we may write 
ri 
Pr(failurein ri,T2) = ^11 
T2 1 = 1 
which gives the desired result by comparing this last equation with (10.1), since 
po(-) = 0. 
10.2 Derivation of Equation (4.3) 
We want to show that 
oo 
p{ti) = j ^ = l,2...,n 
4 
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where P(fQ) = 0 by definition. 
Proof: 
Pr(will be rejected at tj) = Pr ({^q < ao(i£)} (10.5) 
n{passes first i — 1 insp} 
n{is rejected at insp z}) 
Factorizing /(oq, aj^,..., aj) and expressing ûq as a function of t  as in the previous 
proof, we have 
Pr(rejection at t^) 
ao(^i) i - l  
aq((x))^^l ARi_iRj  ^=0 
oo 
"i  
oo 
i - l  
/. /=0 
n / /(4i®om4 / 
i - l  
dt  
d t  
dapi t )  
d t  
d t  
oo 
= / 5r,z-i(0-pi(0 
t ;  
d t  
where (4.2) has been used in the last step. 
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10.3 Derivation of Equation (6.1) 
We want to show that 
0 f < fg 
i  oo 
1 t > t  
^ ^n+l  
where i = 0,1... ,n. 
Proof: For any t  E i  = 1,2,...,ti, we have 
= Pr(T < () 
= Pr({^o > «o(^)} {r < (}) + Pr({^0 < ®o(0} H {T < (}). 
Now, Pr({T < i}|{^o > ®o(0}) = 1 so that the first term in the rigth hand side 
reduces to Pr({v4Q > aQ(t)}), i.e., Fj' jtfjit). As to the second term of the rigth hand 
side, note that it refers to the event of ending life before t while the crack is heading 
to fail after t. Therefore, it is the event of rejecting at one of the inspections before 
t a component whith a crack that would cause failure after t. Thus, 
j=i  
-r ^ Pr({^o < ^ be rejected at t j } )  
j=l  
j=i  
= FT,Nl i^)  + pr({^0 < «0(^)} ^  
j=1 
{passes first j  — 1  inspections} fl 
{is rejected at inspection j } ) .  
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The last probability in the sum is readily recognized as the one in (10.5), with t  
replacing So, we have finally 
i  00 
=-^T,iV/(0 + è j (% < ( < ^z-Li z = 0,l,...,n. 
J=1 t  
(10.6)  
Also, (10.6) may be extended to include the case t  G ((Q,^^) by starting the sum at 
j = 0 and by recalling the convention — 0-
10.4 A Partition of Pff-j 
We want to show that 
00 
Pjj-I = Ph-,NI ~ è / n = 0, l,2,...,nmax. 
/=0 t j j  
Proof; Based on the equality 
i  ( l - l  \  
j=i '=1 v=i 7 
i  = 1, 2 , . .  
which is easilly derived using a De Morgan law, we may write 
j=l  
as 
l - l  
jr=0 
I  
9T, i i^ )  = 9T,Nl i^)  -
/=1 
or 
i  
9T,i(^) = 9T,NI(^) ~ z = 1,2,(10.7) 
1=1 
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Further, 
oo 
PH;I  =  J  
oo n 
= J  9T,Nl i^ )^^  ~  ^  J  R =  l ,2 , . . . , 7Zmax .  
t f f  l=Uf f  
We recognize the first term in the right hand side as the probability to reach 
horizon when no inspections are performed i.e., n = 0. By including 0 in the domeiin 
of n, and starting I at 0, the last equation contains the non inspection case (n = 0). 
10.5 Derivation of Equation (5.7) 
Using equation (10.7) with i  =  n ,  equation (4.3), and the expression of Pj j . j  
from section 10.4, formula (5.6) is written as 
n  
ESLLh^I = J (10-8) 
i=o a  
n  ^^+1 
-0 /. 
n  i  
"e / ih 
i=0  / .  1=1 
oo OO 
+tH j  9T,NI(^ )^*  - ^H f l  /  9T, l - l i ^ )P l i ^ )^*-
tH 
oo 
The second term in this equation is equivalent to J  tg j '  d t  
oo 
— /  tg j< where the first integral is recognized as the expected service life 
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with no horizon and no inspections, i.e., (5.7a). The second integral, combined 
oo 
with the fourth term of (10.8) gives f  ( t f f  -  t)g j '  jY j { t )d t ,  i.e., (5.7b). Then, 
ni  n n  
using the following relation between double summations ^ T = T ^ , the 
2=0 7=1 1=0 i=l  
n  
third term of (10.8) reduces to — ^ / tg j<  (note that the sub-
z=0 '  
script I has been changed to z), which, combined with the first term of (10.8) gives 
n oo n oo 
E y - ^) (^^ 4- E / Finally, we observe that 
z = 0 '  i = O t f f  '  
in the latter expression, the first sum is equivalent to (5.7c) plus the first term of 
(5.7d), and that the second sum, combined with the fifth term of (10.8) is the last 
term of (5.7). 
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PAPER II. 
A GENERALIZED RELIABILITY MODEL FOR PLANNING 
IN-SERVICE INSPECTIONS FOR COMPONENTS SUBJECT TO 
DEGRADATION FAILURE 
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ABSTRACT 
A probabilistic model is developed for the degradation reliability of components 
subject to periodic nondestructive inspections. In this general model, several param­
eters are considered random, e.g., parameters defining the initial level of degradation, 
the observed level of degradation at inspections and the degradation law parameters. 
Also, in-service inspections are scheduled dynamically on the basis of the observations 
made at inspections and in order to meet specific reliability or costs criteria. Beside 
the time to failure density and the hazard function, we express reliability figures of 
merit like the approximate cost per unit of service time , the posterior failure time 
density and its corresponding hazard function. Several important models are derived 
as special cases of the main model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Applications 
When components of a system degrade with an increase in the level of degra­
dation that could lead to failure, two main strategies exist in order to handle the 
problem of controlling reliability. 
1. In the traditional strategy, one decides on theoretical or practical grounds that 
the component will be retired from service at a fixed predetermined time. Of 
course, this horizon time, sometimes called the design life, is chosen so that 
some reliability/cost criteria are satisfied, e.g., the probability of an in-service 
failure is acceptably low. This policy, standard for components requiring de­
structive inspections, is still often in use. It is inefiicient in the sense that many 
components are retired while they could stay safely in service for a much longer 
time. 
2. Recent developments in nondestructive evaluation (NDE) give the opportunity 
to inspect parts and determine if they will be retired &om service or if they 
can safely remain until the next inspection. This is called the retirement for 
cause (RFC) strategy. Of course, we need some specific criterion as to what 
safe means. 
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It is therefore of interest to study the properties and advantages of inspection 
schemes based on such nondestructive inspections, e.g., how the NDE/RFC method­
ology can improve the cost per unit of time while maintaining an adequate level of 
reliability. 
Several books present, under different approaches, general views of this problem, 
e.g., Jorgenson, McCall, and Radner (1967), Barlow and Proschan (1981), Anders 
(1990), etc. A very important case arises when the level of degradation is defined as 
the size of a crack which grows within the component of interest, eventually reaching 
a failure size. Even so restricted, the problem is involved and allows many approaches 
as testified in the very comprehensive compendium by Pro van (1987). Several models 
have been developed in order to allow stochasticity in the crack growth, mainly 
by considering a stochastic multiplicative factor in the right hand side of the crack 
growth equation, see Yang and Donath (1983), Yang and Chen (1985), Provan (1987). 
Kitagawa and Hisada (1977) consider a crack growth with two random parameters. 
Reliabihty analysis based on a variety of assumptions/approaches have been made, 
e.g., Yang and Chen (1984, 1985), with lognormal distribution for the time to crack 
initiation and a complex random multiplicative factor in the crack growth law. Harris 
and Lim (1983) analyze a two dimensional model of the crack as it is growing. 
A model is developed here for a general degradation process which allows key 
parameters to be random. For generality, the number and the physical nature of these 
parameters is not specified in the model, but they could typically be thought as the 
parameters describing the initial level of degradation, the speed of degradation, and 
the parameters related to inspection/rejection: actual level of degradation values at 
inspections and observed level of degradation vzdues conditional on actual parameter 
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values. Also, the NDE technique is assumed to be precise enough so that the in-
service inspections provide measurements of the level of degradation parameters. At 
each inspection, the next inspection is scheduled based on the current information and 
a reliability/cost criterion to be met. This will be referred to as dynamic scheduling. 
Several reliability figures of merit are established like the time to failure probabil­
ity density, the hazard function and the approximate cost per unit of service time. In 
-particular, the Bayesian updating of failure time density (posterior density) based on 
the current set of measurements is used. This enables the use of a dynamic schedul­
ing of inspections where the criterion is to maintain the posterior hazard function 
below a certain threshold. From the general theoretical model, several submodels are 
examined, some corresponding to systems with specific properties, other being more 
realistic in terms of data availability. 
1.2 Terminology 
We present here some important terms used in the paper. 
• NDE stands for nondestructive evaluation i.e., nondestructive inspections per­
formed on a component in order to detect, or measure, a flaw within the com­
ponent. 
• POD stands for probability of detection, the conditional probability to observe 
degradation given the actual level of degradation. 
• RFC stands for retirement for cause i.e., the decision to remove a component 
from service on the basis of what was observed at an inspection. 
• If a component is removed because an inspection decided so, it is "rejected". 
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• The points in time where an inspection may be performed are referred to as 
"inspection opportunities", or simply, opportunities. 
• An inspection scheme is a set of opportunities where inspections will be per­
formed. 
Also, for all random variables, we will follow the usua.1 procedure of having capital 
.letters denote random variables, and lowercase letters will denote the realizations of 
these random variables. 
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1.3 Notation 
AR^ : The complement of the rejection region RR^ at inspection i .  
0 ; An element of the degradation model vector of parameters w. 
gj ' i t ) :  The continuous part of the service life length probability 
distribution. 
i :  Index of the inspections. 
I: Index of the inspection opportunities. 
M: The total number of inspection opportunities. 
N:  The total number of inspections. 
RR^ : The rejection region at inspection i .  
s :  Index of the opportunity where the first inspection is 
performed. 
f The set of combinations of i  inspections between inspection 
opportunities 5, and I. 
5^ The set of combinations of i  inspections between inspection 
opportunities 5, and Z, with an inspection at rj. 
T: The service life length, this is the time the component 
will be in service. 
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T^: Time of the /th inspection opportunity. 
Time of the ith inspection. 
w: The vector of parameters describing the degradation model. That is, 
the initial level of degradation and degradation law parameters, 
w*:  The  vec tor  o f  observa t ions  made  on  the  component  a t  inspec t ion  i .  
: The vector of observations made on the component at inspections 
1,..., z, that is 
1.4 Overview 
In Section 2, we describe the general model. Then, basic formulae are derived 
in Section 3, and special cases of interest are presented in Section 4. We consider 
some reliability figures of merit in Section 5. Details of the derivations in Section 5 
are given in the Appendix. 
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2. THE MODEL 
2.1 Overview of the Model 
We give here a broad picture of the model by following the key events in the life 
of a component. 
• Each component starts its service life with a level of degradation; the parameters 
describing this level of degradation are random from component to component. 
• While in service, the component degrades obeying a deterministic degradation 
law; the parameters of the law are random from component to component. 
• NDE is performed periodically on the component in order to assess how the 
component is degrading. In particular, inspections determine if RFC should be 
applied, and if not, where to schedule the next inspection. There is a cost for 
inspecting, and a cost for the removal of a component. 
• A component may pass all inspections, and reach the failure level; a failure cost 
is associated with that event. 
• Finally, in the best of the cases, the component passes all inspections and 
reaches its design life. The asociated horizon cost is the cost for removing a 
component. 
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Each time a component is removed, another new component is put into service under 
identical conditions. 
2.2 Features, Issues and Assumptions of the Model 
We proceed now with a detailed account of the model where its features are 
described, issues related to these features are discussed and the principal assumptions 
are stated. Some lesser assumptions may be found locally in the body of the paper. 
Initial level of degradation parameters: The components under analysis have 
random level of degradation parameters at service time zero. The initial level of 
degradation parameters probability distribution describes component-to-component 
variability and could represent degradation variability right after components 
are manufactured or, later on, after an inspection has been performed by the 
manufacturer and a selection of the components has been made. 
Degradation law: We assume that the components degrade obeying a law that 
is known, and specified by a set of degradation law parameters. For given 
values of the degradation law parameters, the evolution of a component is 
deterministic with degradation law parameters constant over time. However, 
these parameters are considered random in the sense that we assume they 
vary from component to component, obeying a known probability distribution. 
Thus, a component degrades in a well defined way, conditional on values of its 
initial level of degradation parameters and degradation law parameters. 
Failure times: Given the deterministic degradation law, a relationship will exist 
between the vector w_ of degradation law/initial level of degradation parameters 
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and the time t  at which the degradation would reach the failure level, were it 
not stopped at some inspection. Therefore, the failure time t may be viewed as 
a function of the vector w: t(w). Now, let 
w = (ag ,  y / )  
where ag stands for one of the parameters measuring the initial amount of 
degradation. We isolate oq because it is physically clear that such a parameter 
should then be a monotone function of the time to failure when we condition on 
all other parameters w'. This important function will be denoted by ûq ^/(O-
However, more generally, one can write 
w = (<6,  w! )  
where the scêilar é could be any of the elements of the vector w. It could 
theoretically happen then, that for certain choices of f, and conditional on 
several values of <f) lead to the same value of say (t>q{t)-, q = !,...,& where 
k itself could depend both on w' and t. This last assumption is used in the 
approach for the general model of section 3, but most submodels in section 4 
w^ill consider the simplifying assumption <p = aQ. 
.41so, when inspections are performed, gj ' { t )  will denote the continuous part 
of the probability distribution of the service life length T, associated with the 
event of failure. 
Horizon time: Time when a component is retired from service, even if the level of 
degradation is low. This time could be associated to the component, or to the 
system to which the component belongs. In order to simplify, we consider hori­
zon times both for the component and for the system. If a component survives 
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its system, it is removed and installed in another system in identical conditions 
so that one may assume continuity in the evolution of the degradation, and the 
system horizon will not intervene in the component expectations. 
Inspection schemes: We assume that for a model with a finite horizon there is 
a maximum number M +1 of equally spaced inspections opportunities denoted 
• Thus we have • -f (mIJ) = 2"^+^ 
available inspection schemes. 
For a given horizon time and its corresponding M, the total number of in­
spections in the inspection scheme of our choice is denoted by iV, where N 6 
{0,1, ...M + 1} for M finite. 
In the no-horizon model, M = oo. However, it is assumed that the total 
number N of inspections in the inspection scheme may not be taken as oo. 
This comes from the fact that it is meaningless to schedule inspections beyond 
a point in time where the probability to see the component in an unfailed state 
is negligible. Thus, here N 6 {0,1,...}. 
We also assume that the spacing from to tjj is equal to the spacing between 
inspection opportunities and thus, the notation will often be convenient 
for the horizon time t j j .  
Inspection times: We will call the time where the zth inspection is actually 
performed. Then, a scheme of iV > 0 inspections is defined by inspection times 
ti" -tN such that 
{^1? ^ 2' : ^ {^0' ^ 1' * • • ' } 
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with tq <ti  < 12 -
Note that inspection times will be random variables when inspections are sched­
uled based on observations of the component made at previous inspections. 
Dynamic inspections: For a given component, measurements are taken at each 
inspection to estimate the level of degradation. Based on these measurements, 
one can decide where to schedule the next inspection, so that a given reliabil­
ity/cost criterion will be satisfied by the component currently in service. This 
criterion could be chosen in many ways. As an important and illustrative case, 
one may schedule the next inspection as late as possible so that the hazard 
function conditional on observed parameters is maintained below a critical pre-
specified value, say Ac- The inspection scheme that results from scheduling 
each inspection based on current observations is called dynamic. 
As to the first in-service inspection, it can be scheduled in two different ways. 
If there is no preservice inspection, the first in-service inspection could be de­
termined from the initial level of degradation/degradation law parameters joint 
probability distribution so that some criterion of reliability/cost is satisfied. In 
this case, the first inspection time is not random. If, in turn, some useful infor­
mation (measurement) is available from preservice inspection, that information 
could help schedule the first in-service inspection of the component in a more 
efiicient way. Then, will vary from component to component. 
Rejected components: Theoretically, one should reject a component either be­
cause it has level of degradation parameters in a predetermined rejection region 
or because some reliability criterion fails to be satisfied somewhere between the 
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present inspection and the next inspection opportunity, (even if scheduling the 
next inspection as soon as possible, the reliability criterion will not be satis­
fied). Intuitively, one expects to find these two criteria in good agreement, or 
even possibly equivalent. That is, the rejection region could be defined as the 
set of level of degradation parameter values such that at some point before the 
next inspection opportunity, the reliability criterion would not be satisfied. For 
generality, one will consider here that the component is kept in service only if 
both criteria are met. 
Costs: Three types of costs are assumed here. 
• Cost for performing an inspection: Cj .  
• Cost for removing a component at inspection, or horizon: Cjg. 
• Cost for removing a component that has failed: Cp.  
Main model: We refer to the model described by the previous assumptions as the 
main model because it turns out to contain several other models of interest as 
special cases. For example, a prespecified inspection model may be viewed as a 
special case of the dynamic inspection model where restrictions force inspections 
to be performed in a given number and at some specific locations in time. 
Results for many models can be obtained by applying the adequate restrictions 
to the formulae derived in the main model. The necessary restrictions for several 
important models are described in section 4. 
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3. SERVICE LIFE LENGTH PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION 
A component may be removed from the system upon one of the following three 
events: by failing, by being rejected at inspection, or by reaching the horizon. There­
fore, the probability distribution of the service life length T is composed of a contin­
uous part associated to failure and a discrete part associated to inspections/horizon. 
In this section, the formulae necessary to express probabilities associated to these 
continuous and discrete parts are derived under the main model assumptions. 
3.1 Continuous Part of the T Probability Distribution 
T, the random service life length, is restricted here to values associated with 
the event of failure, i.e., to the intervals between inspection opportunities. Thus, 
we proceed now to establish the expression of ^y(.), the function such that for two 
points y and t, on the time axis, the probability to fail in (i', t) may be expressed as 
t  
Pr{r 6 i t ' ,  i)} = jg f{u)du .  
t '  
For that purpose, we analyze the event {T G (i', Z)}, were < t '  <  t  <  and 
being any two successive inspection opportunities. We let the first inspection 
be prescheduled at r^, 5 > 0 and focus for now on the case I = s,..M. Then, the 
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event 
{T  6  ( ( ' ,  ( ) }  
is equivalent to the intersection of the following two events; 
Event E^:  The component starts its service life with level of degradation/degradation 
law paramete rs  l ead ing  to  fa i lu re  in  the  in te rva l  ( t ' ,  t ) .  
That is, the elements of the vector of initial level of degradation and degradation 
growth parameters w take values such that the failure time t{w) G (/, t). We 
denote this event by 
El  =  {W = w3  t (w)  e  ( t ' ,  t ) } .  (3.1) 
Event f 2: The component passes successfully all inspections up to the /th inspection 
opportunity. 
£2, as El, may be written in terms of simple events, here involving only the 
observed level of degradation parameters. (Details are given in the Appendix). 
We have 
t  z—5+1 
2^ = U U 
i= l  s,-
n  {lej = Wj  9 ij + i}, ^  l  =  s , . . . ,M (3.2) 
where iWj = Wj 3 stands for those védues of the random variables W^jt 
(the vector of all observed (*) level of degradation parameters at inspection 
1,... ,j), such that inspection j is passed successfully and inspection j + 1 is 
set at time tjj~i- This is so because the scheduling of inspection j + 1 could 
depend not only on the vector of observations at the last inspection (w^), but 
also on the whole set of current observations, = (w^ ... wj). Hence, the 
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event in the large brackets is equivalent to passing successfully all i  inspections 
before / and to setting the following one after t. These z + 1 inspection times 
are specified by i as to their number and by ^ as to their location's between 
Ts and r^, inclusive. Thus, the two unions in (3.2) cover all possible inspection 
schemes before r^, for a given I. 
For the trivial case where failure occurs before the prescheduled first inspection (/ = 
0,..., 5 — 1), 5 > 0, we have 
{Te{ t ' , t ) }  =  Ei .  
Further, Pr{E]^ fl £'2} can be expressed analytically in terms of the joint CDF's 
G{w^ when I = s,., M, and G{w), when / = 0,..., .s — 1. Then, as indicated 
in the model description, any of the parameters, say (j), is isolated and written as a 
function of time, so that w = {wLi'p) is reparameterized as (w/, <). This enables the 
differentiation of PrfT 6 (t', i)} with respect to t, i.e., we get These steps 
are carried out in the Appendix (Section 8.2) and lead to 
i - s+i  
Î -1  D{w!)  •? - !  w '^3 t2  
9Ti^ )  =  
k{w' , t )  
J  e dGq{w, t )  / = 0, ...,5-1 
D{y^)  9=1 
(3.3) 
where t  G (t^jT^^^). The subscript q  in the joint CDF Gq{ . )  accounts for the pos­
sibility of having several values of (f> leading to the same value of t, its maximum 
value k may depend on yJ and t. D{w') is the whole domeiin of integration of y/, 
and 3 ^j+1 stands for the domain of values of observations at inspections j such 
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that inspection j + 1 is set at Note that this domain may depend on previous 
observations ..., Finally, note that the different joint CDF's are expressed 
in the Appendix in terms of probability distributions considered by the model as 
being available in practice. 
INTERPRETATION; We consider here (3.3) in the I  =  s , . . . ,  M case, so that we do 
have  in service inspections before t'. The first sum takes care of the fact that i, the 
number of inspections performed on a component heading to fail within (r^, is 
random, and ranges from 1 up to / — s -f 1 depending on what is observed when in­
specting. For example, i = 1 if observations at Tg (first inspection) lead to scheduling 
the second inspection beyond the failure time. i in the second sum covers all the 
ways to allocate inspections among inspection opportunities given that i inspections 
have to be performed. The different ways to allocate i inspections are limited by 
the  number  o f  oppor tun i t i es  cor responding  to  the  fcd lure  t ime  loca t ion  i t se l f ;  thus ,  S  
depends on I too. The first integral covers all the possible values of the degradation 
parameters v/ and the following sum considers all the possible values of the isolated 
parameter (j> heading to fail at time t, conditional on yJ. Finally, the multiple inte­
gral domains restrict the observed parameters to values consistent with the scheme 
defined by Sj j, i.e., at each inspection, the level of degradation parameters are ob­
served in the "continue in service" region and lead to scheduling the next inspection 
where specified by 5^ j. 
Remark 1; The multiple integration with, respect to the observed parameters at 
different inspections cannot be expressed in general as a product of integrals, even 
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assuming the independence of the observed variables conditional on the initial param­
eters. This is because the criterion defining the domains of integration of Wg.... w* 
may depend on previous observed values, as it is the case when the criterion is a 
bounded conditional hazard function in the dynamic inspection scheme. 
Remark 2: The no inspection failure time density is simply obtained 
by putting 5 = M -f 1 in the no inspection part of formula (4.3). 
5iv7(0 = 
k{w' , t )  
I  E dGq{ w , t )  0 < ( < 
D{w' )  9—1 
0 otherwise. 
3.2 Discrete Part of the T Probability Distribution (At Inspections) 
We are interested here in Pr{T = r^}, the probability that a rejection occurs 
at r^. As for the failure density, a general formula is developed under the dynamic 
inspection schedule model with first inspection preset at r^. 
First, we remark that if inspections are scheduled dynamically, any inspection 
opportunity is associated with a probability of performing an inspection and having 
the component rejected at this point. Therefore, in the dynamic inspection scheme, 
Pr{T = r^} > 0 for all / > 3. Reasoning in a manner very similar to the one in section 
3.1, let us analyze the event {T = r^}, that rejection occurs at the Zth opportunity. 
We will distinguish between the following two cases 
• For / = 5, {T = T^} is the event of rejection at the first prespecified inspection. 
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• In the nontrivial case where I  =  5+1,, M, {T  = T^} is the event of rejection at 
an inspection dynamically scheduled at r^. Note that here, at least 2 inspections 
are performed. 
These cases can be covered by a combination of the following events, 
Event E^ '  the component starts its service life with degradation parameters such 
that failure would occur after r^. 
That is, the vector of initial level of degradation and degradation law parameters 
w have values leading to a failure time t{w) larger than r^. We denote this event 
E'i - {W = wB t{w) > Ti}. 
Event E2' '  the component passes successfully all inspections prior to r^, and obser­
va t ions  l ead  to  schedul ing  an  inspec t ion  a t  r^ ,  /  =  5  +  1 , . . . ,  M. 
Event Eg: the component is rejected at r^. 
Expressing a:id in terms of the observed parameters, it is shown in Appendix 
(Section 8.3) that for Z = s -f 1,..., M, 
{J = rj = n ^2 n Eg 
l—s+1 
u u 
z-l 
n  {IE =  w3  t{w)  >  Tj}n  
j=i 
{Wj  =Wj  B iy+i} n (3.4) 
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and that for I  =  s ,  
{T  =  r / }  =  E[nE '^  
= = w 9 ((w) > T^} n (1^2 = e (3.5) 
where RR^ ^ stands for the rejection region at inspection i ,  opportunity I, and 5^ ^ is 
the set of all schemes of i inspections in Tg, with inspections at Tg and at r^. Then, 
taking probabilities in (3.4) and (3.5), and isolating <5, we get (See Appendix, section 
8.4) 
pr{r = r^} = 
/ E / I  dGim{ ,4>,w ' )  l  =  s  
D{w' )  ? - l  Wi^RRi j  
' Z-5+1 
e e ; e ; ; 
Z = s + 1,..., M 
(3.6) 
where the segment (©^ ^/(r^), 4)'^ ^/(rj)) is defined as the gth segment of ^'s values 
leading to values of T greater than r^, conditional on y/. The joint CDF's may be 
broken down in terms of probability distributions available in practice, and similar 
to these of (3.3). See Appendix (Section 8.4). 
INTERPRETATION (/ = s + 1,...,M case): The first five sum/integrals cover 
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all the possible inspections schemes and parameters values that correspond to failure 
after in the manner of (3.3). The remaining multiple integrals cover all possible 
values of the observed parameters such that inspections occur where specified by the 
first two summations and rejection occurs at the last inspection. 
3.3 Discrete Part of the T Probability Distribution (Horizon) 
The event of replacement at the horizon may be viewed as the event of reaching 
a dummy inspection at ti\/[where rejection is a sure event. One may therefore 
take advantage of the previous section result for our present purpose by substituting 
I  =  M-r  1  and J  dG{w*,4>,w ' )  =  dG{2i i ^_-^ ,4>,w ' )  
w^eRRi^M+1 
in (3.6), I  >  s .  This gives 
PT{T = tm+I} = 
M-s^2  Hw' . t )  
/ IZ / I  I  
Similarly, in the no-inspection case, Pr{T = is obtained by putting 
l  =  M + l  and j dGiy i^^cp^v / )  =  dG{( f>,w ' )  
m leRRi^M+i  
in (3.6), I  =  s .  
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4. EXPRESSIONS OF g^it) AND Pr{r = rj IN SOME SPECIAL 
CASES 
We study next the different forms that gj ' i t )  and P{T = r^} take under several 
special cases of interest corresponding to practical models. 
4.1 Models with Preservice Inspection 
To obtain gj ' { t ) ,  with a preservice inspection, one must schedule inspection 1 at 
tq in that part of (3.3) dealing with inspections. That is, s is set to 0, and the now 
meaningless part for failure before inspection is discarded. Then 
/+1  .  k{w , t )  
9T i^ )=Y,  I  J  (4.1) 
'=1  D{w' )  wlBt2  
for Tf  <  t  <  and Z = 0,..., M. 
Pr{T = Ti} is modified similarly. In particular, for the preservice inspection, we have 
from (3.6), with I  =  s  
/  <f>' / ( O )  
,0 )  
Pr{T  =  To}  =  J  J  /  dG[wl ,Oiw]  
Dim') 
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= J  J  dG[wl ,  w \ ,  
D{w) 
because the sum of the integral over (p can now be substituted by a single integral over 
the whole domain of <i> and because we disregard the possibility of a component failing 
at the mathematical point t = 0 with probability larger than 0. In the following, a 
preservice inspection is always assumed. In all cases, the necessary modifications of 
gj'it) for no preservice inspection models are straightforward from (3.3) and (4.1) 
and lead to two-parts formulae as in (3.3). 
4.2 f as a Monotone Function of ^ 
In the previous section, for the sake of mathematical generality, t  was allowed 
not to be a monotone function of 4>. However, in practice, given the joint probability 
distribution of the degradation parameters at i = 0, it is useful to choose <p as 
a parameter with a functional dependence on t as simple as possible so that the 
probability density of é conditional on all other degradation parameters would be 
simple, (i.e., t(w% t) should take small values, ideally 1). 
For instance, when the level of degradation is adequately described by the size 
of a flaw within the component, the initial flaw size is recognized as a key parameter 
in predicting the future size of the flaw. Beside, it is most reasonable physically to 
consider the time to failure cis a monotone function of the initial flaw size, conditional 
on all other parameters being fixed. In particular, for an infinitely small initial flaw 
size, the time to failure is infinitely large. We consider now that ^ is a measure of 
the initial level of degradation having the properties just described, and denote it by 
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ag. Then, with k  =  1  =  q ,  we  have 
/+! . . . 
= £  S  J J  J  aQ^^ f{ t ) ,w]  (4.2) 
Diw' )wl3 t2  
for Ti < t < and Z = 0,..., M, 
where the subscript q  has been omitted, for it is restricted to one value. Similar 
modifications in (3.6) lead to 
i+l  
E E /  S  /  • • •  
S'-^l D{w') 0 w'^3t2 
Pr{r = r^} = / /  dG[w^ ,  UQ,  w ' ]  l  =  l , . . . ,M,  
S S f OQ, w'] 1 = 0. 
D{w!) 0 y^£RR-^i 
In the remainder of this section, we proceed keeping the features (p = oq with its 
monotone mapping over t conditional on y/, so that the formulation is less cumber­
some. 
4.3 Single Random Parameter with a Dynamic Inspection Scheme 
If we assume that stochasticity is present only in one parameter, for instance, 
an initial level of degradation parameter, the vector of other random parameters 
has to be taken as degenerate and all conditionalities on u;' can be omitted in the 
general expressions (3.3), (3.6) ol gj'{t) and Pr{T = r^}. The continuous part of the 
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T distribution, for example, takes the more specific form 
9T^^)  =  gko(()] daQ( t )  d t  
/+1 
Z Z / ••• / dG[ '^ \aQ{t% 
^=1 ^z,z w*3t2  w? 3(^+1 
where we have made use of formula (8.7) in the Appendix, modified by the current 
submodel restrictions. 
4.4 Multiple Random Parameters with a Prespecified Inspection 
Scheme 
When the number of inspections and their locations in time are scheduled ahead 
of time no matter what happens during the component service life, we speak of 
prespecified inspection scheme. Thus, in the case of a prespecified inspection scheme, 
a deterministic number of inspections is associated to each failure time t, and the 
times of inspections are deterministic. These restrictions imply that, in (4.2), the 
range of I as well as the range of the vector of location times of the inspections 
correspond to fixed values. Therefore, the two summations vanish. 
Another important simplification appears in the domains of integration of the 
observed variables, ^ ^j-fl- Recall that this notation stands for values of the 
vector of random parameters observed up to inspection j such that the following in­
spection will be performed at In the prespecified inspection scheme, inspection 
J' + 1 is prescheduled at time hence, the event Wj = Wj 3 tjj^i is restricted 
now to the simple event that the vector of random parameters observed at inspection 
j  fa l l  i n  the  accep tance  reg ion  ARj  a t  th i s  inspec t ion .  Thus ,  we  rep lace  Wj  3  t j ^ i  
by the more specific and explicit notation wj E ARj . Observe also that gj<{t) does 
not depend on the subscript I anymore. That is, the expression of g^it) remains 
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the same for any t  between two prespecified inspection times, independently of the 
inspections opportunities in the intervzil. 
F r (^ )  =  /  /  •••  /  (4 .3 )  
for t j < t <  and i  = I , . . . ,  N.  
Remark: Using formula (8.7) in the Appendix and assuming that the rejection 
regions are functionally independent of the degradation parameter védues observed 
at previous inspections, the multiple integral over the observed vectors can 
be factored, i.e., 
r  r  ^  ^  r  
J  J  \ {dG[wj \{w,a^^^{ t ) ) ]='[ l  J  dG[w-\{w ,  aQ^^f{ t ) ) ]  
w leARi  ^='^w*.eARj  
Now, / /(())] is the probability to accept at inspection 
j  a component that started with a vector of initial parameters (w', Oq ^/(i)). We 
denote this probability by Pj^wit), tj\, and get the much simplified formula 
dt  9T{^)  =  I  9[%^y^{ t )]  
D{w!)  
for <t  < and i  = 1,..., iV. 
Similarly, one has for the discrete part of the T distribution 
n dG{w)  
3=1 
(4.4) 
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pr{r = t i }  =  
/ / Pr Iw .', %, ^l] <^0 dG{w')  for i  = 1, 
'w^\ 0 ' 
I I n PaI^'^ ®0' (?] Pr[^'^ v] daQdG{w')  
D{w!)  0  j=l  ' -
for i  = 2 , . . . ,  N .  
4.5 Single Random Parameter with Prespecified Scheme 
In this model, gj ' i t )  is obtained, for example, from the expression of in 
the previous section by taking the random vector v/ to be degenerate. Then, 
This formula is obtained by Harris and Lim ( 1983) by means of an iterative argument. 
Remark: The simple expression of this last density makes it easier to interpret 
intuitively. In effect, in order to fail in an interval dt, with probability gj<{t)dt the 
component needs 
1. to start with an initial level of degradation parameter in the interval da^ which 
is the mapping of dt trough the degradation law. This event has probability 
^[cq] daQ or, in terms of t using the transformation method. 
(4.5) 
for < t  < and 2 = 1,..., N. 
gko(()] àt  
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2. to pass all inspections performed on the way conditional on the initial level of 
degradation parameter aq which is an event with probability 
i  
n ijl-j=1 
Thus, for a small interval dt ,  the probability to fail in dt  may be viewed roughly as 
the product of the two probabilities described above. 
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5. figures of merit 
We consider here other figures of merit for the reliability/cost analysis of the 
component and the effect of the parameters/inspections setting. The hazard function 
is given particular attention as it is a generally realistic figure to assess degradation 
reliability. An expression for the approximate cost per unit of service time is given. 
5.1 Hazard Function 
A general expression for the probabiHty to fail in the unit of time following time 
t conditional on survival up to t or hazard function A(i) is obtained from (3.3) by 
setting 
l - s+1 .  
Z IZ / S J J (5.1) 
wl3t2  
for t  >  and / = 0, 1..., M, 
and by substituting this expression of gj' ^ {t), in the standard formula 
A«) = 
f  
for t  G (T^,Tj_|_2) and I  = 0,1,..., M. Note, however, that this is a special type 
of hazard function because gj'it) is not a proper probability density. The general 
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benefit of dynamic scheduling can be assessed by comparing the X{t )  function with 
dynamic scheduling to the one with a given prespecified inspection scheme. For 
a given reliability criterion on the hazard function, a comparison of much interest 
would of course be the dynamic scheduling scheme versus the best among prespecified 
schemes. 
When considering a dynamic inspection scheme, we are faced with the issue of 
establishing a criterion such that from the set of currently available observations, 
the location in time for the next inspection will be optimized, (if the component is 
accepted). Although this criterion could be any reasonable rule taking in account 
the current information, a certainly interesting class of criteria is the one based on 
functions of the failure time density conditional on the current observations, i.e., 
the posterior failure time probability density in the Bayesian terminology. A typical 
function of this posterior density that would be of interest is the hazard function. 
The posterior failure time density in the interval (fj, denoted may 
be derived from the general expression of gj'it), (formula (3.3)). We have 
where g[yi^] stands for the joint probability density of the vector of observed param­
eters vectors at the first i inspections. This joint density is given by 
CO 
Now, observe that conditionality on actually implies conditionality altogether on 
5.2 Posterior Failure Time Probability Density 
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• a given number of inspections, 
• given locations in time for these inspections, 
• given values of the parameters observed at these inspections. 
Therefore, the expression of g[ t ,  îu|] may be obtained from (3.3) by substituting 
the observed values of i, i and i.e., by omitting the two summations and 
considering probability densities evaluated at by restricting to these 
values the observed parameters domains of integration. Thus, 
. dar. i{t) i 
J  g[aQ^^ , ( t ) ]  ^  Y[ g[wj \{w' ,  dG{w' )  (5.2) 
D{w')  ' 
for t i  <  t  < and i = 1 , . . . ,  iV ,  
where the inequality t  < is to emphasize the fact that only i  inspections are 
per formed before  t .  
Remark: By conditioning on y/, one recognizes in (5.2) the usual features of the 
Bayesian framework. That is. 
stands for the prior of t ,  a reparameterization of the 
prior of cq by the probability transformation method, 
• and n g[ltLl\{lt^ 1 On /(^))] is the joint probability density of the sample of j=l J 
observations ..., wj conditional on a védue of the parameter t .  The factor­
ization is allowed because of the independence of the observations at different 
inspections when conditioning on 
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Thus, the integrand in (5.2) is proportional to the posterior failure time probabil­
ity density conditional on w', and the integral over w' yields to the corresponding 
proportion of the unconditional posterior density. 
5.3 The Posterior Hazard Function as a Dynamic Scheduling Criterion 
If the reliability criterion for dynamic inspection scheduling is to maintain the 
posterior hazard function (conditional on current observations) under a certain crit­
ical threshold, say Ag, one is dealing now with a hazard function 
a(i|^) 
which is calculated from the posterior failure time density, i.e., 
a(f|^)= , 
I 9iu\w^)du 
t  
or more practically, 
Mtigr) = o c ^ " ' -  ,  
/ giu ,mi)du  
t  — 
where the joint density g{t ,y^)  is given by (5.2). Inspection z + 1 should be set at 
Tr such that 
vi £ a(i|ù^) < ac 
e (Tr,Tj.^i) D A(f|^) > Ac. 
In this context, the domain of integration denoted as 9 in (3.3) refers to 
values, such that the above inequalities are satisfied. Remark that for 
and for given values of ..., w^, if '''k+l) ^ A(i|w^) > Ac, 
rejection will occur at inspection i .  
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5.4 Approximate Cost per unit of Time 
By stopping the component life at the horizon or after an inspection, the cost of 
failure is replaced by a replacement/inspections cost. However, the expected service 
life length of the component is also decreased so that a standardized measure of 
improvement is necessary. Here we approximate the cost per unit of time Cu by the 
ratio of the expected service life cost to the expected service life length ~ 
Cu.  This equality actually holds asymptotically. See for example Gertsbakh (1989). 
Computing ESLL is straightforward, 
Y m+1 
ESLL = /  ug j ' {u)du  + ^ Pr{T = r^} 
0 
where and Pr{r = r^} are given by (3.3) and (3.6). As for ESLC, it should be 
noted that (3.3) associates different numbers of inspections to the same failure time. 
Expressing (3.3) as 
I — 5 + 1 
i=l 
gx i t )  = 
9T,Nl i^ )  / = 0, . . . , 5 — 1 
and (3.6) as 
Pr{T = Ti} = 
I—s+l 
Z Pr{T2,z}  s<l<M 
i=2 
Pr(Ts)  I  =  s ,  
we may write 
t5 
.  M l -s+1 /  ^^+1 
ESLC = J  Cfg j ' ^^ j{u)du+Yl  ^ (cj? + zcj-) J  g j ' {u , i )du  
0 l=s  z=l  
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s+1 
2 = 2 
where, for example, Cp + iCj -  is the cost when failure occurs after i  inspections have 
been performed. 
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the service life length probability distribution of a component sub­
ject to degradation failure and submitted to nondestructive inspections is expressed 
in a general setting where most parameters are random, e.g., initial level of degrada­
tion parameters, degradation law parameters, and where the observations made at 
inspections are used for scheduling the next inspection. The important case is consid­
ered where the figure of merit for the component reliability as well as the reliability 
criterion for scheduling the future inspection are based on the hazard function. As 
a tool for the dynamic inspection scheduling, the hazard function may be updated 
based on available observations. This is done by using the posterior failure time den­
sity, and thus the corresponding posterior hazard function. In this general setting, 
most formulae are involved, and even using computers for the numerical analysis, 
it is probably appropriate to assess the influence of stochasticity and/or dynamic 
scheduling on the outputs of interest by focusing on some restricted cases of specific 
interest. 
I l l  
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8. APPENDIX 
8.1 Expressions of E2, 
Conditional on a failure time t  6 (''"/? ^+1)5 the number of inspections that may-
have been performed prior to this failure time is random in the dynamic inspections 
model. Let I denote this random number of inspections. If the first inspection has 
been  prese t  a t ,  say  rg ,  s  =  I , . . . ,  M then ,  I  = 0 for  Z =  0 ,1 , . . . ,  s  — 1 ,  and  E2 
is defined as the sure event. On the other hand, for 5 < Z < M, I ranges from 1 
to Z — 5 + 1, in which last case an inspection has been scheduled at each inspection 
opportunity in Thus, we have 
E2 = 
r z-s-fi 
U [{/ = i} n {The i  inspections are passed}] I  =  . . .  ,M 
i=l  
{SURE EVENT} Z = 0,...,5-l 
where s  = 0,..., M, with the understanding that when 5 = 0, only the first, nontrivial 
part of the previous equation holds. We focus now on the nontrivial form of £2-
The event of having exactly i  inspections scheduled in some interval is still a 
complex event since the locations of these inspections among the inspections oppor­
tunities available in the interval are random. That is, in the dynamic inspection 
model with first inspection prescheduled at r^, there are (i_f) ways to schedule the 
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remaining i — 1 random inspections in {Tg,T^}, and ways to schedule the 
( i  4 -  l ) t h  inspec t ion  a f t e r  so  tha t  exac t ly  i  inspections are scheduled in {t s ,t i}. If 
we let I denote the range of (t]^,... corresponding to the event {/ = i}, i.e., 
the set of inspection times vectors satisfying t s  = t i  < t2  < • • • < 
we have 
{ I  —  i }  —  I J  { T j  —  . . . , —  ^i + l }  
and, 
'i,i 
I—5 + 1 
^2 = U U {{^1 = ^ l'---'^z+l = ^ t+l}^ 
'=1 
{The i  inspections are passed}} 
I — 5 + 1 
P) {{Inspection j  is passed} fl {Tjj_i = 
j=l 
= U U 
where Tj = is omitted since it is the sure event. (Tj is nonrandom and can only 
take the prespecified value = Tg). £'2 can now be expressed in term of the variables 
we observe at inspections. For that purpose, remark that the event 
{Inspection j passed} f l  =  ^ j+ i}  
is equivalent to observing values of the random vector of level of degradation param­
eters  a t  inspec t ion  j  
• in the acceptance region, and such that, 
• from a given criterion, the next inspection is scheduled at 
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We use the notation 3 to describe this set of numerical vectors. Thus, 
l - s+1 
^2= U U n ij+i) 
[ j=i  
However, one must keep in mind that the scheduling of inspection j + 1, in general 
depends not only on the la: 
observations, (wf •••Mj)-
st observations ( wj ), but rather on the whole set of current 
8.2 Derivation of (3.3) 
From (3.1) and (3.2), 
{T G { t ' ,  0} = £'i n #2, 
l - s+l  
= u u 
i=\  S .  
n  {{IE = m 3 t {w)  e  ( t ' ,  f)}n 
i= i  
{Kj  =m. j3  
fo r  Z =  . . . ,  M 
(8.1) 
= {py  = w 3  t (w)  G ( t ' .  f )}  fo r  /  =  0 , . . . , 5  —1.  (8.2) 
Further, the probabilities of the right hand side events can be expressed in terms of 
the  jo in t  cumula t ive  probabi l i ty  d is t r ibut ion  of  w,  denoted  G{w,w^)  =  
G{w,  , . . .  w^) .  for / = 5,..., M, and, in terms of G{w) ,  for / = 0,..., s — 1. Hence, 
equations (8.1), (8.2) lead to 
Pr{r e (/, i)} = YI J I I 
w3t iw)Gi t ' , t )  wpt2  
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I  =  s , . . . ,  M, and to 
Pr{r  G ( f ' ,  i ) }  = y  dG{w)  for / = 0,... ,5 - 1, 
t )  
where we have used the convenient notation w? = [w^- • - Hlj)- We focus now on 
the first integral and isolate one of the parameters in w, say <p.  so that w = {v / ,  é ) .  
If one considers for generality that, conditional on y/. several values of ç> can lead 
to a same value of the failure time t ,  then the integral with respect to ô over the 
domain where t ^ f {4>)  Ç.  ( t ' ,  t )  i s  actually a sum of integrals over several segments of 
the domain of é .  Conditional on let k{ 'u / ,  t )  denote the number of segments in 
the domain of é such that, at some end of these segments, the value of <p corresponds 
to r = t .  Also, let ( f>^  represent the variable 4> in the gth segment, conditional on 
w' . Note that the constant t '  is chosen so that d> / i s  m o n o t o n i e  i n  e a c h  o f  t h e  q 
— ^q ,  w '  ^  
segment. We have now that 
P r{T  € ( / , ( )}  =  
^ J j I I (8.3) 
for / = s,..., M, and 
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mm',') ''î.e'''* 
j Y, j <iG(s) 
D{w')  
(8.4) 
for Z = 0,... ,s — 1, 
where D{y/ )  is the unrestricted domain of w'-
In order to differentiate with respect to t ,  let us write the integrand in (8.3) as 
dGiw,  w*)  =  dG(w' )g l (p lm]  dôdGlwJl (w^ ,  (p)] .  
After differentiation, we get for Z = 5,..., iW 
/ - s+1 .  k{w! , t )  
9Ti^) = Z E / Z I I 
^=1 ^UD{w')  ^=1 w*3t2  
(8.5) 
and similarly, for / = 0,..., 5 — 1 
dt  dG[^ \{w' ,  4>^^^r{ t ) ) ]  dG(w' ) , .  
k iv / , t )  
5r(^ )  =  j  Y .  
D{w!)  9=1 d t  
dG{y/ ) .  (8.6) 
This leads to (3.3) by setting 
dGq{w' , t , ^ )  =  
dt  dG[^ \ (w ' ,4>^^^ ,{ t ) ) ]  dG(w' )  (8.7) 
and 
dGqiw' , t )  =  9[<f>q^y/{ t ) ]  d t  dG{w' ) .  (8.8) 
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Remark: The probability distribution of the observed parameters at an inspection 
depends functionédly on the parameters actual values at this inspection. On the 
other hand, given {y/, 4> /(()), the initial level of degradation and the degradation 9) y i  
law are uniquely defined so that the actual level of degradation parameters values 
at all inspection times are themselves uniquely defined. Thus the joint probability 
distribution of all observed values expressed conditionally on can be 
expressed conditionally on parameter's actual values as it must be. Moreover, since 
observed values at different times are statistically independent, conditional on w, one 
has 
dG[^\ iw ' ,  = n dG[wj \{w' ,  ç) /(())]. (8.9) 
j=l  
The GlwjKn/, <p^ ^/(())] CDF's are considered input functions in our model, that is, 
we assume this conditional CDF can be directly measured in practice. In particular, 
in the case where one does not measure values of the level of degradation parameters, 
but only detect degradation or not, this conditional is closely related to the POD 
function. 
8.3 Expressions of E!^, 
9 Event the component passes successfully all inspections prior to rj, and 
observations lead to scheduling an inspection at r^, s < / < M. Hence, £'2 
is similar to E2 in section 3.1 except that the set of observations prior to 
lead to scheduling an inspection at r^. Thus, this new feature of the event E2 
modifies sligthly the set Sj Let's call now S'- ^ the set of inspection times 
satisfying the current restrictions, i.e., 
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-  t l  =  Ts ,  
-  -r_s+i <t2< •••  <  t -_ i  <  r;_j .  
Next, following Section 8.1 argument and notations, one may write 
l - s+1 (  i -1  ] 
^2= u u I n {^*j=^ ^ j+i} f • 
i=2 5'  i i=l J 
• Event Eg: the component is rejected at Tj. This corresponds to observing the 
level of degradation parameters vector W* in the rejection region RRj^ j at r^, 
i.e., {W^ = wl € RRifi 
Back to the event {T = r^}, that a component is removed from service at r^, we 
have  fo r  Z =  s  +  1 , . . . ,  M 
{T = r;}  =  ^2  ^  ^2  n  Eg 
l -S-r l  
u u 
2=2 
i -1  
n  {Wi  =  W3 t{w)  > r/}n 
j=l  
(8.10) 
{W j^ = wj 3 ri {lej = e 
and, for I — s, 
{T = t i }  = e j n e g  
= {W- = m. 3 t{w) > T^} n {W-i = € RRi}. (8.11) 
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8.4 Analytical expression of Pr{r = r^} 
Recall that G{y^,w) stands for the joint CDF of and w. Then, taking 
probabiHties in (8.10), for / = s + 1,..., M, we get 
-s+l , ... 
Pr{r  = r^}= i ]  I]  /  I  I  I  
Diw3t iw>Ti)  wl3 t2  j ^eRR^ 
(8.12) 
where the unions have become summations since any two different inspection schemes 
are  d is jo in t  events .  S imi lar ly ,  for  I  =  s ,  
Pr{r = Ti}  =  j  J  dG[wi ,w] .  (8.13) 
m3t{w]>Ti  
As in section 8.2, when evaluating the multiple integral over the domain w 3  t{w)  >  
T^, the inerest variable may take several values that lead to i > r^. Thus, if we let 
{àq  4> / ( ' ' " / ) )  denote  the  g th  segment  where  va lues  of  <))  l ead  to  va lues  of  T 
greater than r^, conditional on we will have 
/ ^ / z / . 
w3t{w )>Ti D{w!)  ^  
Finally, the integrand may suitably be broken down in the simpler CDF's encountered 
in  sec t ion  8 .2 ,  except  for  the  fac t  tha t  they  are  not  reparameter ized  in  te rms of  t  
because we do not need here to differentiate with respect to time, e.g., 
dG[w*,w]  =  JJ  dG[yi - \ {v i ,  <^)]  g[ ( i>\w']  d( f> dG{w' ) .  
j=l  
121 
PAPER III. 
COMPUTATIONAL AND GRAPHICAL TOOLS FOR ANALYZING 
THE RELIABILITY OF AN ITEM SUBJECT TO DEGRADATION 
FAILURES WITH IN-SERVICE INSPECTIONS 
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ABSTRACT 
Components in certain types of service suffer degradation and eventually fail. For 
units such that inspections costs are low relative to replacements costs, it is possible 
to extend the useful life by defining parameters that describe the level of degradation 
and performing in-service inspections so that the evolution of the degradation is 
assessed by means of measurements. In this paper, we describe a computer program 
developed in the S language (Becker, Chambers, and Wilks 1988) and interfaced with 
Fortran subroutines. The program provides computational and graphical tools for 
analyzing the reliability of a component for which the level of degradation is measured 
by one parameter. This level-of-degradation parameter is random from component 
to component as the service life begins and obeys a degradation law which is itself 
random. Two examples using fatigue crack growth data are presented where the 
sensitivity of reliability functions to some model parameters is analyzed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider in this paper the problem of extending the useful life of components 
that fail due to degradation. Inspections are to be performed on the components 
during service life. At each inspection, the component may be rejected or remain 
in service, depending on the observed level of degradation. A computer program is 
presented to evaluate reliability features like the time-to-failure probability distri­
bution, the probability to be rejected at the inspections, and the hazard function. 
The program also draws useful graphs for the reliability analysis of such degrading 
components. The computer code is written in the S language (Becker, Chambers, 
and Wilks 1988), with calls to Fortran subroutines for the heavy computations. The 
mathematics underlying the computer program have been developed in different con­
texts and with different approaches in a number of papers (Harris and Lim 1983, 
Yang and Chen 1985, Kitagawa and Hisada 1977, Garrigoux and Meeker 1992). The 
key features of the model considered in this paper are described next. The amount of 
degradation is measured by means of a level-of-degradation parameter that evolves 
through time until it reaches a critical value where failure occurs. Stochastic!ty is 
present in three ways within the degradation process: 
• The level-of-degradation parameter for a component entering in service is a 
random variable with known probability distribution, 
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• The level-of-degradation parameter evolves in time following a known degra­
dation law. This degradation law depends on two degradation law parameters 
considered to be random with a known joint probability distribution, 
• When inspections are performed on the component in order to assess the current 
value of the level-of-degradation parameter, measurement errors occur so that 
the observed level-of-degradation parameter is a random variable with known 
probability distribution conditional on a given actual (unobservable) level of 
degradation. 
The computer program is applied to the reliability analysis of two sets of actual data 
in fracture mechanics, where the level of degradation parameter is the size of a crack 
within the component. Thus, the degradation process is defined as fatigue crack 
growth. The effects of modifying parameters in the initial crack size distribution, 
crack growth law, and probability of detection of the crack at an inspection are 
considered. The influence these parameters have on the service life length probability 
distribution or on the hazard function are analyzed numerically and graphically. 
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2. MODEL AND FORMULATION 
In this section, we describe the degradation model for which the computer pro­
gram has been developed. We also present the mathematical formulae corresponding 
to the reliability figures computed and plotted by the program. 
2.1 Description of the Model 
We give next a list of the features/assumptions that describe the model under­
lying the computer program. 
• The level of degradation of the component is adequately described by one single 
parameter. 
• The level-of-degradation parameter for components starting their service life 
(initial level-of-degradation parameter) is a random variable with a known prob­
ability distribution. 
• The physical law describing the degradation process is known, e.g., a closed form 
expression or a differential equation relating the level of degradation parameter 
to time. 
• The degradation law depends on two parameters that are random, and corre­
lated, with a known joint distribution. These two degradation law parameters 
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are stochastically independent of the initial level of degradation parameter. 
• The component fails as soon as the level-of-degradation parameter reaches a 
given critical value. 
• A prespecified set of points in time is given where inspections may take place. 
These points, called "inspections opportunities" are equally spaced. 
• Inspections are performed in order to assess the presence or absence of degrada­
tion. If degradation is observed, the component is removed. For a given actual 
level of degradation, degradation may be observed or not. The probability of 
detection (P.O.D) of degradation conditional on the actual level of degradation 
is known. 
• An horizon time is set where the component must be removed. 
Thus, a component can terminate its service life in three ways, upon rejection at 
inspection, failure, or retirement at the horizon. 
Three reliability figures are considered here: the continuous and discrete parts 
of the service life length probability distribution and the hazard function. In the 
notations of Garrigoux and Meeker (1992), the formula for the continuous part (^^(i)) 
of the service life length distribution (i.e., the failure case) is 
2.2 Formulae 
j=l  
for t i  <  t  < and i = 1, • • • ,7i, 
D{w!)  
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where stands for the initial level of degradation parameter {à) that reaches 
failure size at time t when the vector of degradation law parameters has the values 
(w'), and n is the total number of inspections. We denote by tji+l the horizon time. 
Here, g is the initial level of degradation probability density function, D{w') denotes 
the domain of all values of (ty'), w = and 4>^/{t), tj] represents the 
probability not to reject at inspection time t j  an component with parameters w! 
heading to fail at t. Finally, G is the joint cumulative probability distribution of the 
degradation law parameters. 
For the discrete part of the service life length distribution (Pr{r = t^}), i.e, 
rejection occurs at the ith inspection which takes place at time we have 
/  /  n  Pa I^  '  ^ j]  ,  4>,  9[4>]  d (pdG{w ) 
D{w!) 0 j —1 
for z = 2,... ,71, 
S s Pj i lm' ,  <p,  t i ]g[<p]d<pdG{y/ )  for z = 1, 
D{w')  0  
(2.2) 
where Pj^[w' ,  4>,  t j ]  is the complementary probability of P^[y / ,  <p,  t j ]  defined above. 
This last formula is also used for the probability of reaching the horizon, by setting 
an inspection at t^  = Horizon time, with Pj^  = 1. 
The hazard function X{t )  is calculated from 
where Fj'lt), the cumulative probability of having the component ending its service 
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life before time t ,  may be obtained from 
= ^j} + /9ti^)dt, (2.3) 
j=1 0 
where t  G i = 1,... ,re, and is defined as the horizon time. 
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3. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM 
We describe here how the computer program actually computes the formulae of 
the previous section and plots the corresponding graphs. 
3.1 Discretizations 
In order to approximate and evaluate numerically the formulae of the previous 
section, two input probability distributions, (i.e., initial level of degradation distri­
bution and bivariate distribution of the degradation law parameters) are truncated 
and discretized. Thus, the féiilure time distribution and the hazard function become 
discrete. Therefore, the formulae to be computed need modifications. For example, 
consider first that only the bivariate distribution is discretized, then we have from 
(2.1), with w' = (C, m), C and m being 2 parameters sufficient to describe the 
degradation law, 
C, m j=l 
for < t < J and i  = 1,  • •  •  ,n .  
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Next, if we want the probability t  + At)  to fail in an interval {t ,  t  + At)  between 
two inspections (say, an interval of the gj^it) discretized distribution), we write 
Note that limits in the integral were permuted considering that the time to failure 
increases as the initial level of degradation decreases. Also, the discretization on 
gj'it) is such that inspection times are ends of intervals. Finally, if the 4> distribution 
is discretized and intervals are indexed by g, we have intervals denoted by (A (6)g, 
with associated probabilities g{{Aé)q). Thus, instead of integrating over all o values 
heading to the A f interval of interest, we sum over all the {A<f>)q intervals heading 
to intersect in this {t, t -h At) interval. This leads to 
ÏOT < t  < t  + At < ti j_i  and i = 1, • • • ,n ,  
or, integrating over é instead of t ,  
{oT < t  < t  + At  < and i = 1, . . . ,  n.  
gj ' i t ,  At)  = ^  ^5[(Açi)g] 
c,m {A<f>c^jni^, t+At))q . 
(3.4) 
for < t  < t  + At  < i = 1, ..., re. 
where we will have to define 
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1. How the probability associated with an incoming (A <p)g interval is altered when 
an inspection is performed on this interval, and 
2. How the probabilities associated with the different (A4>)q incoming intervals 
t h a t  c r o s s  a  g i v e n  ( ( ,  (  +  A  t )  a r e  a s s i g n e d  t o  ( ( ,  (  +  A  t ) .  
Similarly, the probability of rejection (Formula (2.2)) becomes 
= 
i-1 
E E n m, (Aç!>)ç, i •] P^[C, m, (Aç.)ç, i^-]5r[(Ao)g] 
C,m{Aéç^^i t i ,oc))qj=l 
' for z = 2,..., 71 
S E Pji [ C ,m , ( A é ) q , t i ]g [ ( / : ^ ( f > ) q ]  for î = 1, 
C,m(A4>Q^^it i ,oo))q 
(3.3) 
where the second summation is over all A<?i intervals that lead to failure in [ t j ,  oo) 
for given C, m. The cumulative probability in the hazard function (Formula (2.3)), 
is 
=  t j }  ^ ' ^ g j ' { ( A t ) r ) ,  (3.6) 
j = l  
where { A t ) r  is the rth interval of the discretized and g j ' { { A t ) r ) . ,  the proba­
bility associated to (At)r, is given by (3.4). 
3.2 Overall Algorithm Description 
First of all, notice that it would be quite inefficient to program the previous 
formulae blindly. For instance, for the probability of failure in the, say, rth interval 
(A ()r, we do not know in advance what the {A(I>q ^((A ()r))g are that will grow 
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to intersect { A t ) r -  That is, the sums over all the combinations of C, m, { A (p ) q  
would have few terms that do lead to failure in the rth interval for any given r. So, 
the program works the opposite way. Instead of focusing on one failure interval, say 
(A t)r, and grow all {A<i>)q, with aU combinations of C, m so that all (A intervals 
intersecting {At)r are found and the probability to reach (fail in) {At)r evaluated. 
The program grows aU (A ©)g, with all combinations of C, m, once each, and assigns 
•the probabilities associated to each incoming {A(p)q interval to the (Ai) intervals 
that happen to be crossed. This is performed in part 3 of the program description 
coming next. 
We have the following main parts in the program 
1. Discretizations are performed: 
• The initial level-of-degradation parameter distribution is discretized by 
first selecting the probability that will be left out of the extreme tails. 
Then, the remaining range is partitioned in a finite number of intervals 
(grid) and probabilities are associated to each interval by integrating the 
continuous distribution over this interval. Finally, the probability distri­
bution is restandardized so that the total probability adds up to 1. 
• The joint distribution of the degradation law parameters is approximated 
by a rectangular grid centered at the means of the two parameters. Each 
side of the rectangle is given as input and handled by the program as 
being a range of 6 x «r, where <t is the standard deviation of the random 
parameter corresponding to this side. The probability assigned to each 
bidimensional cell is the height of the continuous joint distribution at the 
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center of the cell multiplied by the area of the cell. 
• The failure time grid is created by computing the shorter and larger failure 
times, (from all possible C, m, (p combinations), and by partitioning the 
range of time so obtained in the desired number of intervals. 
2. Then, the program loops over all the C, m, discrete values, and for each 
combination of these parameters computes 
• the level of degradation at inspection times/horizon, and 
• the time at which the level of degradation reaches its critical level 
by solving the degradation law, respectively 
• at C, m, <f),  inspection/horizon time, 
• at C, m, é, critical degradation level. 
3. Probabilities of rejection and failure are computed as follows. (See Figure 1). 
Each {Aé)q interval with its associated probability g[{A.é)q^^ degrades up to 
the first inspection according to the values down' çi'g,up that delimit 
this interval. There, it meets the P.O.D and comes out with an associated 
probability 
X + f.0.D(^p)/2, 
where the superscript is to indicate that the starting values (p^ down' up 
have degraded until the time of the first inspection and are now the super-
, scripted values. Thus, the probability of detection for the incoming level of 
degradation interval is defined as the average of the probabilities to detect the 
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upper and lower values of this interval. (In figure 1, these upper and lower val­
ues are indicated for the largest degradation parameter interval with horizontal 
segments on the P.O.D line). The complement 1 — i.e., the probability 
for that interval to be detected at inspection 1, is saved to form part of the 
probability of rejection at inspection 1. Then, the level of degradation interval 
keeps on degrading and eventually reaches its critical value or the horizon (pos­
sibly after meeting other inspections with the same scenario). When reaching 
the critical value, it meets the failure time grid and the probability associated 
to the incoming interval is assigned to the failure time grid intervals. A grid 
interval intersected by an incoming cell receives a proportion of incoming prob­
ability equal to the proportion of the incoming cell that the intersected part 
of the grid interval represents on the time to failure axis (i.e., in Figure 1, the 
incoming interval with width D on the failure time axis passes a percentage 
dID of its probability to the 7th failure time grid interval). As to the horizon, 
it is handled as an inspection with P.O.D= 1. 
The special cases where an incoming interval contains an inspection/horizon 
time, when reaching the critical value, is dealt with by splitting the incoming 
interval in one part that goes to failure, the other passing through the inspec­
tion/horizon (e.g., dl and d2 in Figure 1). 
4. Finally, after all loops are completed, the value of the failure time distribution 
corresponding to each failure time grid interval is obtained by dividing the total 
probability grp{[At)r) assigned to the rth interval by the width (Ai)r of the 
interval. The hazard function is constructed on the same failure time grid; 
for the rth interval, the value of the hazard function is obtained by dividing 
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gj^{{At)r) by the survival function up to this interval, using (3.6). However, 
notice that this gives the hazard function for intervals as defined in the time 
to failure grid; if we are rather interested in the hazard function for the next 
unit of time, then t)r) has to be divided by the survival function and by 
{ A t ) r ,  that is the choice in this program. 
The S-plus/Fortran interaction in the operations presented above is as follows 
• The numerical inputs necessary for a given plot of interest are given to an initial 
S-function. 
• This S-function calls S-plus/Fortran interfacing S-functions so that 
• the heavy calculations described above are performed by Fortran routines which 
return the necessary numerical outputs to the initial S-function via the inter­
facing S-functions. 
• Then, the desired curves are plotted by the initial S-function. 
Note that when the degradation law parameters are random, degradation curves are 
plotted only for their central values. Figure 2 is an example of degradation curves 
obtained by looping over three initial level of degradation values, as well as three 
values of each C and m with data from example 1, next section. Note that the 
parameters are primed in Figure 2 for consistency with example 1 notations. 
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4. EXAMPLES 
The two examples presented next are cases of fatigue crack growth. That is, the 
level-of-degradation parameter is the size of a crack located within the component 
of interest. Under cyclic loading, the crack grows until it reaches a critical size. A 
classical model in materials science, used to describe the crack growth, is the Paris 
law, a differential equation relating crack length (a) and number of loading cycles (i/) 
as follows 
dv 
Thus, the crack growth rate ^ depends on A K ,  the difference between maximum 
and minimum of the stress intensity factor K during a cycle, and on two physical 
parameters C and m, derived empirically (e.g., see Trantina and Johnson 1983). 
Actually, the stress intensity factor is related to both the crack length a and to 
the applied stress cr. When a hurried, isolated crack has a circular shape, and is 
subjected to a pure tensile stress a this relation is given by if = ^ <t \/âlr. In other 
configurations, the 2/% factor in this expression may be replaced by an appropriate 
configuration factor, see Anderson (1991). We take the minimum stress as being 0 
so that A (T = <7 and the differential equation may be written 
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For more details, see for example Anderson (1991). Of course, by setting 
I / 2 \ m 
C = C y-cr y/ ir j  (4.2) 
and 
m = m/2,  (4.3) 
(4.1) reduces to 
du 
In both examples, we assume that 
• the crack growth obeys the Paris law presented above, 
• the parameters C' and m' have a joint bivariate normal distribution, 
• there are twenty opportunities for inspection, equally spaced in time, the first 
at time zero, the last at the horizon time, 
• inspections are scheduled so that the hazard function remains below a given 
critical value. 
Next, for each example we describe the numerical inputs of the model, and study 
how modifying some of them affect the reliability figures of interest. 
4.1 Example 1 
4.1.1 Inputs 
Data in this example appeared originally in Hudak, Saxena, Bucci, and Malcolm 
(1978). Based on curves drawn from these data by Bogdanoff and Kozin (1985), 
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Lu and Meeker (1993) estimate the means and the covariance matrix of C' and m! 
assuming they are random and distributed bivariate normal. Time units are here 
millions of cycles with the horizon set at 0.1-5 millions of cycles. Crack length units 
are inches and we set the critical crack size at 1.4 inches. The critical level for 
the hazard function is set at 2 x 10~^. Moreover, we have the following numerical 
characteristics for the initial setting: 
• The initial crack size is normally distributed. It is truncated from the 0.001 
quantile set at 0.65 inch to the 0.999 quantile set at 1 inch, restandardized and 
discretized in 149 equally spaced intervals. 
• The probability of detection distribution is a logistic. It is defined as having its 
0.001 quantile set at 1 inch and its 0.999 quantile set at 1.4 inch. 
• We assumed that C' and m! are distributed as 
/ 
(3.7319,2.5714), {C' ,m) ~ BVN 
( / \ \ 
.5456 -.09553 
-.09553 .06667 \ \ / / 
that is, SD(C') = 0.7386, SD(m') = 0.2582, Cor(C', m') = -0.5. 
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis on Reliability Figures 
4.1.2.1 Discretizations Three discretizations are involved in the computa­
tions of the time-to-failure density and therefore of the hazard function. Namely, the 
initial crack size distribution, the Paris parameters joint distribution (inputs) and 
the time-to-failure density (output) are discretized. Although an exhaustive study 
of the discretizing combinations for different parameters setting is not our purpose 
here, we make a few comparisons and comments on this issue and present our choice. 
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Initial crack size distribution In Figures 3, 4, 5, the initial crack size normal dis­
tribution is partitioned into respectively 49, 99, 149 equally spaced intervals, 
as may be appreciated in the distances between growing curves. The values 
showed on the graphs for the probabilities of failure indicate that discretizing 
beyond 149 will hardly improve the approximation for the overall failure prob­
ability value by more than 3 x 10 when discretizing the bivariate normal 
with a 20 X 20 bidimensional grid, or by more than 2 x 10~'^, when discretizing 
the bivariate normal with a 5 x 5 grid. As we will see, the effect of modify­
ing the types of the probability densities, or certain parameters, is larger by 
several orders of magnitude. We, therefore, work with a 149 discretization for 
the initial crack size distribuition. Note, however, that it is a simple matter to 
modify this value ad libitum, because input parameters are at the S-plus level 
in the software. Of course, computation time increases linearly with the size of 
this discretization. 
Bivariate normal discretization Any of Figures 3, 4, 5 together with Figure 14, 
where the random case is for a 10 x 10 discretization, indicate that by parti­
tioning the joint distribution of {C',m!) in as few as 25 cells, we already detect 
most of the effect due to the stochasticity of these parameters (The term "fixed" 
in the graph refers to nonstochastic parameters). Here, we chose the 10 x 10 
option. Note that computing time grows as in an nx x nx discretization. 
Time-to-failure discretization Note first that no matter how many intervals in 
the time-to-failure grid, the probabilities of failure for intervals between in­
spections will be exactly the same since they are the sum of the incoming 
140 
probabilities. Two important features however depend on how fine the time-to 
failure grid is chosen: the visual smoothness of the time-to-failure density and 
hazard function and the translation of this smoothness to the mathematics, i.e., 
the available for calculating probabilities of failure between 2 given times, and 
the available accuracy for evaluating the hazard function ay any time point. In 
this example, a time-to -failure grid of 180 equally spaced intervals is used. 
As for the initial crack size distribution discretization, modifying the number of inter­
vals in the bivariate or the failure time discretizations simply amounts to substituting 
a number in the S-function. 
4.1.2.2 Effect of cheinging the initial crack size probability distribu­
tion In Figures 6/7, we compare the effect on the time-to-failure density/hazard 
function of having a logistic versus normal initial crack size distribution for the no-
inspection case, and for nonstochastic parameters C' and •m! . It is readily observed, 
both visually and numerically, that this effect is not negligible. In particular, the 
probability of failure differs by about 0.07, (Figure 6). Figure 7 shows that for the 
given critical hazard value, the first inspection would not be scheduled at the same 
opportunity if we have a logistic instead of a normal initial crack size distribution. 
The same comparison is done in Figures 8/9, but now, C' and m' are bivariate 
normal distributed as described in the previous section on "inputs". The variability 
in C' and m! appears to have the interesting effect of covering the variability between 
logistic and normal. Specifically, the difference between failure probabilities has re­
duced to 0.02 (Figure 8) and the hazard functions for the logistic and normal cases 
cross the critical hazard value in the same inspection opportunity interval (Figure 9). 
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4.1.2.3 Effect of changing the P.O.D distribution In Figures 10/11, we 
compare the effect on the time-to-failure density/hazard function of having a smallest 
extreme value (s.e.v) versus logistic P.O.D distribution, for nonstochastic parameters 
C' and m! and for a normal initial crack size distribution. An inspection is set at 
opportunity 11 as required for not having the hazard function cross its critical value 
(See Figure 7). Here too, it is clearly observed, both visually and numerically that 
the effect of changing the P.O.D distribution is not negligible. The probabilities of 
failure after the inspection differ by about 0.09, (Figure 10). Figure 11 shows that for 
the given critical hazard value, the second inspection would not be scheduled at the 
same opportunity if we have a s.e.v instead of a logistic P.O.D distribution, namely, 
12 instead of 13. 
The same comparison is done in Figure 12/13, but now, C' and m! are bivariate 
normal distributed as described in the previous section on "inputs". The inspection is 
now set at opportunity 10 (See Figure 9) so that the hazard function do not cross its 
critical value. The difference between failure probabilities after inspection is here of 
about 0.065 (Figure 12) and the hazard functions for the s.e.v and logistic cases do not 
cross the critical hazard value in the same inspection opportunity interval. Actually, 
we cannot compare directly the sets of Figures 10/11 and Figures 12/13 starting with 
the fact that inspections are not performed at the same points. However, numbers and 
graphs indicate that s.e.v versus logistic P.O.D's generate about the same differences 
on time-to-failure density and hazard function, for fixed or random C' and m!. This 
should be obvious considering that P.O.D's deal with the size of the crack that is 
measured, independently of the probability for the crack to be of this size. 
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4.1.2.4 Effect of the C' and m' stochastic!ty Figure 14 shows how the 
time-to-failure density is affected when C' and m' are considered random and dis­
tributed as a bivariate normal with parameters as specified in the previous "inputs" 
section instead of being considered fixed with values equzd to the means of the ran­
dom case. Growth curves in this figure are these of the fixed case. The dot on the 
critical crack size line indicates where the first crossing occurs in the random case. 
Both from the position of this dot (at about 4 inspection opportunities before the 
fixed case first crossing time), and from the shapes of the failure densities, it is clear 
that the increase in the failure density spread due to the C' and m! stochasticity is 
important. Also, the probabilities indicated on the graph show that the spread of 
the failure probabilities when taking C' and m! random is larger to the right than to 
the left. This is easily understood by looking at Figure 2 again, where the growing 
curves are calculated with data from the present example. Thus, the term "level of 
degradation" in Figure 2 actually refers to crack size. For clarity, only three values 
are considered for each of the initial crack size, C' and m!. The three values of C' 
and m! are their means, and values deviated at ± 2 times their respective cr. Thus, 
we observe that 
1. Most of the variability in the time to failure is accounted for by the variability 
of C',  
2. The low value of C', is pushed farther away to the right than what the high 
value of C' is pushed away to the left (from the C' mean). This is why in 
Figure 14, we have more spread of the fixed case failure density to the right 
than to the left when passing to the random case. 
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We see in Figure 15 that the hazard function crosses its critical value in different 
inspection opportunity intervals so that taking in account the variability of C' and 
m! will modify where to start the inspections scheme. Figure 16 actually illustrates 
the complete inspections schemes that result from considering C' and m! random or 
not. Observe that these schemes differ in several places. 
4.1.3 Comments 
In practice, the fact that the time-to-failure density is wider in some settings 
than in others, matters in the two following ways 
• A larger left tail of the time-to-failure density is likely to imply an earlier first 
inspection, 
• More variability in the time-to-failure density implies a lesser accuracy in our 
ability to predict where failure may occur. 
Finally, it may be interesting to compare the original curves from experimental data 
in BogdanofF and Kozin (1985) (Figure 17) with the curves obtained by fitting a Paris 
law with bivariate normal parameters to the original curves (Figure 18). The theo­
retical curves in Figure 18 are grown for 7 C' quantiles equally spaced in probability 
and 3 quantiles of m! also equally spaced in probability. 
4.2 Example 2 
The component in this example is made of 304 stainless steel powder metal. Data 
were furnished by the Center for Nondestructive Evaluation at Iowa State University. 
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4.2.1 Inputs 
The crack is assumed to have a circularshape, and equation (4.1) is used with 
the following parameters values 
• The yield stress of this material is 3.3 x 10^ Pascals. We choose a safety factor 
of 2 and thus we have cr = 1.65 x 10^ Pascals, 
• m = 3.25, 
•  C  =  5.9 X 10"^, in units such that the left side of (4.1) is obtained in mil­
limeters/cycle when <7 and a are substituted respectively in Megapascals and 
meters. 
With the parameters in the units given above, we write (4.1) as 
^ = C X 10^ 10~® X (7 y 10"3 X ax] , 
dv \TT J 
where a is in millimeters in both sides of the equation and the factor 10~^ puts it 
back in meters to be consistent with C units. The factor 10~® puts a in Megapascals, 
and the factor 10^ gives the crack growth rate per millions of cycles. Thus, we have 
finally, from (4.2) and (4.3) 
C '  =  5.9 X 10-9 X 10® IQ-G x 1.65 x 10^ ^/lO'^ x , 
giving 
C '  =  1.87. 
Also, 
m = m/2 = 1.625. 
Moreover, 
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The failure (critical) crack size is given as being of 0.2 mm. 
The critical hazard value is fixed at 10"'. 
The horizon is set at 15 millions of cycles. 
Twenty equally spaced opportunities for inspections are set, with the first at 
time 0, the last one being the horizon time. 
The initial crack size distribution is modeled as a normal, truncated from the 
0.001 quantile set at 0.002 mm to the 0.999 quantile set at 0.02 mm. The 
distribution is restandardized and discretized in 149 equally spaced intervals. 
The probability of detection is a smallest extreme value distribution. It is 
defined as having its 0.001 quantile set at 0.0 mm and its 0.999 quantile set at 
0.15 mm. 
A bivariate normal is assumed for C' and m!. Data were not available for 
estimating the variability of C and m, and therefore the variability of C' and m! 
by using for instance the so called "delta method", (e.g., see Lawless ( 1982), pp. 
516,517). We opted for using the coefficient of variation CV = /i/cr evaluated 
from Example 1 in order to illustrate the possible effect of spread here. Thus, 
considering the same CV for C' in both examples, we get 
X 0.7386 = 0.3701 
and, similarly, for m' 
X 0.2582 = 0.1632. 
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• Finally, in agreement with the previous item, we take a coefficient of correlation 
of -0.5. 
4.2.2 Graphical Analysis of Reliability 
4.2.2.1 C' and m! fixed Figure 19 shows the behavior of the growth curve 
and the failure time density. Due to the size of the critical crack size with respect to 
the initial values of the crack, the growth curves are very steep by the time they reach 
the critical value. Notice also that the failure time density has a much larger skew to 
the right and spread than in Example 1, this is seen for instance in the growth curves 
of the smallest cq values, which reach the horizon with about no slope. This makes 
failure time prediction less accurate. In terms of reliability, the steepness implies 
that crack with small values, and therefore undetected, by the time an inspection 
is performed, can reach the critical size a short time later. It may be observed in 
Figure 20, that the hazard function has a first portion of fast increase and then settle 
down relatively. (Compare the change in the hazard function slope with the one in 
Figure 7, Example 1). This is due to the short left tail of the failure time density 
compared to Example 1, i.e., after the first crossing, the failure density increases 
rapidly, (Compare this density with the one in Figure 6). 
Thus, when setting an inspection at the 12th inspection opportunity (See Fig­
ures 21/22), the failure time density as well as the hazard function, reach rapidly 
their respective curves of the no inspection case. Finally, in order to maintain the 
hazard below its critical value, inspections need to be scheduled at each inspection 
opportunity, as seen in Figure 23. Even so, the crossing points shift slowly to the 
left indicating that in some settings, the next crossing point could eventually occurs 
147 
before the next inspection opportunity. 
4.2.2.2 C' and m' random Figures 24/25 show respectively how the failure 
time density and the hazard function are modified when putting variability on C' and 
mJ as indicated in section 4.2.1. Clearly, the spread of the failure time density is very 
large now. The flatness of the density translates into a hazard function that grows 
very fast and then stabilizes. This may indicate that the coefficient of variation 
technique does not lead to realistic values of C' and m' variabilities. However, in 
order to make a sounder comparison with the first example, we compare again the 
behavior of the failure time densities with and without stochasticity in C' and m', 
with the critical crack size set now at 0.04 mm. Thus, the relative vailues of the initial 
and critical crack sizes are close to these in Example 1. Figure 26 shows this new 
graph. 
First and last crossing times in the fixed crack growth parameters case are 
(.3.47, 35.2) when the critical size is set at 0.04 mm, and (7.53, 39.26) when it is 
set at 0.2 mm. First and last crossing times in the random crack growth parameters 
case are (0.46, 776) for the critical size at 0.04 mm, and (1.34, 800) at 0.2 mm. Thus, 
and as expected, shifting the critical crack size does not make much difference in 
the relative spread of the fixed to random case failure time densities. It is precisely 
due to the steepness of the growth curves. Hence, the variability used in this second 
example illustration may be questionable. This analysis leads, however, to the fol­
lowing consideration: as the critical crack size gets larger with respect to the initial 
crack size vedues, the variability on the growth curves increases its share of the failure 
time density variability. For a small critical crack size, in the previous sense, most 
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of the failure time density variability is due to the variability in the initial crack size 
distribution. 
149 
5. SUMMARY 
This paper considers the problem of components that degrade while in use until 
they either fail or are removed from service at an inspection, or, in the best eventu­
ality, reach they design life. A computer program, interfacing the S-plus and Fortran 
languages, is presented for the case where the initial level of degradation is random 
from component to component, and where the degradation law depends on two jointly 
distributed random parameters. Inspections are performed to assess the current level 
of degradation. They include measurement error so that the observed level of degra­
dation is random. The computer program focuses on two reliability figures of merit, 
the failure time probability density and the hazard function. Beside the numerical 
analysis of these functions, the program draws graphs that relate the degradation 
curves with the probability densities both of the inputs and outputs variables. The 
effect of inspections both on the failure time density and on the hazard function may 
also be appreciated visually. 
Two sets of real data, where degradation is a fatigue crack growth process, are 
used for illustration. The graphical analysis of the reliability turns out to be very 
useful in the sense that it provides us with immediate insights as to the failure 
behavior of the component of interest. 
With minor changes in the program, other useful quantities like the cumulative 
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probability distribution (so we know the probability to fail before a given time), or 
time quantiles (so we know the point in time such that the probability to fail before 
we reach it is, say, 0.01) can be evaluated. Then, the effect of inspections could be 
assessed in term of these quantities. Notice that this numerical evaluation of the 
degradation/inspection/failure process may already be appreciated qualitatively in 
the graphs. 
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Figure 9: Comparison of hazard functions for normal versus logistic initial crack 
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Figure 10; Comparison of time-to-failure densities for s.e.v versus logistic P.O.D 
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Figure 11: Comparison of hazard functions for s.e.v versus logistic P.O.D with fixed 
crack growth parameters (Example I) 
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Figure 12: Comparison of time-to-failure densities for s.e.v versus logistic P.O.D 
with random crack growth parameters (Example 1) 
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Figure 13: Comparison of hazard functions for s.e.v versus logistic P.O.D with ran­
dom crack growth parameters (Example 1) 
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Figure 14: Comparison of time-to-failure densities for random versus fixed crack 
growth parameters (Example 1) 
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Figure 15: Comparison of hazard functions for random versus fixed crack growth 
parameters (Example 1) 
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Figure 16: Comparison of hazard functions for random versus fixed crack growth 
parameters with respective optimal inspections scheme (Example 1) 
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Figure 17: Experimental crack growth curves (Example 1) 
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Figure 18: Theoretical crack growth curves (Example 1) 
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Figure 19: Crack growth curves and time-to-failure density for fixed crack growth 
parameters (Example 2) 
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Figure 20: Hazard function for fixed crack growth parameters (Example 2) 
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Figure 21; C'omparison of time-to-failure densities with and without inspection for 
fixed crack growth parameters (Example 2) 
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Figure 22: (Comparison of hazard functions with and without inspection for fixed 
craclc growth parameters (Example 2) 
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l'igiup 2'}; Comparison of hazard fniirtioiis for fixed rrack growt h parameters as 
inspections are set to avoid crossing the critleal \ alue (Example 2) 
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Figure '21: Comparison of t.iine-to-failure densities for random versus fixed era* k 
growth parameters (Example 2) 
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Figure 25: C'onii>aiison of hazard functions for random versus fixed crack growt h 
])avanieters (Example 2) 
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APPENDIX A: ILLUSTRATION OF THE S FUNCTIONS USE 
We give here two examples of the use of the S functions. 
1. Crack growth curves and failure time probability distribution plot 
The following set of operations in S produces Figure 19. 
nde.ai.model <-malc0.ai.model(hazlim =le-7, maixtime = 15) 
nde.crack.model <-make.crack.model( paris.n =1.625, paris.c = 
1.87, random.crack=F, cor = -.50, af = .2, 
distribution = "normal", perclow = 0.002, 
perchi =0.02) 
nde.pod.model <-make.pod.model(distribution = "sev", 
perclow = 0.0, perchi = 0.15) 
index <-c(0) 
crackplot(index, bk.ai.model, bk.pod.model, bk.crack.model) 
2. Overlapped failure time probability distribution plots 
The following set of operations in S produces Figure 10. 
bk. ad .modeK-meJce. ai. model (hazlim = 2e-06, maxtime = .15) 
bk. crack.modeK-maike.crack.model( paris.n = 2.5714, 
peuris.c = 3.7319 , random.crack = F, 
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cor = -.50, aif = 1.4, distribution 
= "nonnal", perclow = 0.65, perchi =1) 
bk. pod. modeK-make. pod. model (di stribut ion = "logistic", 
perclow = 1,perchi = 1.4) 
bk.overai.modeK-make.ai.model(hazlim = 2e-06, maxtime = .15) 
bk. over crack. modeK-make. crack, model ( paris, n =2.5714, 
paris.c = 3.7319 , random.crack=F,cor = -.50, 
af =1.4, distribution = "normal", 
perclow = 0.65, perchi = 1) 
bk.overpod. modeK-make .pod. model (distribut ion = "sev", 
perclow = 1,perchi = 1.4) 
index<-c(ll) 
overindex<-c(11) 
overcrackplot ( index, overindex, bk. ai. model, bk. o verai. model, 
bk. pod. model, bk. o verpod. model, bk. crack .model, 
bk.overcrack.model, kprint=0) 
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APPENDIX B: DOCUMENTATION OF S FUNCTIONS 
Plot crack growth curves and failure-time probability distribution. 
DESCRIPTION: 
Produce a plot of the crack growth curves, failure-time 
probability distribution, initial crack size probability 
distribution and, if there acre inspections, of the P.O.D 
distribution. 
USAGE: 
crackplot(index, ai.model, pod.model, crack.model, kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities where inspec­
tions will be performed. No inspection is specified as 0, 
(index <-c(0)). 
ai.model; a list of parameters produced by ''make.ai.model''. 
pod.model: a list of parameters about the P.O.D model pro­
duced by ''make.pod.model''. 
crack.model; a list of paorameters about crack growth and ini­
tial crack values produced by "make.crack.model". 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS; 
kprint; debug option for Fortram routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
vauriables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE; 
Beside plotting growth curves and failure-time, initial 
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crack size and P.O.D probability distributions, probabili­
ties of failure and removal at inspection/horizon aire 
available and may be indicated on the graph. 
SEE ALSO: 
make.ai.model, maike.pod.model, meike.crack.model. 
Plot hazard function 
DESCRIPTION: 
Produce a plot of the hazard function with values of the 
hazard function on a vertical logarithmic scale. 
USAGE: 
hazplot(index, ai.model, pod.model, crack.model, kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities where inspec­
tions will be performed. No inspection is specified as 0, 
(index<-c(0)). 
ai.model: a list of parameters produced by ''make.ai.model''. 
pod.model: a list of paurameters about the P.O.D model (produced by 
''make.pod.model''). 
crack.model: a list of parameters about crack growth and ini­
tial crack values produced by ''make.crack.model''. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
variables in Fortran routines. 
SEE ALSO: 
make. ai .model, make. pod. model, make. crack. model. 
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Call Fortran routine "kernel" 
DESCRIPTION: 
Called by S functions ''crackplot" or ''hazplot'' to pass 
information to Fortran routine ' 'kernel'' for calculations 
of crack growth curves, failure and removal probabilities. 
USAGE: 
kernel(crack.model, aOden, pod.model, index, itset, tivec, 
kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
crack.model: a list of parameters about the crack growth and 
initial values, produced by ''make.crack.model''. 
aOden: a list with the vector of crack size values and the 
corresponding vector of probabilities representing numeri­
cally the discretized initial crack size distribution. 
pod.model: a list of parameters about the P.O.D model, pro­
duced by ''make.pod.model''. 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities where inspec­
tions will be performed. No inspection is specified as 0, 
(i.e., index <-c(0)). 
itset: the vector of inspections/horizon indicators at the in­
spections opportunities, with 1 for inspection, 2 for 
horizon and 0 otherwise. It is produced by ''gtitset''. 
tivec: the vector of inspection opportunities times. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS : 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
vauriables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE: 
A list with the following components: tgvec: the vector 
of crossing (the critical crack size) times. If crack 
growth parameters sure random, this is the vector of 
crossing times for mid-values of the peurameters. atmat: 
the matrix of crack sizes versus time until crossing times. 
If crack growth peurameters are random, this is the matrix of 
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crack sizes versus time for mid-values of the paurameters. 
grid: a vector for which elements are the time values defining 
the intervals grid used to plot the failure-time probabil­
ity distribution, prgrid: a vector which elements are the 
failure probabilities associated to the intervals ''grid'', 
fprep : the total probability of removal, fpfadl; the to­
tal probability of failure. 
SEE ALSO: 
make.crack.model, make.pod.model, gtitset. 
NOTE: 
This function returns also the input information. 
Create a list of parameters 
DESCRIPTION: 
Produce a list of input parameters related to crack growth 
law and initial crack size probability distribution. 
USAGE: 
make.crack.model(paris.n, paris.c, cor, af, distribution, 
perclow, perchi, nx, rangxn=NULL, rangxc=NULL, random.crack=T, 
perc=0.001, ningri=90) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
paris.n: the value of the power in the single case of Paris 
law, i.e., C x a"(n); the mean of ''n" when ''n" is random, 
paris.c: the multiplicative factor ''C' in the simple case of 
Pairis law; the mean of ' ' C '  when ' ' C '  is random. 
cor: the coefficient of correlation between ''C' cind ''n'' . 
af: the critical crack size. 
distribution: the type of distribution for the initial crack 
size. May be normal, lognormal, sev, weibull, logistic, 
loglogistic. 
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perclow: the value at which the 0.001 quantile of the initial 
crack size distribution is set. 
perchi: the value at which the 0.999 quantile of the initial 
crack size distribution is set. 
nx: the number of intervals in the discretization of each of 
"C" and ''n'' , i.e., the joint distribution of ''C' and 
''n'' is partitioned in ''nx*(2)'' cells. Default in the 
random case is 10. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
ramgxn: the range of values of ''n''. Handled as 6 times the 
standard deviation of ''n'' in the program. 
raingxc: the range of values of ''C'. Handled as 6 times the 
standeurd deviation of ''C' in the program. 
random. crack : a parameter with true (T) , false (F) values in­
dicating if the crack growth is modeled with random (T) or 
fixed (F) peurameters ''C" and ''n'' . Default is true. ' 
perc: the probability left out in each tail of the initial 
crack size distribution when truncating. Default is 0.001. 
ningri: the number of intervals in the discretization of the 
failure-time probability distribution. Default is 90. 
VALUE: 
a list with all the components listed above. 
Create a list of parameters 
DESCRIPTION; 
Produce a list of miscellaneous input parameters. 
USAGE: 
maike.ai.model(haizlim, maxtime, hscale=le-06, na0v=149, ntail 
=74, nsub=74, ntiv=20) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
haizlim: the critical value of the haizard function (value that 
should not be reached). 
maxtime : the meucimum value of the service-life time, e.g., the 
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design life or horizon. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
hscale: a scaling factor necessaury to calculate the hazard 
function as a probability to fail in the next cycle being 
that the units used are a multiple of one cycle. By de­
fault, units are millions of cycle so that ''hscale=10"(-
6 ) "  .  
naOv: the number of intervals in the discretization of the 
initial crack size probability distribution. Default is 
149. 
ntail: the number of intervals, in each tail of the initial 
crack size probability distribution, that will be 
rediscretized with equal spaces (on level of degradation 
axis). Default is 74. 
the number of equally spaced intervals in which each 
tail (made of ntail intervals) will be rediscretized. De­
fault is 74 so that the whole initial crack size distribu­
tion is actually discretized with equally spaced intervals 
by default. 
the number of opportunities for inspections between 
service time 0 and meuctime, both inclusive. 
a list with all the components listed above. 
Create a list of parameters 
DESCRIPTION: 
Produce a list of inputs peurameters related to the 
probability of detection distribution (P.O.D). 
USAGE: 
make.pod.model(distribution, perclow, perchi, perc=0.001) 
nsub : 
ntiv: 
VALUE: 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
distribution: the type of distribution for the P.O.D. May be 
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normal, lognormal, sev, weibull, logistic, loglogistic. 
perclow: the value at which the 0.001 quantile of the P.O.D 
distribution is set. 
perchi: the value at which the 0.999 quantile of the P.O.D dis­
tribution is set. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
perc: the probability left out in each tail of the initial 
crack size distribution when truncating. Default is 0.001. 
VALUE: 
A list with all the conçonents listed above. 
Get factor standardizing height of failure-time distribution 
DESCRIPTION: 
Get maximum height of the failure time probability distri­
bution with no inspection and get factor such that this 
height is 75% of the available space to plot the distribu­
tion. This factor needed in ''crackplot''. 
USAGE: 
get.denfact(crack.model, aOden, pod.model, itset, tivec, 
kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS; 
crack.model: a list of parameters about the crack growth and 
initial values, produced by ''make.crack.model''. 
aOden: a list with the vector of crack size values and the 
corresponding vector of probabilities representing numeri­
cally the discretized initial crack size distribution, 
pod.model: a list of parameters about the P.O.D model,. pro­
duced by ''make.pod.model''. 
itset: the vector of inspections/horizon indicators at the in­
spections opportunities , with 1 for inspection, 2 for 
horizon and 0 otherwise. It is produced by ''gtitset''. 
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tivec: the vector of inspection opportunities times. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
vêiriables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE: 
a standardizing factor for the maucimum height of the 
failure-time probability distribution. 
SEE ALSO: 
make. crack. model, maike. pod. model, gtitset. 
Create vector of inspections/horizon indicators 
DESCRIPTION : 
Generate a vector of O's with length equaû. to the number 
of inspections opportunities and change 0 to 1 when in­
spection, 0 to 2 at horizon. 
USAGE: 
gtitset (tivec, index) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
tivec: the vector of inspections opportunities times. 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities numbers where 
inspections are to be performed. 
VALUE: 
itset: a vector of indicators with values 0, 1, 2 as 
described above. 
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Call Fortran routine "gtdist" 
DESCRIPTION : 
Pass information to Fortran for calculating discretized 
probability distributions. 
USAGE: 
gtden(model, numden, ntail=l, nsub=l, kprint=0) 
•REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
model: the type of probability distribution we want to discre-
tize. 
numden: the number of elements in the discretization. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
ntail: the number of intervals in each tail that we want to 
discretize with equal spacings. Default is 1. 
nsub: the number of equal spaced intervals in which each of 
the ''ntail'' intervals in each tail will be discretized. 
Default is 1. 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
variables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE: 
a list with the following components 
xvec: the vector of values of the remdom variable that 
determine the discretization of the probability distribu­
tion. 
fvec: the vector of probabilities associated to the inter­
vals determined by ''xvec''. 
model: the input information. 
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Call Fortran routine "hazfun" 
DESCRIPTION: 
Called by S function ''hazplof' to pass information to For­
tran routine ''hazfun'' for calculations related to the ha-
zard function. 
USAGE : 
hazfun(kernel.out, index, hscale=l, kprint=kprint, debug=F) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
kernel.out: a list of information, obtained by ''kernel'', 
about crack growth and failure time probability distribu­
tion. 
index; the vector of inspections opportunities numbers where 
inspections will be performed. No inspection is specified 
as 0, (index<-c(0)). 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
hscale: a scaling factor necessary to calculate the hazard 
function as a probability to fail in the next cycle being 
that the units can be a multiple of one cycle. Default is 
1 .  
kprint : debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
veuriables in Fortran routines. 
debug : logical variable for debugging. Default is false (F). 
True (T) actives a ''browser'' right before the call to For­
tran. 
VALUE: 
a list with the input information and the following new 
data 
haznew: a vector of values of the hazard function. 
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Plot of overlapped failure time distributions. 
DESCRIPTION: 
Two failure time distributions eure plotted corresponding 
to different initial crack size distributions, or dif­
ferent P.O.D, or random versus fixed crack growth, etc. 
USAGE: 
overcrackplot(index, overindex, ai.model, overai.model, 
pod.model, overpod.model, crack.model, overcrack.model, kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities where inspec­
tions will be performed. No inspection is specified as 0, 
(index<-c(0)). 
overindex: the vector of inspections opportunities where in­
spections will be performed for the overlapped case. 
ai.model: a list of peurameters produced by "meike. ai .model" . 
overai.model: the same list as in the previous item, with dif­
ferent parameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
pod.model: a list of parameters about the P.O.D model pro­
duced by "make.pod.model". 
overpod.model: the same list as in the previous item, with dif­
ferent paurameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
crack.model; a list of parameters about crack growth and ini­
tial crack values produced by "maJce.crack.model". 
overcrack.model: the same list as in the previous item, with 
different paurameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
vairiables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE: 
Plot overlapped failure time distributions corresponding 
to different cases of inputs. If different initial crack 
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sizes distributions or P.O.D, these are plotted too. Crack 
growth curves are these of the "non over" inputs. 
SEE ALSO: 
meJce.ai.model, make.pod.model, make.crack.model, crack-
plot . 
Plot of overlapped hazard functions. 
DESCRIPTION: 
Two hazard functions are plotted corresponding to dif­
ferent initial crack size distributions, or different 
P.O.D, or random versus fixed crack growth, etc. 
USAGE; 
overhaizplot(index, overindex, ai.model, overai.model, 
pod.model, overpod.model, crack.model, overcrack.model, kprint=0) 
REQUIRED ARGUMENTS: 
index: the vector of inspections opportunities where inspec­
tions will be performed. No inspection is specified as 0, 
(index<-c(0)). 
overindex: the vector of inspections opportunities where in­
spections will be performed for the overlapped case. 
ai.model: a list of parameters produced by "medce.ai.model". 
overai .model: the same list as in the previous item, with dif­
ferent parameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
pod.model; a list of parameters about the P.O.D model pro­
duced by "maJce.pod.model". 
overpod .model : the same list as in the previous item, with dif­
ferent peurameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
crack.model: a list of parameters about crack growth and. ini­
tial crack values produced by "make.crack.model". 
over crack, model: the same list as in the previous item, with 
different parameters values if desired for the overlapped 
case. 
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OPTIONAL ARGUMENTS: 
kprint: debug option for Fortran routines called by S. Default 
is 0. kprint values greater than 0 print the values of 
veuriables in Fortran routines. 
VALUE: 
Plot overlapped hazard functions corresponding to dif­
ferent cases of inputs. 
SEE ALSO: 
make.ai.model, make.pod.model, make.crack.model, hazplot. 
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APPENDIX C: S FUNCTIONS 
######################################################################### 
• #  
"madce.ai.nio(iel"<-fuiiction(hazlim, maxtime, hscale=le-6, n.a0v=149, 
ntail=74,nsub =74, ntiv = 20) 
{ 
return (list (heizlim=hazliin, maxtime=maxtinie ,naOv=naOv, 
ntail=ntail, nsub=nsub, ntiv=ntiv,hscale=hscale)) 
} 
# 
########################################################################## 
# 
"make.crack.model"<-function( paris.n, pauris.c, 
cor, af, distribution, perclow, 
perchi, nx , rangxn=NirLL, rangxc=NULL, 
random.crack=T, perc =0.001, ningri = SO) 
{ 
if(random.crack){ 
if(is.null(rangxn)I lis.null(rangxc)) 
error("Missing rangxn or rangxc") 
if(missing(nx)) {nx<-10} 
> 
else{rangxn<-l 
rangxc<-l 
nx<-l} 
return(list(ningri =ningri, nx = nx, rangxn =rangxn, rangxc = 
rangxc, cor = cor, paris.n = pétris.n, 
paris.c = paris.c, 
distribution = distribution, af = af, 
perclow = perclow, 
perchi = perchi, perc = perc)) 
} 
} 
# 
########################################################################## 
# 
"make.pod.model"<-function(distribution, perclow, perchi,perc = 0.01) 
{ , 
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retiimClist(distribution = distribution, perclow = perclow, 
perchi = perchi, perc=perc)) 
} 
# 
########################################################################### 
# S function to get the standeird factor for the height of the 
# time-to-failure probability distribution 
########################################################################### 
# 
"get.denfact"<-function(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
# 
###### Set "0" inspection. 
# 
index<-c(0) 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
# 
###### Get failure distribution with no inspection. 
# 
kernel.out<-newkemel(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,index,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
# 
###### get max height of the probability distribution. 
# 
prgrid <- kernel.outSprgrid 
grid <- kernel.out$grid 
tdiff <- diff(grid) 
yden <- prgrid/tdiff 
af <-kemel. out $crack. model$af 
maxden <- max(yden) 
# 
###### Get factor "denfact" such that the max value of the failure 
# distribution is at 75'/, of the height of the upper box on 
# the graph. 
» 
top.scale <-1.2 
denfact <- (.75 * (top.scale - 1) * af)/maxden 
} 
# 
########################################################################## 
# S function to get degradation curves, failure and removal 
» probabilities, time-to-failure probability distribution, emd 
# draw degradation curves, time-to-failure probability 
# distribution, initial level of degradation distribution and 
# P.O.D if inspections. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"newcrackplot"<-function(index,ai.model,pod.model,crack.model,kprint=0) 
{ 
195 
# 
####### Create initial crack size distribution 
# 
aOden <- gtden(crack.model, ai.modelSnaOv, ai.model$ntail,ai.model$nsub) 
# 
####### Place ntiv equally spaced oportunities in interval (O.maxtime) 
# 
maxtime<-ai.modelSmaxtime 
tivec <- gttivec(maxtime, ai.modelSntiv) 
# 
####### Get opportiinities numbers where inspections are scheduled and 
####### create indicators vector. 
* 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for 
####### degradation curves and time-to-failure distribution 
# 
kernel.out<-neHkemel(crack.model, aOden,pod.model,index,itset,tivec, 
kprint=0) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for the 
####### P.O.D, used ONLY to plot the P.O.D. 
####### This discretization is used only for plot éind should be OK for 
####### all purposes. 
# 
podden <- gtden(pod.model, numden=99, ntail=49, nsub=49) 
# 
####### Find out if there are any inspections. 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset == 1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
####### Call function that calculates standeurd height factor for 
####### time-to-failure distribution. 
# 
denfact <- get.denfact(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
X <- . 1 
y <- .1 
# 
####### Get matrix of degradation versus time points 
# 
atmat <- kernel.out$atmat 
xvec <- aOdenSxvec 
naOv<-length(xvec) 
af <- crack.model$af 
# 
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####### set up test boundary mairgins for plot 
# 
tivec.mauc <- max(tivec) 
xhi.value <- 1.03 * tivec.max 
side.scale <- -0.1 
xlow.value <- side.scale * tivec.max 
» 
####### #Set up top space for the failure-time distribution. 
# 
ylow.value <- min(xvec) 
top.scale <- 1.2 
yhi.value <- top.scale * af 
par(mar = c(ll, 7, 10, 4) + 0.1) 
# 
####### Plot margins and labels. 
# 
plot(x, y, type="n",xlim = C(X1OH.value, xhi.value), ylim = 
c(yloH.value, yhi.value), xlab = 
"Service life time (Millions of cycles)", ylab ="Crack Size (in.)") 
# 
####### Make matrix of degradation curves points aind plot. In the 
####### random degradation paretmeters case, these are curves for the 
####### midvalues of the random peirameters. 
# 
tgvec<-kemel. out$tgvec 
timat <- t(matrix(rep(tivec, naOv), ncol = naOv)) 
for(j in 1:nrow(timat)) 
timat [j, atmat [j , ] >= af] <- tgvec[naOv -j +1] 
atmat [atmat > aif] <- af 
matpoints(t(timat), t(atmat), type = "1", Ity = 1, col = 2) 
# 
####### Plot initial crack size density and label 
# 
sdenplot(aOden$xvec, aOden$fvec, lty=l,fact = 0.75 * xlow.value, col = 2) 
xai<-l.2*xlow.value 
yai<-(crack.modelSperchi+crack.modelSperclo)/2 
text(xai,yai,"Initi2J. crack size",cex=.8,srt=90) 
xai<-xlow.value 
text(xai,yai,"distribution",cex=.8,srt=90) 
# 
####### How get time-to-failure distribution data 
# 
prgrid <- kernel.outSprgrid 
grid <- kernel.outSgrid 
# 
####### Get the height of the failure-time distribution 
# 
tdiff <- diff(grid) 
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yden <- prgrid/tdiff 
# 
####### For esthaetics, create a yden point at horizon by lineeir 
####### extrapolation 
# 
yden[length(yden)+l]<-yden[length(yden)]-(yden[length(yden)-l] -yden 
[length(yden)]) 
# 
####### Standardized the height of the failure-time distribution. 
# 
yden <- af + denfact * yden 
# 
####### Plot failure-time distribution. 
# 
lines(grid, lty=l,yden, col = 2) 
# 
####### Draw critical degradation level line and label. 
# 
abline(h = af, col = 6) 
yccs<-.2*af*(top.scale-l) 
text(-1.5*xlow.value,af+yccs,"Critical",cex=.8) 
text(-l.5*xlow.value,af-yccs,"crack size",cex=.8) 
# 
####### Draw start/finish time lines and label. 
# 
abline(v = 0) 
abline(v = t ivec.max,lwd=2) 
par.usr<-par("usr") 
text(1.02»tivec.max,(af+paur.usr [3])/2,"Horizon",srt=-90) 
# 
####### If there are inspections, plot and label P.O.D. 
# 
if(inspection) 
{ 
maxfvec<-max(podden$fvec) 
sdenplot(podden$xvec, podden$fvec, lty=l,fact =0.75 *xlow.vêilue,col= 4) 
text(-.2*xlow.value,(pod.model$perchi+pod.model$perclow)/2,"P.O.D", 
cex=.8,srt=90) 
> 
# 
####### Mark opportunities emd label. 
# 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = seq(l:length(tivec))) 
mtext(side=3, line=3, paste("Inspections opportunities")) 
} 
# 
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######################################################################### 
# s function linking S to Fortran routine "kernel" for 
# calculations related to degradation curves, failure eaid removal 
# probabilities, time-to-failure probability distribution. 
# Called by newcrackplot and newhzizplot. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"newkemel"<-function(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,index,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
{ 
# 
####### Prepcire data. 
# 
nx<-crack.model$nx 
rangxn<-crack.modelSrangxn 
rangxc<-crack.model$rangxc 
cor<- crack.modelScor 
ningri<-crack.modelSningri 
crack.model <- aOden$model 
n <- length(itset[itset==i]) 
ntmax <- 200 
naOv <- length(aOden$xvec) 
ntiv <- length(tivec) 
# 
####### Make vectors of parameters to pass to Fortran. 
# 
pvec <- c(pod.model$percloH, pod.modelSperchi, numdist(pod.modelS 
distribution), crack.modelSparis.c, crack.model$paris.n, 
crack.model$af,pod.model$perc,0,0,crack.model$sigma.stress.si,0} 
pvecnes<- c(nx,ningri,ntiv,na0v,n,rangxn,rangxc,cor) 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "kernel". 
# 
zout <- .Fortran("kernel", 
as.double(pvec), 
as.double(pvecnew), 
as.double(aOden$fvec), 
as.double(aOden$xvec), 
ntac=integer(naOv), 
as.double(tivec), 
as.integer(itset), 
tgvec = double(naOv), 
atmat = double(naOv * ntiv), 
nt=as.integer(l), 
double(naOv»ntiv), 
fprep = double(ntiv), 
fpfail = double(ntiv), 
as.integer(kprint), 
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as.integer(index), 
grid = double(ntmax), 
prgrid = double(ntmax)) 
# 
####### Get rid of useless elements in grid, prgrid. 
# 
nt<-zout$nt 
grid<- zout$grid 
grid<-grid[l:nt] 
prgrid<-20ut$prgrid 
prgrid<-prgrid[l:nt-l] 
return(list(crack.model = crack.model, tivec = tivec, tgvec = zoutS 
tgvec, atmat = matrix(zout$atmat, nroB = naOv), grid = grid, 
prgrid = prgrid, fprep = zout$fprep, nt=nt,pvecnew=pvecnew, 
pvec=pvec,fpfail = zoutSfpfail, itset = itset, tivec = tivec, 
pod.model=pod.model)) 
} 
# 
######################################################################### 
# S function linking S to Fortran routine "gtdist" for 
# calculations related to failure-time and P.O.D distributions. 
# Called by aOden and podden. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"gtden"<-function(model, numden, ntail=l,nsub=l,kprint = 0) 
{ 
# 
####### Take probability model (dist,low quant, high quant, prob) 
# 
idist <- numdist(model$distribution) 
zout <- .Fortran("gtdist", 
as.double(model$perclow), 
as.double(modelSperchi), 
as.double(model$perc), 
as.integer(idist), 
as.integer(numden), 
xvec = double(numden), 
fvec = double(numden), 
as.integer(ntail), 
as.integer(nsub), 
as.integer(kprint)) 
# 
####### Return discretized probability distribution. 
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# 
retum(list(model = model, xvec = zoutSxvec, fvec = zoutSfvec)) 
} 
# 
######################################################################### 
# S function to create the vector of inspections/horizon indicators. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"gtitset"<-function(tivec, index) 
{ 
# 
####### take vector index and set up inspections at the specified times 
# 
itset <- rep(0, length = length(tivec)) 
itset[index] <- 1 
itset[length(tivec)] <- 2 
return(itset) 
} 
# 
##############################################################«:########## 
# S function to create the vector of inspections opportunities times. 
#######################################^################################# 
# 
"gttivec"<-function(maxtime, ninsp) 
{ 
seq(0, maxtime, length = ninsp) 
} 
# 
######################################################################### 
# S function linking S to Fortran routine "hazfun" to perform calculations 
# related to the hazard function. Called by newhazplot. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"haizfun"<-function(kemel.out, index, hscale = 1, kprint = kprint, debug = F) 
{ 
# 
####### Prepare information. 
# 
grid <- kernel.out$grid 
nt <- length(grid) 
tivec <- kernel.outStivec 
prgrid <- kernel.out$prgrid 
fprep <- kernel.out$fprep 
ntiv <- length(tivec) 
n <- lengthCindex) 
if(index[1]==0){n<-0} 
index [n+1] <-ntiv 
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if(debug)browser() 
zout <- .Fortran("hazfuii", 
as.double(hscale), 
as. integer(n), 
as.double(grid), 
as.double(prgrid), 
as.integer(nt), 
as.double(t ivec), 
as.integer(ntiv), 
as.double(fprep), 
haznew = double(nt), 
as.integer(kprint), 
as. integer(index)) 
# 
####### Return discretized hazard function. 
t 
retum(list(grid = grid, haznes = zout$haznew,tivec=tivec, 
crack.model=kemel. out$crack.model, pod.model=kemel. out$pod.model) ) 
} 
t 
########################################################################## 
# S function to make hazard function plot. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"newhazplot"<-fTmction(index,ai.model,pod.model,crack.model,kprint=0) 
# 
####### Create initial crack size distribution. 
# 
aOden <- gtden(crack.model, ai.model$naOv, ai.modelSntêiil, ai.modelSnsub) 
# 
####### Create inspections opportunities and inspections indicator vectors. 
# 
maxtime<-ai .model$maixtime 
tivec <- gttivec(maxtime, ai.model$ntiv) 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "kernel", to get failure-time 
####### distribution data. 
# 
kernel.out<-newkemel(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,index,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
# 
###### find out if there aœe any inspections. 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset == 1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
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####### Call to Fortran routine "hêizfun" to get the hcizeird function 
####### numerically . 
# 
hazfun.out<-hazfun(kernel.out.index, hscaj.e=ai.model$hscale,kprint=0) 
# 
####### Get X and y to plot the heizeœd function. 
# 
grid <- hazf Tin. out Sgrid 
haznew <- hazfun.out$haznew 
# 
####### Avoid "0" values in the log plot. 
# 
hciznew [haznew< 1 .e-20]<-l .e-20 
# 
####### Catch only the values we want to plot. 
# 
hciznew<-haznew [1 : length(grid) -1] 
« 
####### Cosmetical continuation of the heiZcird function curve up to horizon. 
# 
hazlen<-length(haznew) 
haznew[hazlen+1]<-haznew[hazlen]+(haznen[hazlen]-haznew[hazlen-1]) 
# 
####### Set multiplicative factor from bottom to top of frame (log scale) 
# 
scalfact<-100000 
# 
###### Get the max value of the hazard function without inspection. 
# 
hazmax<-get.maxhaz(ai.model,pod.model.crack.model,kprint=0) 
# 
####### Set frame and labels. 
# 
par(mar=c(11.7.10.4)+.l) 
plot(grid, haznew. type = "n", xlim=c(2*grid[l]/3,maxtime),ylim = 
c(hazmax/scalf act,hazmax),log="y",xlab = 
"Service life time(Millions of cycles)", ylab = "Hazard function") 
# 
####### Plot hazard function. 
# 
lines(grid, haznew, type = "1", Ity = 1, col = 2,lwd=3) 
ylim <-c(hazmax/scalfact,hazmax) 
hcizlim<-ai .modelShazlim 
abline(h = hazlim, col =6) 
peur. usr<-par ( "usr" ) 
yh<-ylim[l]*10"((log(hazlim/ylim[1])/log(10))/2) 
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xh<- (pair. usr [2] -maxtime) / 2+maxtime 
text(xh,yh,"Horizon",srt=-90) 
xlim<-c(2*grid[l]/3.maxtime) 
textd .2*xlim[l] , 10" { .2)*heizlim,"Critical" ,cex=.8) 
text(1.2*xlim[1],10"(-.2)*hazlim,"hazard value",cex=.8) 
# 
####### More lines, labels, majrks . 
# 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = seq(l:length(tivec))) 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = F, pos = hazlim) 
•abline(v = inaxtime,lsd=2) 
mtext(side=3, line=3, paste("Inspections opportunities")) 
if(inspection) { 
xitime <- tivec[index] 
yitime <- rep(hazlim, length(xitime)) 
points(xitime, yitime, pch = 3, col = 4)> 
invisible 0 
> 
# 
########################################################################## 
# S function to get max of hazard without inspections. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"get. maxhaz "<-f unct ion ( ai. model ,pod. model, crack. model, kprint=0) 
{ 
index<-c(0) 
# 
####### Create initial crack size distribution. 
# 
aOden <- gtden(crack.model, ai.model$naOv, ai.model$ntail, ai.model$nsub) 
# 
####### Create inspections opportunities and inspections indicator vectors. 
# 
maxt ime<-ai.modelSmaxtime 
tivec <- gttivec(maxtime, ai.model$ntiv) 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "kernel", to get failure-time 
####### distribution data. 
# 
kernel. out <-newkemel ( crack .model, aOden, pod. model, index, it set, tivec ,kprint=0) 
# 
####### Call to Fortrem routine "haizfun" to get the hazard function 
####### numerically . 
# 
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hazfun.out<-hsizfun(keniel.out,index, hscale=ai.modelShscale,kprint=0) 
grid <- hazfun.out$grid 
haiznes <- hazfun.out$haznev 
mauchsiz<-max (hsiznew) 
} 
» 
########################################################################## 
# S function to overlap crackplots. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"overcrackplot"<-function(index,overindex,ai.model, 
overai.model,pod.model,overpod.model, crack.model,overcrack.model,kprint=0) 
{ 
# 
########Create initial crack size distribution 
# 
aOden <- gtdenCcrack.model, ai.model$naOv, ai.model$ntail,ai.model$nsub) 
# 
########Place ntiv equadly spaced oportunities in interval (O.maxtime) 
# 
maxtime<-ai.model$maxtime 
tivec <- gttivec(maxtime, ai.model$ntiv) 
# 
####### Get opportunities numbers where inspections are scheduled and 
####### create indicators vector 
# 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for 
####### degradation curves and time-to-failure distribution 
# 
kernel.out<-newkemel(crack.model, aOden,pod.model,index,itset,tivec, 
kprint=0) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for the 
####### p.O.D, used ONLY to plot the P.O.D. 
####### This discretization is used only for plot and should be OK for 
####### all purposes. 
# 
podden <- gtden(pod.model, numden=99, ntail=49, nsub=49) 
# 
####### find out if there are any inspections 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset == 1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
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####### Call function that calculates steoidard height factor for 
####### time-to-failure distribution. 
# 
denfact <- get.denfact(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
X <- .1 
y <- .1 
# 
####### Get matrix of degradation versus time points 
# 
atmat <- kernel.out$atmat 
xvec <- aOden$xvec 
naOv<-length(xvec) 
af <- crack.model$af 
# 
####### set up test boundary margins for plot 
# 
tivec.max <- max(tivec) 
xhi.value <- 1.03 * tivec.max 
side.scale <- -0.1 
xlow.value <- side.scale » tivec.maix 
# 
####### #Set up top space for the failure-time distribution. 
# 
ylow.value <- min(xvec) 
top.scale <- 1.2 
yhi.value <- top.scale * af 
par(mar = c(ll, 7, 10, 4) + 0.1) 
# 
####### Plot margins and labels. 
# 
plot(x, y, type="n",xlim = c(xlow.value, xhi.value), ylim = 
c(ylow.value, yhi.value), xlab = 
"Service life time (Millions of cycles)", ylab ="Crack Size (in.)") 
# 
####### Make matrix of degradation curves points and plot. In the 
####### random degradation parameters case, these are curves for the 
####### midvalues of the random peurameters. 
# 
tgvec<-kemel. outStgvec 
timat <- t(matrix(rep(tivec, naOv), ncol = naOv)) 
for(j in 1:nrow(timat)) 
timat [j , atmat [j, ] >= af] <- tgvec [naOv -j +l] 
atmat[atmat > af] <- af 
matpoints(t(timat), t(atmat), type = "1", Ity = 1, col = 2) 
# 
####### Plot initial crack size density and label 
# 
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sdenplot(aOdeii$xvec, aOden$fvec, lty=l,fact = 0.75 * xlow.value, col =2) 
xai<-l.2*xlow.value 
yai<-(crack.model$perchi+crack.modelSperclo) / 2  
text(xai,yai,"Initial crack size",cex=.8,srt=90) 
xai<-xloH. vailue 
text(xai,yai,"distribution",cex=.8,srt=90) 
# 
####### BOH get time-to-failure distribution data 
# 
prgrid <- kernel.out$prgrid 
grid <- kernel.out$grid 
# 
####### Get the height of the failure-time distribution 
# 
tdiff <- diff(grid) 
yden <- prgrid/tdiff 
# 
####### For esthaetics, create a yden point at horizon by linear 
####### extrapolation 
# 
yden[length(yden)+1]<-ydenClength(yden)]-(yden[length(yden)-1]-yden 
[length(yden)]) 
# 
####### Steuideirdized the height of the failure-time distribution. 
# 
yden <- af + denfact » yden 
# 
####### Plot failure-time distribution. 
# 
lines(grid, lty=7,yden, col = 2) 
# 
####### Draw critical degradation level line and label. 
# 
abline(h = af, col =6) 
yccs<-.2*af*(top.scale-l) 
text(-1.5«xlow.value,af+yccs,"Critical",cex=.8) 
text(-l-S^xlow.value,af-yccs,"crack size",cex=.8) 
# 
####### Draw start/finish time lines emd label. 
# 
abline(v = 0) 
abline (v = tivec.meuc,lHd=2) 
par.usr<-par("usr") 
textd.02*tivec.max,(af+par.usr [3])/2,"Horizon",srt=-90) 
# 
####### If there are inspections, plot ctnd label P.O.D. 
# 
if(inspection) 
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{ 
maxf vec<-inaix (poddenSf vec) 
sdenplot(podden$xvec, poddenSfvec, lty=7,fact = 0.75 *xlow.value,col= 4) 
text(-.2*xlow.value,(pod.model$perclii+pod.model$percloH)/2,"P.0.D", 
cex=.8,srt=90) 
> 
# 
####### Mark opportunities and label. 
# 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = seq(l:length(tivec))) 
mtext(side=3, liiie=3, paste("Inspections opportunities")) 
# 
############# overplot ########################################## 
# 
# 
########Create initial crack size distribution 
# 
aOden <- gtden(overcrack.model, overai.model$naOv, 
overai.modelSntail,overai.model$nsub) 
# 
####### Get opportunities numbers where inspections are scheduled and 
####### create indicators vector 
# 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,overindex) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for 
####### degradation curves and time-to-failure distribution 
t 
kernel.out<-neakemel(overcrack.model, aOden,overpod.model.overindex, 
itset,tivec, kprint=0) 
# 
####### Call S/F linking S-function to perform calculations for the 
####### p.O.D, used ONLY to plot the P.O.D. 
####### This discretization is used only for plot and should be OK for 
####### all purposes. 
# 
podden <- gtden(overpod.model, nujnden=99, ntail=49, nsub=49) 
# 
####### find out if there are any inspections 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset == 1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
####### Plot initial crack size density. 
# 
sdenplot(aOdenSxvec, aOdenSfvec, lty=l,fact = 0.75 * XIOH.value, col = 2) 
# 
####### Now get time-to-failure distribution data 
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# 
prgrid <- kernel.out$prgrid 
grid <- kernel.out$grid 
# 
####### Get the heights of the failure-time distribution 
# 
tdiff <- diff(grid) 
yden <- prgrid/tdiff 
# 
####### For esthaetics, create a yden point at horizon by lineeur 
####### extrapolation 
» 
yden[length(yden)+1]<-yden[lengthC yden)]-(yden[length(yden)-1]-yden 
[length(yden)] ) 
# 
####### Statndardized the height of the failure-time distribution. 
# 
yden <- af + denfact * yden 
# 
####### Plot failure-time distribution. 
# 
lines(grid, lty=l,yden, col = 2) 
# 
####### If there are inspections, plot POD. 
# 
if(inspection) 
{ 
sdenplot(poddenSxvec, poddenSfvec, lty=l,fact = 0.75 *xlow.value,col= 4) 
} 
} 
# 
########################################################################## 
# S function to overlap hazard function plots. 
########################################################################## 
# 
"overhazplot"<-function(index, overindex,ai.model,overai.model,pod.model, 
overpod.model.crack.model, overcrack.model,kprint=0) 
{ 
» 
####### Create initial crack size distribution. 
# 
aOden <- gtden(crack.model, ai.modelSnaOv, ai.model$ntail, ai.model$nsub) 
# 
####### Create inspections opportunities and inspections indicator vectors. 
# 
maxtime<-ai.model$maxt ime 
tivec <- gttivec(maxtime, ai.modelSntiv) 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,index) 
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# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "kernel", to get failure-time 
####### distribution data. 
# 
kernel.out<-newkemel(crack.model,aOden,pod.model,index,itset, tivec,kprint=0) 
# 
###### find out if there are any inspections. 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset == 1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "hazfun" to get the hazard function 
####### numerically . 
# 
hazfun.out<-hatzfun(kemel.out,index, hscale=ai.model$hscale,kprint=0) 
# 
####### Get X and y to plot the heizard function.. 
# 
grid <- hazfun.out$grid 
heizneg <- hazfun. outShaznew 
# 
####### Avoid "0" values in the log plot. 
# 
haznew[hazneH<l.e-20]<-l.e-20 
# 
####### Catch only the values we want to plot. 
# 
haznew<-hazneH[1 :length(grid)-1] 
# 
####### Cosmetical continuation of the hazard function curve up to horizon. 
# 
hazlen<-length{haznew) 
haznew [haizlen+1] <-haznew [hazlen] + (haznew [hazlen] -haznew [hazlen-1] ) 
# 
####### Set multiplicative factor from bottom to top of frame (log scale) 
# 
scalfact<-100000 
# 
###### Get the max value of the hazard function without inspection. 
# 
heizmax<-get .maxhaz (ai. model ,pod.model, crack .model, kprint=0) 
# 
####### Set frame and labels. 
# 
par(mar=c(11,7,10,4)+.!) 
plot(grid, haznew, type = "n", xlim=c(2*grid[l]/3,maxtime),ylim = 
c (hêizmax/s calf act, hazmcuc) ,log="y" ,xlab = 
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"Service life time(Millions of cycles)", ylab = "Heizard function") 
# 
####### Plot heizard function. 
# 
lines(grid, haznew, type = "1", Ity = 1, col = 2,lwd=3) 
ylim <-c(hazmax/scalfact.hazmax) 
hazlim<-ai.model$hazlim 
abline(h = hazlim, col =6) 
par.usr<-par("usr") 
yh<-ylim[l]•10"((log(hazlim/ylim[l])/log(10))/2) 
xh<-(par.usr[2]-maxtime)/2+maxtime 
text(xh,yh,"Horizon",srt=-90) 
xliin<-c(2*grid[l]/3,maxtime) 
text(1.2»xlim[1], 10"(.2)•hazlim,"Critical",cex=.8) 
text(1.2*xlim[l],10"(-.2)$hazlim,"hazeird value",cex=.8) 
# 
####### More lines, labels, marks. 
# 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = seq(l:length(tivec))) 
axis(3, at = tivec, labels = F, pos = hazlim) 
abline(v = maxtime,lwd=2) 
mtext(side=3, line=3, paste("Inspections opportunities")) 
if(inspection) { 
xitime <- tivec[index] 
yitime <- rep(hazlim, length(xitime)) 
points(xitime, yitime, pch = 3, col =4)} 
invisible() 
########################################################################## 
# Overlapped hazard function plot. 
########################################################################## 
# 
# 
####### Create initial crack size distribution. 
# 
aOden <- gtden(overcrack.model, overai.modelSnaOv, overai.modelSntail, 
overai.modelSnsub) 
# 
####### Create inspections opportunities and inspections indicator vectors. 
# 
itset <- gtitset(tivec,overindex) 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "kernel", to get failure-time 
####### distribution data. 
# 
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kernel.out<-neHkemel(overcrack.model,aOden,overpod .model,overindex,itset, 
tivec,kprint=0) 
# 
###### find out if there are any inspections. 
# 
inspections <- length(itset[itset ==1]) 
inspection <- inspections > 0 
# 
####### Call to Fortran routine "hazfun" to get the hazard function 
####### numerically . 
# 
hazfun.out<-hazfun(kemel.out,overindex, hscale=overai.model$hscale, 
kprint=0) 
# 
####### Get X and y to plot the hazard function. 
# 
grid <- hazfun.out$grid 
haznew <- heizfun. outShaznew 
# 
####### Avoid "0" values in the log plot. 
# 
haznew[haznew<l.e-20]<-l.e-20 
# 
####### Catch only the values we want to plot. 
# 
haznew<-haznew[1 :length(grid)-1] 
# 
####### Cosmetical continuation of the hazard function curve up to horizon. 
# 
hazlen<-length(haznew) 
haznew [hazlen+1] <-hêiznew [hazlen] + (haznew [hazlen] -haznew [hazlen-l] ) 
# 
####### Plot hazard function. 
# 
lines(grid, haznew, type = "1", Ity = 7, col = 2,lwd=3) 
if(inspection) { 
xitime <- tivec[index] 
yitime <- rep(hazlim, length(xitime)) 
points(xitime, yitime, pch = 3, col = 4)} 
invisible() 
} 
# 
############################################################### 
# Function to plot pod/initial crack size distribution 
############################################################### 
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# 
"sdeiiplot"<-function(xvec, fvec, lty=l, fact = 1, col = 5) 
{ 
fvec <- c(0, fvecC - length(fvec)]/diff(xvec), 0) 
lagxvec <- c(xvec[-l], NA) 
xvec <- c(xvec[l], (xvec + lagxvec)/2, xvec[length(xvec)]) 
xvec <- xvec[ - (length(xvec) - 1)] 
fvec <- (fvec » fact)/max(fvec) 
lines(fvec, xvec, lty=lty, lwd=2,col = col) 
} 
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APPENDIX D: FORTRAN ROUTINES 
double precision function expo(cor,const1,2n,zc) 
c 
implicit real»8(a-h,o-z) 
expo=dexp(const1*(zn* »2-2*cor»zn»zc+zc**2)) 
return 
end 
Q***************** ************************************* **************** 
c next, subroutine to create the paris parameters distribution. 
c 
subroutine papadi(xn,xc,nx,rangxn, rangxc,cor,xnvec,xcvec,stdpro) 
implicit real»8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension xnvec(50),xcvec(50),height(50,50) 
dimension stdpro(50,50),imat(50,50) 
c 
c set useful constants and initialize. 
cn2=rangxn/dfloat(nx) 
cnl=xn-cn2»(dfloat(nx+l)/2) 
cc2=rangxc/dfloat(nx) 
ccl=xc-cc2»(dfloat(nx+l)/2) 
constl=-.5d0/(l-cor*cor) 
tothei=0.d0 
c 
c (If Paris random case) 
if(nx.gt.l)go to 01 
c 
c If deterministic growth, set ranges at 1 to get right z-values. 
c 
rangxn=l.dO 
rangxc=l.dO 
c 
c Create the z-values for C and m considering the input range as 
c 6 Sigma. 
c 
01 do 10 ixn=l,nx 
xnvec(ixn)=cnl+ixn*cn2 
zn=6.do*(xnvec(ixn)-xn)/rangxn 
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do 11 ixc=l,nx 
xcvec(ixc)=ccl+ixc»cc2 
zc=6.dO*(xcvec(ixc)-xc)/rangxc 
c 
c Get exponential term in the bivauriate normal distribution at the 
c given z-vailues. 
c 
height(ixn,ixc)=expo(cor,const1,zn,zc) 
c 
c Add these "probabilities" for the approximate total probability 
c corresponding to the bidimensional grid. 
c 
tothei=tothei+height(ixn,ixc) 
11 continue 
10 continue 
c 
c Standeirdize the total probability to one. Note that the multipli 
c cative constant in the bivariate as well as the curea of the grid 
c cells were not calculated because they would cancel out in the 
c "stdpro" ratio. 
c 
do 12 ixn=l,nx 
do 13 ixc=l,nx 
c 
c Probability associated to ith value of C and m. 
c 
stdpro(ixn,ixc)=height(ixn,ixc)/tothei 
13 continue 
12 continue 
return 
end 
c*********************************************************************** 
c next, subroutine to construct the aO distribution. 
c 
subroutine gtdist(pclow,pchi,wayout, 
êkdist,naOV,aOvec,f aOvec,ntail,nsub,kprint) 
implicit real»8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension aOvec(naOv),faOvec(naOv) 
data zero/0.OdOO/,one/l.OdOO/ 
c 
c decide if we have a log distribution or not. 
klog=l 
if(mod(kdist,2).eq.l)klog=0 
if(klog.eq.O)go to 50 
c 
c ; take logs if necessary and set distribution parameters. 
pclowx=dlog(pclow) 
pchix=dlog(pchi) 
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go to 51 
50 pclowx=pclow 
pchix=pchi 
51 asigma= 
& (pchix-pclowx)/(quant(one-wayout.kdist)-quant(sayout.kdist)) 
amux=pclowx-asigma*quemt(wayout,kdist) 
c 
c create equal p-spaced cells in the center. 
c 
c Get standardizing (to probability one) factor due to truncation. 
stdfac=l/(l-2*Hayout) 
c 
c Get the probability for cells with equal probabilities. 
xiprob=one/dfloat(naOv-2*(nsub-ntail)-1) 
c Standardize. 
xipstd=xiprob*stdfac 
c 
c Get probability left in each tail. 
c 
cprob=(ntail-1)*xiprob 
c 
c Get the ends of the (central) equal probability spaced intervals. 
c 
iloH=nsub+l 
ihigh=naOv-nsub 
do 20 ia=iloB,ihigh 
c 
c Assign probabilities to eq. pr. spaced intervals. 
faOvec(ia)=xipstd 
cprob=cprob+xiprob 
c 
c Calculate ends of eq. pr. spaced intervals and assign. 
aOvec(ia)=amux+as igma*quant(cprob,kdist) 
if(klog.eq.1)aOvec(ia)=dexp(aOvec(ia)) 
20 continue 
c 
c create nsub equal aO-spaced cells in the ntail equ2Q.ly 
c p-spaced cells of each tail. 
c 
c First get sizes of eq. spaced intervals in left and right tails. 
dleft=(aOvec(ilow)-pclow)/nsub 
dxight=(pchi-aOvec(ihigh))/nsub 
c 
c Get ends of eq. spaced intervals in right and left tails. 
iahpl=ihigh+l 
do 21 ia=iahpl,naOv 
iarr=naOv-ia+l 
aOvec(ia)=aOvec(ia-1)+dright 
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aO vec ( iêirr ) =aOvec ( iaurr+1 ) -dlef t 
c 
c Get standardized values for ends of intervals. 
if (klog.eq.O)go to 01 
zhighx=(dlog(aOvec(ia))-amux)/asigma 
zlowr=(dlog(aOvec(ia-l) )-amiix)/asigma 
zh.ighl= (dlog ( aO vec ( isŒ-r+l ))-amux)/asigma 
zlowl=(dlog(aOvec(iarr))-ainux)/asigma 
go to 02 
01 zhighr=(aOvec(ia)-amux)/asigma 
zloBr= ( aOvec (ia-1) -eunux ) / asigma 
zhiglil= (aOvec (iarr+1)-amux)/asigma 
zlowl=(aOvec(ieurr)-amux)/asigma 
c 
c Get probabilities corresponding to eq. spaced int., 
c standardize the prob, and assign. 
c 
02 faOvec(ia-1)=(phibf(zhighr,kdist)-phibf(zlowr,kdist))»stdfac 
faOvec(iarr)=(phibf(zhighl,kdist)-phibf(zlowl.kdist))*stdfac 
21 continue 
fa0vec(na0v)=0.d0 
return 
end 
g**********************************#**$******************** 
c next, subroutine to create the time grid cells. 
c 
subroutine dogrid(pvec,ningri,ntiv,xnvec,nx, 
& xclow.xchigh.n,index, 
& tivec,nt,grid,tinin,aOlow,aOhigh,gridel,kprint) 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension tivec(ntiv),index(n),grid(200) 
dimension tinin(n),pvec(ll),xnvec(50) 
call filld(0.d0,tinin,n) 
c 
c first, get upper and lower limits of the grid. 
c 
write(6,101)xclow,xchigh 
101 format('xclow,xchigh ',2gl5.5) 
gridhi=0 
c 
c Get last crossing. 
do 21 ixn=l,nx 
pvec(4)=xcloB 
call put4(pvec) 
call getaf(af) 
pvec(5)=xnvec(ixn) 
call puts (pvec) 
tlast=0.d0 
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alast=a01ow 
write(6,104)tlast,alast,gridhi 
104 formate tlast,alast,gridhi',3gl5.5) 
call tget(tlast,alast,af,canbhi,kprint) 
write(6,102)gridhi,canbhi,xnvec(ixn) 
102 format('gridhi,canbhi,xnvec(ixn) ',3gl5.5) 
if (canbhi .gt .gridhi)gridhi=canbhi 
21 continue 
c 
c Get first crossing. 
gridlo=tivec(ntiv) 
pvec(4)=xchigh 
call put4(pvec) 
do 22 ixn=l,nx 
pvec(5)=xnvec(ixn) 
call put5(pvec) 
alast=aOhigh 
call tget(tlast,alast,af,canblo,kprint) 
if(canblo.It.gridlo)gridlo=canblo 
write(6,103)gridlo,canblo,xnvec(ixn) 
103 format('gridlo,canblo,xnvec(ixn) ',3gl5.5) 
22 continue 
c 
c Then, create the grid without inspections. 
c 
c If horizon comes before last crossing, horizon is 
c right end of grid. 
c 
if(tivec(ntiv).It.gridhi)gridhi=tivec(ntiv) 
c 
c Get size of grid intervals. 
gridel=(gridhi-gridlo)/dfloat(ningri-1) 
C : 
c Set left end of the grid. 
grid(l)=gridlo 
c 
c Set ends of intervals. 
do 10 i=2,ningri 
grid(i)=grid(i-1)+gridel 
10 continue 
c 
c now, complete the grid to include inspections. 
c 
nt=ningri 
ninin=0 
do 11 i=l,n 
c 
c get the number of the t-cell where inspection i falls. 
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c 
ncell=(tivec(index(i))-grid(l))/gridel+l+niniii 
c 
c if inspection i falls before first crossing, it won't 
c modify the grid, go to next inspection. 
c 
if(ncell.lt.l)go to 11 
c 
c if inspection falls beyong the range of crossing 
c times, this and following insp. won't modify grid, 
c we aire done. 
c 
if(ncell.ge.nt)go to 12 
c 
c if inspection falls within the range of crossing 
c times, modify grid. 
c 
c Increment index of intervals ends and # of insp. 
c in the grid. 
c 
ncelpl=ncell+l 
ninin=ninin+1 
do 20 j=ncelpl,nt 
jr=nt+ncelpl-j 
grid(jr+l)=grid(jr) 
20 continue 
c 
c Time of inspection in grid. 
t inin(ninin)=t ivec(index(i)) 
c 
c New interval corresponding to inspection. 
grid(ncelpl)=tinin(ninin) 
nt=nt+l 
11 continue 
12 return 
end 
c next, subroutine to assign probabilities from crossing 
c intervals to time grid cells. 
c 
subroutine as s ign(n,iflag,xleft,xright,grid,gridel, 
& tinin,pfail,prgrid,ncleft,ncrigh) 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension tinin(n),grid(200),prgrid(200) 
c 
c Get # of inspections before the crossing interval. 
ninbef=0 
do 10 i=l,n 
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if(tinin(i).gt.xleft.or.tinin(i).eq.O)go to 11 
ninbef =ninbef+1 
10 continue 
c 
c Get grid cell indices where the left and right of the 
c incoming interval cross. 
c 
11 ncleft=(xleft-grid(l))/gridel+l+ninbef 
ncrigh=(xright-grid(1))/gridel+l+ninbef 
c 
c Difference between left and right crossed cells indices. 
ncdif =ncrigh-nclef t 
c 
c If whole incoming interval is intercepted by one cell... 
if(ncdif.eq.0)go to 20 
c 
c If incoming interval is intercepted by more them one 
c cell, prepare the amount of probability that each 
c interval will receive (proportion of intercepted 
c size relative to the incoming interval size). 
c 
cake=pfail/(xright-xleft) 
c 
c If left and right end of incoming interval are intercepted 
c by 2 consecutive grid cells... 
c 
if (ncdif.eq.l)go to 21 
c 
c If incoming interval is intercepted by more than 2 cells, 
c distribute incoming probability among central intercepting 
c cells. 
c 
ncdml=ncdif-l 
do 30 k=l,ncdml 
prgrid(ncleft+k)= prgrid(ncleft+k) + (grid(ncleft+k+1)-
6 grid(ncleft+k) )»cêdte 
30 continue 
c 
clf 2 consecutive cells distribute prob. to left/right cells. 
c 
21 prgridCncleft)=prgrid(ncleft)+(grid(ncleft+1)-xleft)«cake 
prgrid(ncrigh)=prgrid(ncrigh)+(xright-grid(ncrigh))«cake 
go to 40 
c 
c If one intercepting cell,it receives all incoming prob. 
20 prgrid(ncleft)=prgrid(ncleft)+pfail 
40 return 
end 
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c next,subroutine to compute the hazard function. 
c 
subroutine hazfun(hscale,n,grid,prgrid,nt, 
& tivec.ntiv,fprep,haiznew.kprint.index) 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension tivec(ntiv) ,index(ntiv),haznew(nt) 
dimension fprep(ntiv),grid(nt),prgrid(nt) 
data zero/0.OdOO/ , one/1.OdOO/ 
prepl=zero 
gcdf=zero 
npl=n+l 
ia=l 
call filld(zero,haznew,nt) 
if(kprint.ge.3)write(6 ,ll)n,npl,ia 
11 formate n.npl ,ia',3i4) 
c 
c Increment over the inspection times. 
do 24 jt=l,npl 
if(kprint.ge.3)write(6,12)npl,ia,jt 
12 formate n.ia, jt',3i4) 
C : 
c If first inspection. 
if(jt.eq.l)go to 200 
C T 
c If not, update the total prob. for replacement prior to 
c current point. 
c 
prepl=prepl+fprep(j t-1) 
if(kprint.ge.3)write(6,13)n,npl,ia,jt,prepl,fprep(jt-1), 
&grid(ia),tivec(index(jt)) 
13 formate n.npl,ia,jt,prep,fprep,gr,tiv ',4i4,4glO.3) 
200 continue 
c 
c 
Now check to see if the current gtime is beyond the 
next inspection time. 
if(grid(ia) .ge.tivec(index(jt,)))go to 24 
c If we are in the right insp. interval, compute the hazard 
sf=(one-gcdf-prepl) 
c- Get size of interval so that hazard is for 
deltat=grid(ia+l)-grid(ia) 
hciznew ( ia) =hscale* (prgrid(ia) /sf ) /deltat 
next cycle 
c ratio is just for debugging. 
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ratio=prgrid(ia)/deltat 
if(kprint.ge.3)write(6,423)ia,jt,grid(ia), 
&prepl,prgrid(ia),deltat,ratio,haznewCia) 
423 formate ia,jt,tg,pr,gt,del,ra,h=',2i4,5gl0.3,gl5.5) 
c 
c Update cumulated failure probability. 
gcdf=gcdf +prgrid(ia) 
ia=ia+l 
c 
c See if we are done. 
if(ia.ge.nt)go to 25 
go to 200 
24 continue 
25 return 
end 
c next, general subroutine to get failure time distribution 
c and probabilities of replacement. 
c 
subroutine kernel(pvec,pvecnew,faOvec,aOvec,ntac, 
& tivec,itset,graftg.grafma,nt, 
& fait,fprep,fpfail,kprint,index.grid,prgrid) 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension a0vec(150),fa0vec(150),index(50) 
dimension tgvec(150),ntac(150),graftg(150) 
dimension tivec(50),itset(50),prgrid(200) 
dimension atmat(150,50), fait(150,50) 
dimension fprep(50),fpfail(50),tinin(50) 
dimension pvec(ll),xnvec(50),xcvec(50),grid(200) 
dimension stdpro(50,50),pvecnew(10),grafma(15O,S0) 
data zero/0.OdOO/ , one/l.OdOO/ 
c 
Get inputs. 
call putaJ.l(pvec) 
nx=pvecnew(l) 
ningri=pvecnew(2) 
nt iv=pvecnew(3) 
na0v=pvecnew(4) 
n=pvecnew(5) 
rangxn=pve cnew(6) 
rangxc=pvecnew(7) 
cor=pvecnew(8) 
xn=pvec(5) 
xc=pvec(4) 
create the paris parameters distribution. 
call papadi(xn,xc,nx,rangxn,rangxc,cor,xnvec,xcvec,stdpro) 
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c set extreme paurameters values. 
c xnlow=xnvec(l) 
xclow=xcvec(l) 
a01ow=a0vec(l) 
c xiihigh=xnvec(nx) 
xchigh=xcvec(nx) 
aOhigh=aOvec(naOv) 
c create the grid for failure time distribution. 
c 
call dogridCpvec.ningri,ntiv,xnvec,nx, 
& xclon,xchigh,n,index, 
& tivec,nt,grid,tinin,aOlow,aOhigh,gridel,kprint) 
call filld(zero,prgrid,nt) 
call filld(zero,fprep,ntiv) 
npl=n+l 
totfai=0.d0 
totrep=0.d0 
imat=l 
c loop over paris peirameters discrete values. 
c 
do 10 ixn=l,nx 
pvec(5)=xnvec(ixn) 
call put5(pvec) 
do 11 ixc=l,nx 
pvec(4)=xcvec(ixc) 
call put4(pvec) 
mid=iu/2+l.dO 
if(ixn.eq.mid.and.ixc.eq.mid)imat=2 
c get the paths emd crossing times. 
c 
call afget(pvec,aOvec,naOv,tivec,ntac,ntiv,tgvec, 
& grafma,graftg,atmat,kpr int,imat) 
c assign probabilities. 
c 
call gtgti(pvec,aOvec,faOvec,atmat,tgvec.tivec, 
ftnaOv,itset,ntiv,grid,gridel,stdpro(ixn,ixc), 
&fait,fprep,fpf ail,kprint,index,n,t inin,prgrid) 
11 continue 
10 continue 
c check probabilities. 
ntml=nt-l 
do 13 i=l,ntml 
totfai=totf ai+prgrid(i) 
13 continue 
do 14 i=l,npl 
totrep=totrep+fprep(i) 
14 continue 
total=totfai+totrep 
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c write(6,102)totfai,totrep,total 
cl02 formate' totfai,totrep,total= ',3fl5.7) 
return 
end 
c*********************************************************** 
c next, subroutine to get the failure probabilities. 
c 
subrout ine gtgti(pvec,aOvec,faOvec, atmat,tgvec,t ivec, 
taaOv,itset,ntiv,grid,gridel,stdpro, 
& fait,fprep,fpfail,kprint,index,n,tinin,prgrid) 
c 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension aOvec(naOv),faOvec(naOv) 
dimension tinin(50),prgrid(200) 
dimension itset(l),index(ntiv),atmat(naOv,ntiv) 
dimension fprep(ntiv),fpfail(ntiv),fait(naOv,ntiv) 
dimension pvec(ll), grid(200),tgvec(naOv),tivec(ntiv) 
data zero/0.OdOO/,two/2.OdOO/,one/1.OdOO/ 
c 
c get peo-ameter and initialize. 
c 
call putall(pvec) 
call getaf(af) 
c 
c Put the horizon as the (n+l)th inspection. 
c 
npl=n+l 
index(n+1)=nt iv 
Will grow naOv-1 intervals. 
naOvml=naOv-l 
Start with largest crack, and first inspection. 
do 10 ia=l,naOvml 
Catch the laurgest. 
iar=naOvml-ia+l 
The faC probability associated to the interval is 
multiplied by the probability associated to the 
current values of the crack growth paurameters (stdpro). 
pleft=faOvec(iar)*stdpro 
iflag=l 
do 20 it=l,npl 
•Iterate over inspections. 
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c 
c Get crack size limits at current inspection time. 
c 
abot=atmat ( ieir, index (it ) ) 
atop=atmat(iar+1,index(it)) 
c 
c If the whole interval has grown beyond the critical 
c size, all the associated probability goes to failure. 
c 
if (abot .ge .eif)go to 21 
c 
c If the growing interval is cought, is it by the 
c horizon (100) or an inspection ? 
c 
if(it.eq.npl)go to 100 
c 
c If it is inspection, get the P.O.D value for the 
c interval as the 
c average of P.O.D at bottom and at top. 
c 
podavr=(fpod(abot)+fpod(atop))/two 
go to 22 
c 
c If it is the horizon, 
100 podavr=one 
c 
c Now, check if the growing interval is fully 
c intercepted. 
c 
22 if(atop.le.af)go to 200 
c 
c If it is not, the crossing interval catches inspection 
c or horizon. Let's compute proportions failed and 
c left to go through inspection or horizon. 
c 
c Indicator of paurtial interception. 
iflag=2 
c 
c Get current inspection time. 
t insp=tivec(index(it)) 
c 
c Divide incoming probability by size of crossing 
c interval. 
c 
cake=pleft/(tgvec(ia+1)-tgvec(ia)) 
c 
c Proportion of incoming probability that goes to 
c failure. 
225 
c 
pfail=(tinsp-tgvec(ia))*cake 
c 
c Proportion of incoming probability that goes through 
c inspection or horizon. 
c 
pleft=(tgvec(ia+l)-tinsp)*cake 
go to 23 
c : 
c now, accumulate and update probabilities. 
c 
21 •pfail=pleft 
23 fpfail(it)=fpf ail(it)+pfail 
c If partial interception. 
if(iflag.eq.2)go to 199 
c 
c If not a partial interception, distribute "pfaiil" among 
c intercepting cells. 
c 
call assign(n,iflag,tgvec(ia),tgvec(ia+1), 
& grid,gridel,t inin,pfail.prgrid,ncleft.ncrigh) 
199 if(abot.ge.af) go to 10 
c 
c Update the prob. of removal at insp. it. 
200 fprep(it)=fprep(it)+pleftfpodavr 
c 
c Update the probability left for interval ia at insp. it. 
c 
pleft =plef t »(one-podavr) 
fait(ia,it)=pleft 
c 
c If not a partial interception, job done. 
if(iflag.eq.l)go to 20 
c 
c If peirtial interception, distribute "pfadl" and 
c "pleft" among intercepting cells. 
c 
call assign(n,iflag,tgvec(ia),tinsp, 
& grid,gridel,tinin,pfail,prgrid,ncleft,ncrigh) 
call assign(n,iflag,tinsp,tgvec(ia+1), 
& grid,gridel,tinin,pleft,prgrid,ncleft,ncrigh) 
20 continue 
10 continue 
return 
end 
********************************************** 
c Next, subroutine to get growth curves and crossing times 
c for all initial crack sizes, for given C, m'. 
226 
c 
subroutine afget(pvec.aOvec,naOv,tivec,ntac,ntiv,tgvec, 
& grafma,graftg,atmat,kprint,imat) 
implicit real«8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension aOvec(naOv),tgvec(naOv),ntac(naOv) 
dimension tivec(ntiv),atmat(naOv,ntiv),pvec(ll) 
dimension grafma(naOv,ntiv),graftg(naOv) 
c 
c hard-wired scratch. 
dimension atvec(2000) 
if(kprint.ge.5)write(6,5567)(pvec(i),i=l,ll) 
5567 format(Ix,' pvec in afget=',5gl3.4) 
c 
c get parameters. 
call putall(pvec) 
call getaf(af) 
c 
c Loop over initial crack sizes to gron the curves, 
c one at a time 
c 
do 22 ia=l,naOv 
c 
c The smaller, the later. 
igt=naOv-ia+l 
c 
c call the routine that get growth curves points and 
c crossing time for a given initial crack size. 
c 
call aget(aOvec(ia),tivec,ntiv,af,tgvec(igt), 
& ntac(ia),atvec,kprint) 
c 
c move the vector to the ia row of the atmat table 
c including zero's for points eifter ntac(ia) 
c 
do 33 j=l,ntiv 
atmat(ia,j)=atvec(j) 
33 continue 
22 continue 
c 
c if random growth and not mid C, m' values, do not 
c want to plot the growth curves. 
c 
if(imat.eq.l)go to 222 
c 
c If fixed C',m' or mid C',m' values, get the curves. 
do 01 i=l,naOv 
graftg(i)=tgvec(i) 
do 02 j=l,ntiv 
227 
grafma(i,j)=atmat(i,j) 
02 continue 
01 continue 
c 
c After picking up the curves we wanted, reset imat. 
imat=l 
222 continue 
return 
end 
c Next, subroutine to get growth curve and crossing time 
c for one initial crack size, for given C, m'. 
c 
subroutine aget(aOia,tivec,ntiv,af,tgia, 
& ntacia,atvec,kprint) 
implicit real»8(a-h,o-z) 
external fdadt 
dimension tivec(ntiv),atvec(ntiv) 
dimension y(l) ,work(9),iwork(5) 
data zero/0.OdOO/,relerr/1.Od-4/,abserr/0.OdOO/ 
data neqn/1/ 
data lenw/400/,limit/100/ 
ntacia=ntiv 
call filld(1.3d00*af,atvec,ntiv) 
t=zero 
y(l)=aOia 
c 
c Iterate over potential inspection times. 
do 22 it=l,ntiv 
c 
c Grow crack out to the next potential inspection time. 
c 
tout=tivec(it) 
call arkf45(fdadt,neqn,y,t,tout, 
& relerr,abserr,iflag.work,iwork,kprint) 
c 
c Set last opportunity number for when we leave the loop. 
ntlast=it-l 
if(kprint.ge.5)write(6,422)it,iflag,y,t,tout,iflag 
422 formate in aget»»» y,t,tout,if=',2i5,3gl6.5,2x,i3) 
c 
c Check to see if we have crossed yet. 
c 
atvec(it)=y(l) 
if(atvec(it).ge.af)go to 23 
22 continue 
c 
c Growth curve did not cross by last opportunity. 
228 
c Set up to find crossing time directly by integration. 
c 
ntlast=ntiv 
go to 24 
c 
c If we have crossed, go back and find the point 
c by direct integration, starting at previous point below 
c 
23 if(ntlast.gt.O)go to 24 
c 
c If we had a crossing before the first inspection, 
c find the crossing point by direct integration, 
c starting at zeto. 
c 
tlast=zero 
alast=aOia 
go to 25 
c 
c Get the previous time and the endpoints for integration 
c from the previous time point. 
c 
24 tlast=tivec(ntlast) 
alast =atvec(ntlast) 
c 
c Get the crossing time by direct integration. 
c 
c \int_{alast}"{aif}dadti(a)da and add time to tlast. 
c 
25 call tgetCtlast,alast,af,tgia,kprint) 
c 
c Debug write. 
c 
if(kprint.ge.4)write(6,433)ntiv,ntlast, 
& tlast,alast,af,tgia 
433 formate •••éifter tget»»tl,al,af ,tg=',2i5,4gl5.6) 
return 
end 
c 
subroutine arkf45(fdadt,neqn,y,t.tout, 
& relerr,abserr,iflag,work,iwork,kprint) 
c 
c 
c wrap-around for rfk4S to handle exceptional conditions 
c 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
external fdadt 
dimension work(l),iwork(l),y(l) 
101 iflag=l 
229 
tin=t 
call rkf45(fdadt,neqn,y,t,tout, 
& relerr,abserr,iflag,work,iwork) 
go to (100,100,300,300,500,500,500,500).iflag 
c 
c Reset and try again. 
c 
300 continue 
if(kprint.ge.l)write(6,422)y,tin,tout.iflag 
go to 101 
c 
c Serious problem—return. 
c 
500 continue 
422 formate in arkf45»** y.tin.tout,if='.3gl6.5.2x.i3) 
return 
100 continue 
if(kprint.ge.5) write(6.422)y.tin,tout.iflag 
return 
end 
c 
subroutine tget(tlast,alast,af,tgia.kprint) 
c 
c 
c Get the crossing time by direct integration. 
c 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
external fdadti 
dimension work(400).iwork(lOO) 
data limit/100/,lenH/400/ 
data zero/0.OdOO/.epsrel/1.Od-4/.epsabs/0.OdOO/ 
c 
c Call quadpack routine to do the integration. 
c 
call dqags(fdadti.alast.af.epsabs.epsrel. 
Aresuit.abs err.neval.ier. 
• limit,lenv,last,iyork,work) 
tgia=tlast+result 
if(kprint.ge.7.or.ier.gt.0) 
Awrite(6,455)alast,af.tlast.result.tgia.abserr,neval,ier, last 
455 formate in tget ' ,6gl3.5,3i6) 
return 
end 
c 
subroutine fdadt(t,a.ans) 
c 
c 
c Pairis lao. 
230 
implicit real«8(a-h,o-z) 
dimension a(l),ans(l) 
call getpar(xc,xn) 
ans(1)=xc*(a(1))**xn 
return 
end 
double precision function fdadti(a) 
c 
c 
c •Paris law reciprocal 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-2) 
call getpar(xc,xn) 
fdadti=l.OdOO/(xc*(a)**xn) 
return 
end 
double precision function fpod(a) 
c 
c 
c P.O.D function 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
call getpod(podmu,pods ig,kdpod) 
z=(a-podmu)/podsig 
fpod=phibf(z,kdpod) 
return 
end 
block data 
implicit real*8(a-h,o-z) 
common/hoIdOl/afp,xcp,xnp,podmup,podsip,sigmap,podtpb 
common/hold02/kdpodp 
data afp,xcp,xnp.podmup.podsip,sigmap,podtpb/7*0.OdOO/ 
data kdpodp/O/ 
end 
subroutine putall(pvec) 
implicit realms(a-h,o-z) 
dimension pvec(ll) 
common/holdOl/afp,xcp,xnp,podmup.podsip,sigmap.podtpb 
common/hold02/kdpodp 
podp01=pvec(l) 
podp99=pvec(2) 
231 
xkdpod=pvec(3) 
kdpodp=xkdpod+.01 
podtpb=pvec(7) 
podsip=(podp99-podp01)/ 
& (quant(1.OdOO-podtpb,kdpodp)-quant(podtpb,kdpodp)) 
podinup=podpO 1 -quant (podtpb, kdpodp) »podsip 
xcp=pvec(4) 
xnp=pvec(5) 
afp=pvec(6) 
siginap=pvec(10) 
return 
entry put5(pvec) 
xnp=pvec(5) 
return 
entry put4(pvec) 
xcp=pvec(4) 
return 
entry getaf(af) 
af=afp 
return 
entry getsig(sigma) 
sigma=sigmap 
return 
entry getpar(xc,xn) 
xc=xcp 
xn=xnp 
return 
entry getpod(podaiu,podsig,kdpod) 
podmu=podmup 
podsig=podsip 
kdpod=kdpodp 
return 
end 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
A first order fatigue reliability model is considered where the crack growth obeys 
a deterministic Paris-Erdogan law. Using first principles arguments of probability, 
the continuous and discrete parts for the probability distribution of the service life 
length T" of a component under nondestructive inspections are established on the basis 
of the model assumptions. Then, they are used to express several figures of merit, 
i.e., the expected service life length, the expected service life cost, the approximate 
cost per unit of service time, the cumulative distribution function of the service life 
length, the cumulative failure probability, the hazard function, and the mean time 
between failures. The exact expression of the hazard function with inspections shows 
that the improvement of the hazard function due to inspections depends on the initial 
crack size probability distribution. A program in the S-plus language, interfaced with 
Fortran computational routines, is developed so that crack growth, time to failure 
distribution and hazard function can be ctilculated and plotted. An example is worked 
out of where failure probabilities are very low. A minimum number of inspections 
is set up so that the hazard does not cross a given critical level. It shows how the 
crossing of the critical hazard function level can be avoided by increasing the number 
of inspections unless the slope of the hazard function becomes so large that it grows 
to the critical value in a time smaller than the inspections opportunities spacing. 
235 
The first order model is then generalized by considering a general degradation 
problem where several parameters are allowed to be random and where inspections 
are scheduled dynamically, on the basis of the current observations of the compo­
nent. Thus, the continuous and discrete part of the service life length probability 
distribution of a component subject to degradation failure and submitted to nonde­
structive inspections are derived. The important case is considered where the figure 
of merit for the component reliability as well as the reliability criterion for scheduling 
the future inspection are based on the hazard function.. As a tool for the dynamic 
inspection scheduling, the hazard function is updated by using the posterior failure 
time density, and thus the corresponding posterior hazard function. Formulae are in­
volved, discarding closed form solutions for the outputs expressions, and, even using 
numerical analysis, it is useful to analyze these outputs for some restricted cases of 
specific interest. 
A computer code, interfacing the S-plus and Fortran languages, is developed 
that generalizes the one used in the first paper by considering a degradation process 
with a random initial level of degradation distribution and such that the degradation 
growth parameters are random with known bivariate probability distribution. Ser­
vice life length distribution and hazard function are calculated and plotted so that 
the behavior of these functions may be analyzed both numerically and graphically. 
Numerical examples are given for crack growth degradation cases where the Paris 
parameters probability distribution is a bivariate normal. Two sets of real data, 
where degradation is a fatigue crack growth process, are used for illustration. The 
graphical analysis of the reliability turns out to be very useful in the sense that it 
provides immediate insights as to the failure behavior of the component. 
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We list next some possible topics for further works: 
Study the hazard function dependence on the initial crack size distribution, for 
different values of the key parameters. 
Perform a cost analysis. 
Extend the computer code so that the effect of measuring a level of degrada­
tion at inspection, and having rejection based on this observed value may be 
compared to the simple "detection = rejection" model. 
Extend the computer code so that properties of the dynamic scheduling of 
inspections may be studied numerically. 
Consider optimization problems, e.g., minimize the cost per unit of time subject 
to some reliability restriction or optimize the hazard function behavior for a 
given number of inspections to be scheduled. 
Modify the computer code so that other reliability figures like the failure time 
cumulative probability distribution or failure time quantiles are evaluated. 
Consider the degradation as a stochastic process. 
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